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Introduction 
What is the research interest of this dissertation? 
The professionalisation of political campaigning in general and of election campaigning in 
particular has become a popular subject of research, especially among European scholars. 
Studies have analysed form, degree and causes of professionalised campaigning in single 
case studies (cf. for example Gibson & Römmele 2009; Strömbäck 2009; Lisi 2011) as well 
as from a comparative perspective (cf. Tenscher et al. 2012). Nevertheless, two 
fundamental research desiderata still remain.  
The first concerns the theoretical foundation of the research area. In the existing research it 
remains unclear what the “bigger story” behind campaign professionalisation is, why 
campaign professionalisation is measured and analysed as it is, and how the phenomenon 
fits a larger theoretical framework. I argue that this lack of theoretical foundation is a 
millstone around the neck of campaign professionalisation research as it hinders a more 
profound understanding of the phenomenon of campaign professionalisation, and in 
particular, why campaign professionalisation occurs and by which factors it is influenced. 
Furthermore, the repeated critique that professionalisation researchers leave unclear the 
validity of the measuring instruments for professionalised campaigning 
(“professionalisation indices”) can be traced back to the restraints of theoretical 
substantiation. As it remains uncertain, from a theoretical perspective, why the respective 
indicators are included in the professionalisation indices, the existing indices have been 
criticised for not being exhaustive, for leaving the matter of the legitimacy of the individual 
indicators unclear, for only applying to election campaigning and not to political 
communication in general, and for being time bound (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 13f.). 
Furthermore, “theoretically and empirically, it is unclear if an additive index adequately 
reflects degrees of professional campaigning” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165). Rather, single 
components may “have to be weighted accordingly – or perhaps intentional withdrawing 
of components may sometimes be a better indicator for professional campaigning than 
adding up the elements” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165). 
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The second research desideratum concerns the “why” behind campaign 
professionalisation, that is, the factors that influence and explain campaign 
professionalisation. Existing results concerning the circumstances under which campaign 
professionalisation occurs are currently unsatisfactory, or, as Tenscher and colleagues put 
it, “the hunt for good explanatory variables continues“ (Tenscher et al. 2012: 159). While a 
wide range of explanatory factors for campaign professionalisation has been raised from 
hypothetical perspectives, there have only been a handful of studies which systematically 
test potential explanatory factors. The results of these studies were partially contradictory 
and their interpretation has remained cursory. What is more, existing research suggests that 
there are at least two groups of explanatory variables: those located at the level of the party 
and those at the systemic level. As Strömbäck (2007: 98) asserts: 
„In other words, party behaviour at any point in time should be perceived as a combination of 
systemic and environmental factors, and internal factors tied to specific party types and party 
goals. In the context of political campaigning, the degree of professionalisation can partly be 
explained by systemic and environmental factors – some of which affect all parties roughly to 
the same extent – and internal factors – which vary across parties within a particular 
political system.”  
However, it remains unclear from existing research how the systemic and party levels are 
related. In which way do factors from both levels interact? Do the systemic factors 
determine a framework in which the party level factors have an effect; or is it the other way 
round?  
How, might the reader wonder, do these research desiderata matter, other than in regard to 
scientific discourse within a rather confined research area? I argue that elucidating the 
“bigger picture” and the theoretical framework of campaign professionalisation, as well as 
determining the conditions by which campaigns become professionalised, is not only of 
scientific interest but has become a topic of concern from a democratic and participatory 
point of view. On the one hand, the professionalisation of election campaigning is 
considered a necessity, as well as a vehicle for the hopes and expectations of political 
parties. Parties feel the need to keep pace with modernisation and developments in new 
communication technologies, and they must also cope with tendencies towards 
nonalignment and ever-weaker bounds between parties and the electorate. As Holtz-Bacha 
argues, today’s political actors must use all available strategic and technological 
communication techniques and instruments in order to survive within an age of excessive 
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supply of information and the rival, and potentially more interesting offers of the media, as 
well as to ensure legitimacy for their action (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 15f.). When the number 
of swing voters and late deciders increase election campaigns become more important for 
political parties. Professionalised campaign communication involving more direct 
communication with voters and party members, and utilising a wide and targeted variety of 
campaign instruments, is necessary and expected in order to facilitate the mobilisation of 
the electorate and the party members.  
On the other hand, there are concerns among scholars that campaign professionalisation 
might not be the cure, but rather the cause of increasing electoral abstentions if it 
encompasses an increasing reliance on mass media, direct mail and commercial telephone 
banks (cf. Green & Smith 2003: 324). Maarek raises similar concerns (2004: 220): “The 
final long-term drawback resulting from the excessive professionalisation of political 
communication forms part of the explanation for the recent decline in voting turnout in 
many countries.” Scepticism is also formed due to the growing centralisation of campaign 
responsibility in the hands of a small group of party officials and/or professional 
campaigners, and to the exclusion of party members from campaigning procedures: 
“Would it lead to – and is it a cause of – heightened levels of distrust and disenchantment 
as the parties, led by professionals, fight it out? (…) Will greater professionalisation drive 
away the committed amateur?” (Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007: 23). Therefore, from the 
perspective of inner-party and civic democracy and participation, it is still unclear whether 
campaign professionalisation is a necessary and successful strategy for parties by which to 
re-establish and reinforce their relation to their voters and members in an environment for 
campaigning that is apparently becoming more challenging, or whether it is one of the 
reasons for more problematic mobilisation and turnout. Hence, it is crucial to understand 
why, for which purpose and under which circumstances parties turn to professionalise their 
election campaigns.  
Tying in with the described research desiderata and accounting for the social and political 
relevance of the topic, this dissertation aims to make two contributions to campaign 
professionalisation research. The first contribution is to propose a theoretical foundation. I 
will argue that sociological neo-institutionalism is a valuable theoretical foundation for 
campaign professionalisation and that fruitful and important insights can be gained for 
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professionalisation research by analysing and conceptualising campaign professionalisation 
from a neo-institutionalist perspective. From a neo-institutionalist perspective, the 
professionalisation of election campaigns can be defined as the process by which political 
parties adapt their campaigns to the real or perceived changes and expectations of the 
relevant environments for campaigning, in order to ensure on-going support and legitimacy 
from these environments. While existing research generally understands the 
professionalisation of election campaigns to be the result of parties adapting to “new and 
continually changing circumstances” (Negrine 2007: 29; cf. also Holtz-Bacha 2010: 15f.), I 
argue based on a sociological neo-institutionalism framework that four relevant electoral 
environments can be differentiated: the voters, the members, the media, and other parties. 
It can be deduced by drawing on a sociological neo-institutionalism framework that first, 
election campaigns are not necessarily professionalised to the same degree in relation to all 
four relevant electoral environments, and, second, that different environments provide 
different pressures and incentives to adapt campaign activities in accordance with 
institutional expectations. Hence, an aggregated or additive measurement instrument (or, in 
other words, an aggregated professionalisation index) bears the risk of creating inaccurate 
results, both with regard to the degree of professionalisation of election campaigns, and in 
relation to the causal conditions that lead to campaign professionalisation (i.e., the 
independent variables or explanatory factors in correlational terms). Therefore, I propose 
to measure campaign professionalisation by utilising differentiated indices, in contrast to 
existing studies which group all indicators, and endeavour to capture the parties’ 
adaptations to changes in their environments (or in other words, their campaign 
professionalisation), by combining them in one professionalisation index.  
The second contribution of my dissertation is to shed light on the explanatory factors for 
professionalised election campaigning, by analysing these factors in relation to both 
campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept (i.e., measured by an aggregated 
professionalisation index) as well as in regard to the four most relevant electoral 
environments constituted by the voters, members, media, and other parties. Factors on 
both the systemic and the party level will be included in the analysis.  
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How will this dissertation proceed in order to tackle the research interest? 
In order to tackle this two-fold research interest, the present dissertation draws on a 
combination of three methods. First, semi-structured interviews with the campaign 
managers of the five major Swiss parties in five cantons (i.e., the regional entities below the 
national level) were conducted, focusing on campaign communication and organisation 
during the last campaign for the elections to the cantonal parliament. This resulted in a 
sample of 23 cantonal election campaigns as two cantonal party branches refused to reveal 
details about their campaigns. The Swiss cantons are of particular value to comparative 
research, forming as Vatter puts it, an “extraordinary research laboratory within a small 
space” (Vatter 2007: 148). Belonging to the same national entity of Switzerland, the 26 
Swiss cantons nevertheless differ considerably with regard to their political systems, socio-
economic structures and political legacies (cf. Vatter 2007: 148). Hence, the cantons 
concurrently offer a strong degree of comparative equivalence and variation in context 
factors. Data from various cantons thus provides ideal grounds for a comparative analysis 
across different contexts (cf. Lachat & Sciarini 2002: 45).  
Second, the interview transcripts were content analysed using five different codebooks. 
The first contained indicators for campaign professionalisation with the coding procedure 
resulting in index scores for each of the 23 campaigns on an aggregated professionalisation 
index. The other four codebooks, one for each relevant electoral environment, resulted in 
an index score for each of the 23 campaigns on the four indices reflecting the degree of 
professionalisation with regard to the environments constituted by the voters, the 
members, the media and other parties.  
Finally, the resulting data was analysed with the help of fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA), which is the most advanced among the so-called set theoretic methods. 
The main reasons for choosing QCA as a method for data analysis are the following. First, 
it is particularly suitable for analysing complex causal patterns in the presence of few cases 
(cf. Emmenegger 2011: 343). This is an extremely valuable feature for the research 
purposes of this dissertation as we have a medium number of 23 cases at hand, and are 
interested in discovering which factors, at both the party and systemic level, influence 
campaign professionalisation as well as how they may interact. QCA allows for testing 
combinations of explanatory variables, for revealing necessary and sufficient conditions for 
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professionalised campaigning, and for revealing differing explanatory patterns. Second, the 
relation between the outcome (i.e., the dependent variable in correlational analysis terms) 
and the causal conditions (i.e., the independent variables) can be modelled as 
subset/superset relations. I will confirm what this means, and why it is important, through 
the course of this study. Third, the version fuzzy set (fs) QCA allows the calibration of 
both the causal conditions and the outcome. This means that the set membership of the 23 
cases in both the outcome and the causal conditions can be refined based on empirical and 
theoretical evidence, resulting in a multi value scale (we will see in Chapter 5.2 what this 
means exactly). When dealing with degrees of campaign professionalisation, this reflects the 
empirical reality of the data better than a dichotomous measurement, which only 
differentiates between professionalised and non-professionalised campaigns. Five analyses 
will be conducted for five different outcomes: campaign professionalisation as an 
aggregated concept and campaign professionalisation in relation to each of the four 
electoral environments. The causal conditions which were chosen to be tested in the 
analysis based on theoretical reasoning and existing research, will be the same in each 
analysis: 
• The campaign is organised in a large canton. 
• The campaign is organised in an urbanised canton.  
• The campaign is organised in a canton with close competition in the cantonal 
parliament. 
• The campaign is organised by a right-wing party. 
• The campaign is organised by a catch-all party. 
Based on the theoretical foundation of this dissertation, it is assumed that there are 
different combinations of causal conditions (or, in other words, different causal paths) that 
produce professionalisation as an aggregated concept and campaign professionalisation 
with regard to each of the environments. 
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What are the central findings of this dissertation? 
This dissertation will reveal that, based on the theoretical foundation provided by 
sociological neo-institutionalism, the professionalisation of election campaigns can be 
defined as a process by which political parties adapt their campaigns to the real or 
perceived changes and expectations of the relevant environments for campaigning, in order 
to ensure receiving on-going support and legitimacy from these environments. The most 
relevant environments for campaigning are constituted by the voters, members, media, and 
other parties. The empirical analysis that is performed with fsQCA, in order to explain 
campaign professionalisation in the 23 cantonal election campaigns in my sample, will 
show that there are different causal paths leading to campaign professionalisation as an 
aggregated concept and with regard to each of the four relevant electoral environments:  
• The solution formula leading to campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept is 
dominated by the condition being organised in a large canton, which produces the 
outcome in combination with the conditions being organised by a non-right-wing party, 
being organised by a non-catch-all party and not being organised in a competitive environment. 
When the campaign does not take place in a large canton, professionalised 
campaigns are still organised as an adaptation to a changing environment for 
campaigning, when a combination of incentives, at both the systemic (urbanised and 
competitive environments) and party level (being organised by a catch-all party), reinforce the 
pressures to adapt to these changes. 
• An urban environment is a key incentive at the systemic level for organising a 
campaign that is professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the voters. 
What is more, the causal conditions being organised in a competitive canton and being 
organised in a large canton context enhance the urgency to professionalise the 
campaigns with regard to the environment of the voters. At the party level, catch-all 
parties are under stronger pressure to professionalise their campaigns in regard to 
the voters. Non-catch-all parties also organise campaigns that are professionalised with 
regard to the voters but require stronger incentives at the systemic level (the 
campaign has to be organised in a large, urban, and competitive canton) to do so. 
Non-right-wing parties are more inclined than right-wing parties to professionalise 
their campaigns with regard to voters. 
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• Adapting election campaigns to changes in the environment constituted by the members 
(which are similar to those concerning the voters and include declining numbers of 
party members and more difficult mobilisation) is important, first, for non-right-wing 
parties in a non-urban environment in large cantons and, second, when the election takes 
place in an urban and large canton. For catch-all parties, professionalising the campaign 
with regard to the members is more urgent when the campaign is organised in a 
competitive and urban environment.  
• Professionalising the campaign with regard to the environment constituted by the media is 
more important to catch-all parties, especially the case when the campaign is 
organised in an urban context, as well as when the campaign is organised in a large 
canton, or in a competitive environment. Non-right-wing parties professionalise their 
campaign with regard to the media when the campaign has to address a large and 
scattered audience in a large canton even if there is no competitive situation in the 
cantonal parliament. Right-wing parties require more environmental incentives in 
order to professionalise their campaigns with regard to the media. They must be 
faced with a competitive situation in an urban environment and target a large and 
scattered audience in a large canton.  
• Due to the small number of cases in the outcome set, the analysis was able to 
explain only a certain aspect of campaign professionalisation in regard to the 
environment constituted by other parties. Catch-all parties are not protected from 
competition and therefore professionalise their campaign with regard to other 
parties when the campaign takes place in a competitive and urban environment. 
The results confirm that campaign professionalisation is a strategy that parties rely on in 
order to adapt to challenges they are confronted with due to changes in the four most 
relevant electoral environments. What is more, the results clearly show that each 
environment provokes a different adaptation due to the different incentives and 
expectations it presents for a campaign. In conjunction, the theoretical reasoning and 
empirical results of the present dissertation suggest that campaign professionalisation 
should be considered a differentiated concept and hence be measured with differentiated 
indices.  
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How is this dissertation structured? 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured in three parts. Part I presents the theoretical 
foundation of this study. Chapter 1 aims to familiarise the reader with the central topic of 
this study: the professionalisation of election campaigning. First, I offer a brief 
recapitulation of the origins of the notion “professionalisation” and how it became 
established within political communication terminology (Chapter 1.1). The second part of 
the chapter outlines how professionalisation has been defined and measured in existing 
research (Chapters 1.2.1 and 1.2.2), while also clarifying the differentiation between the 
professionalisation of election campaigning and political marketing (Chapter 1.2.3). Finally, 
a synthesis of this chapter draws on conclusions gained by considering the existing 
definitions and operationalisations of campaign professionalisation and explains how the 
present dissertation will be applied to them. The synthesis also identifies some interesting, 
but until now neglected, aspects of the existing research and shows how this dissertation 
will pursue these loose ends (Chapter 1.3). Chapter 2 draws on sociological neo-
institutionalism in order to propose a theoretical foundation for the professionalisation of 
election campaigning. In Chapter 2.1, the reader is offered an introduction to the 
theoretical approach constituted by sociological neo-institutionalism. Campaign 
professionalisation will then be considered from a neo-institutionalist perspective and three 
main conclusions are drawn (Chapters 2.2.1 to 2.2.3). It will be suggested that by 
professionalising their campaigns parties adapt to real or perceived pressures to change in 
relation to their four most important electoral environments (voters, members, media and 
other parties). For reason of argument, the causal conditions that influence campaign 
professionalisation will be briefly introduced here and then discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 3. Summing up the theoretical reasoning presented to this point, I finally propose 
a definition for the professionalisation of election campaigns (Chapter 2.2.4). Chapter 2.3 
turns to the measurement of campaign professionalisation and first discusses two 
conclusions that follow from theoretical insights presented thus far and from existing 
research: measurement of campaign professionalisation should differentiate between 
environments (Chapter 2.3.1) and take the context that the campaign is organised in into 
consideration (Chapter 2.3.2). Chapter 2.3.3 then presents the measuring instrument for 
campaign professionalisation to be used in this study. The first part of this dissertation 
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concludes with Chapter 3, which focuses on the causal conditions for campaign 
professionalisation. After presenting the current state of research engaged with outlining 
the explanatory factors for campaign professionalisation (3.1), the five causal conditions 
that will be analysed in this study are introduced, including their theoretical substantiation 
(Chapters 3.2 and 3.3; an overview of the operationalisation and calibration of these causal 
conditions can be found in Chapter 7). The hypotheses underlying this study are presented 
in Chapter 3.4. Finally, Chapter 3.5 utilises two schemes in order to visualise the general 
theoretical model underlying the present dissertation as well as the hypothesised relations 
between the outcome (the professionalisation of election campaigning) and the causal 
conditions. 
The database and methodological approach are presented in Part II. Chapter 4 describes 
the database for the outcome and how it was created by conducting semi-structured 
interviews and a content analysis of the interview transcripts (Chapter 4.1). Chapter 4.2 
describes the database for the causal conditions that was established with the help of 
secondary data (Chapter 4.2). Chapter 5 outlines the methodological approach for the data 
analysis of the study in hand, that is fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). 
As readers may not be familiar with this approach, Chapter 5 offers a methodological 
introduction to fsQCA. 
Part III focuses on the empirical heart of this study. Before turning to the analysis of the 
conditions that influence the professionalisation of Swiss cantonal election campaigns 
(Chapter 8), Chapter 6 and 7 present descriptive results in regard to campaign 
professionalisation in the 23 campaigns included in this study. Chapter 6 shows how 
campaign professionalisation is used as a strategy of adaptation to environmental 
challenges from the perspectives of the campaign managers in the cantonal election 
campaigns included in the present study. Chapter 7 indicates to what degree campaigns are 
professionalised on an aggregate level (Chapter 7.1) and in relation to the four relevant 
electoral environments (Chapter 7.2). The results are discussed from the perspective of 
both the indicators (in order to determine which characteristics of professionalised 
campaigning are most common in the 23 cantonal election campaigns included in this 
study) (Chapter 7.3) and that of the campaigns (comparing the index scores that the 
individual campaigns achieved with regard to profes
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and with regard to each of the four environments) (Chapter 7.4). Following the same 
approach applied in Chapter 2.3.1, the results are then analysed to determine which 
environments the cantonal election campaigns have been professionalised towards most 
intensively (Chapter 7.5). 
Chapter 8 begins with an explanation of how the principles and method of fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) are applied in order to extract causal formulas 
that lead to professionalised campaigning in the 23 cantonal election campaigns of this 
study (Chapter 8.1). Chapter 8.1.1 stipulates the conceptual basis of the research design by 
outlining how the professionalisation of election campaigns, as well as the conditions 
influencing them, can be modelled as subset/superset relations. The subsequent chapters 
focus on the calibration of the outcome (Chapter 8.1.2) and of the causal conditions 
(Chapter 8.1.3). These subjects of inquiry are included at this point in the dissertation 
because, as the reader will surmise, the application of the method is so closely linked to the 
results of the analysis that both can be better comprehended when presented in direct 
sequence. Chapter 8.2 provides the results of the fsQCA analysis for campaign 
professionalisation as an aggregated concept, stating both the necessary (Chapter 8.2.1) and 
sufficient conditions (Chapter 8.2.2). Chapter 8.3 does the same for the four differentiated 
outcomes: the necessary and sufficient conditions for professionalisation are conveyed in 
regard to the electoral environments constituted by the voters (Chapter 8.3.1), members 
(Chapter 8.3.2), media (Chapter 8.3.3) and other parties (Chapter 8.3.4). Chapter 8.4 gives 
and overview over the results and they are discussed in Chapter 8.5. 
The conclusion provides a summary of the proceedings of the study and its core findings. 
Critical discussion is offered concerning both the theoretical and methodological 
approaches of this dissertation, while also addressing the validity of the causal paths leading 
to campaign professionalisation in other contexts, as well as considering the central 
question of whether campaign professionalisation should be conceptualised and measured 
by differentiation per environment rather than in an aggregated manner. Finally, limitations 
of the present study as well as challenges and perspectives for future research are discussed.  
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Part I: Theoretical Foundation 
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1. Professionalisation of election campaigns – a rather fuzzy concept 
This chapter aims to familiarise the reader with the central topic of this study: the 
professionalisation of election campaigning. The chapter first briefly recapitulates the 
origins of the notion of “professionalisation” and how this concept has been assimilated 
into political communication terminology (Chapter 1.1). The second section illustrates how 
professionalisation has been defined and measured in the existing research (Chapters 1.2.1 
and 1.2.2), as well as clarifying the differentiation between the professionalisation of 
election campaigning and political marketing (Chapter 1.2.3). Finally, a synthesis of this 
chapter draws a conclusion from the existing definitions and operationalisations of 
campaign professionalisation and explains how the dissertation will engage with these 
existing definitions and operationalisations. The chapter’s synthesis also identifies some 
noteworthy, yet until recently neglected, aspects of the existing research and asserts how 
this dissertation will pursue these loose ends (Chapter 1.3). 
 
1.1 A brief history of the term 
Before presenting a brief history of the origin of the term professionalisation three general 
remarks regarding the term must be made. First, as election campaigns have been 
transformed throughout the last few decades, changes in campaign communication and 
organisation have become widely recognised realities and actively studied topics of 
research. Several notions have been employed to describe processes of change in electoral 
campaigning: modernisation (see e.g. Swanson & Mancini 1996; Römmele 2005), 
Americanisation (see e.g. Swanson & Mancini 1996, Römmele 2005; Plasser 2000, 2002), 
political marketing1 (see e.g. Strömbäck 2007; Lees-Marshment 2001), and the transformation 
from labour intensive to capital-intensive campaigns (cf. Farrell 1996: 168). In recent years, a 
coherent branch of research has evolved around the notion of professionalisation. Since this 
dissertation engages with the findings and desiderata of this branch of research, it will also 
employ the term professionalisation. However, the author remains open to other, or better, 
terms for describing changes in election campaigning.  
                                                 
1 Amongst these notions, professionalisation and political marketing have been used most extensively. As 
both notions appear to encapsulate different concepts, I will elaborate further on the differentiation of 
professionalisation and political marketing in Chapter 1.2.3.  
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Second, as the term professionalisation has become a popular identifier for describing 
changes and trends in election campaigning, its scholarly use by far exceeds the work 
undertaken concerning its conceptual and operational definition. In other words, the term 
professionalisation is occasionally used without describing what exactly the researcher 
means by the term, how he or she defines it, or how the term has been operationalised (this 
is the case, for example, in Maarek 2004, 2007). Articles and books of this kind are not 
included in the present dissertation and therefore do not appear in the following discussion 
of the present state of research. This makes the elaboration of the state of research less 
comprehensive, regrettably, but without knowing how campaign professionalisation is 
conceptualised, defined and measured in the studies we are concerned with it is impossible 
to evaluate if they address the same phenomenon. This makes it difficult to coordinate with 
the research, bringing about the risk of relating to findings and insights that were reached 
by way of theoretical and conceptual premises different from the present study.  
Third, readers will note that the empirical analysis in the present study measures campaign 
professionalisation at only one point in time. Subsequently, this study does not retrace the 
professionalisation of election campaigns in the five sample cantons over time. It will, 
however, analyse how professionalised the campaigns were during the time of this study as 
well as clarify the different degrees and profiles of campaign professionalisation. Therefore, 
in the context of this dissertation, professionalisation must be examined in relation to the 
degree by which it is applied to a current campaign, not as a reconstruction of the process 
within a specific time frame. Zucker (1977: 728) argued, in regard to the term 
institutionalisation, that  
“(…) institutionalization is both a process and a property variable. It is the process by which 
individual actors transmit what is socially defined as real and, at the same time, at any point 
in the process the meaning of an act can be defined as more or less taken-for-granted part of 
the social reality.” 
The same logic may be applied to the term professionalisation. Hence, this dissertation 
deals with professionalisation as a property variable of Swiss cantonal election campaigns 
as it analyses and explains the different levels and profiles of professionalisation that 
cantonal election campaigns engage in. Readers who are German fluent may also wish to 
refer to Donges (2008: 114ff.) who applies the two-fold conceptualisation of process and 
state to the term “Medialisierung” (medialisation).   
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The existing research dealing with the professionalisation of election campaigning 
originates primarily from the work of European scholars, perhaps as Strömbäck notes, 
because “campaigns in the United States are more advanced than in other countries, and 
because it is hence more or less taken for granted that political campaigns in the United 
States have become professionalised” (Strömbäck 2009: 96). Professionalisation is 
originally a sociological term, which refers to the process in which an occupation becomes 
a profession. While the inclusion of professionals (such as spin doctors, public relations 
consultants, etc.) in election campaigns is indeed part of all existing operationalisations of 
professionalisation, the concept of professionalised campaigns (as far as we can speak of 
one concept, cf. Chapter 1.2) goes far beyond this aspect. This is in large part due to the fact 
that professionalism among European parties more often originates from within the party 
organisation than from without (cf. e.g. Esser et al. 2000: 212). Mancini thereby concluded 
that, „in most European countries, because of their different cultural and political contexts, 
the management of the campaign is rarely consigned to outside professionals who are not 
part of the party apparatus” (Mancini 1999: 238). While the overall level of campaign 
centralisation, with campaign tasks and decisions centralised in the hands of a small but 
powerful group of campaign managers, is not necessarily lower than in the United States, 
this “overall management typically is assigned to someone within or close to the party“ 
(Mancini 1999: 238): 
„In some cases, party bureaucrats themselves try to master the new technologies and skills 
needed to operate successfully in the competitive arena. In the meantime, they seek the support 
of external technicians for specific tasks and goals.“ (Mancini 1999: 243) 
Whereas we may assume that this characteristic would have changed over time, more 
recent case studies suggest that political communication experts employed in campaigns are 
in the majority of cases, party members, party officers, or at least persons in some way 
affiliated to the particular party (for the German case cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 14; for Greece 
cf. Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007: 19). “The difference is that their political marketing 
techniques have been adapted to the new communication landscape.“ (Papathanassopoulos 
et al. 2007: 19) 
Thus, in view of the fact that the inclusion of external professionals does not alone 
effectively account for the development of campaigns in the European context, scholars 
have broadened their analysis of professionalisation and now focus “less on measuring the 
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competence and skills of individual members and more on the shifts taking place in the 
overall ethos of the organization and the tools and resources that are typically relied upon” 
(Gibson & Römmele 2009: 268). To be precise, it is mainly the characteristics of campaign 
organisation and communication that are drawn upon when analysing campaign 
professionalisation. However, presently there is no commonly accepted definition of 
professionalised campaigning. Rather, three “trends” are apparent within scholarship 
applied to the concept of campaign professionalisation. First, thus far, there have been few 
attempts to offer a concise, coherent definition of campaign professionalisation (see 
Chapter 1.2). Second, scholars have attempted to encapsulate campaign professionalisation 
via its components by proposing operationalisations regarding the measurement of 
campaign professionalisation (see Chapter 1.2.1). In the majority of cases these 
operationalisations are not accompanied by a more general definition of campaign 
professionalisation. Third, professionalisation is described as an adaptation to a changing 
environment in relation to campaign communication, often without specifying the exact 
form or characteristics of this adaptation (see Chapter 1.2.2). 
 
1.2 Definitions and operationalisations of campaign professionalisation 
Strömbäck (2007: 54), to date, has proposed the most comprehensive definition of 
professionalised political campaigning: 
„Professionalized political campaigning is characterized by being permanent, although with 
varying intensity; by the central campaign headquarters being able to coordinate the messages 
and the management of the campaign; and by using expertise in analyzing and reaching out 
to members, target groups and stakeholders, in analyzing its own and competitors’ 
weaknesses and strengths and making use of that knowledge, and in news management.“  
In a later article, Strömbäck applies a condensed version of this definition by contending 
that, “it appears reasonable to think of the professionalisation of political campaigning 
mainly in terms of the use of different sophisticated campaign techniques, the use of 
expertise in applying these campaign techniques and the management of political 
campaigning“ (Strömbäck 2009: 97). Referring to Lilleker and Negrine (2002), Strömbäck 
and colleagues furthermore conclude that, “in fact, the essence of professionalization can 
be described as the ‘specialization of tasks’ and the ‘increased use of experts’ (Lilleker and 
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Negrine, 2002: 102)” (Strömbäck et al. 2013: 43). In an earlier definition, Esser and 
colleagues focus on management and expertise by defining campaign professionalisation as 
“(1) central planning and controlling of all campaign communication activities as a part of 
an integrated communication strategy that follows the pattern of commercial PR and 
advertising campaigns; (2) employment of professional experts in PR, marketing, 
advertising and polling in spite of relying on non-professional party members” (Esser et al. 
2000: 212). Tenscher defines professionalised campaigning as a permanent and strategic 
management of communication (cf. Tenscher 2008: 110; cf. Tenscher 2011: 68). Holtz-
Bacha identifies professionalisation as an intensive use of a multitude of campaign 
instruments (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 14) and the use of all available strategic and 
technological communication instruments (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 15).  
 
1.2.1 The operational definitions: professionalisation indices 
Gibson and Römmele (2001, 2009) and Tenscher (2007, 2011) have proposed operational 
definitions or professionalisation indices. Strömbäck’s (2007, 2009) indices are based on the 
index formulated by Gibson and Römmele. Tenscher, Mykkänen and Moring (2012) utilise 
an index very similar to the one proposed by Tenscher. Both groups of indices focus 
mainly on aspects of campaign communication and organisation and contain similarities, 
for example, in the stressing of the meaning of so-called direct communication 
(“narrowcasting” (Tenscher), “use of telemarketing for contracting own members and 
outside target groups”, “use of direct mail to own members and outside target groups”, 
(Gibson & Römmele)), opposition research, and the externalisation or outsourcing of 
headquarters and consultants. However overall, the two solutions for operationalising 
campaign professionalisation contain so many different indicators that they could scarcely 
come to the same results if applied to the same case. 
Gibson and Römmele’s motivation to propose an index for measuring campaign 
professionalisation was to provide a tool that included, “indicators that adequately capture 
the concept of professionalized campaigning in a broader generic sense” (Gibson & 
Römmele 2009: 269), thereby allowing for systematic and comprehensive comparative 
analyses of campaign professionalisation. They proposed to employ the following 
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indicators by which to measure campaign professionalisation (cf. Gibson & Römmele 
2001: 39; cf. Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285):  
• Use of telemarketing for contracting own members and outside target groups 
• Use of direct mail to own members and outside target groups 
• Presence of an internal Internet communication system 
• E-mail sign up or subscription list for regular news updates 
• Outside headquarters 
• Continuous campaigning 
• Use of outside public relations/media consultants 
• Use of computerized databases 
• Use of opinion polling 
• Conducting opposition research 
Strömbäck argues that most of the items in the index proposed by Gibson and Römmele 
“concern the use of expertise in applying the marketing techniques that should be available 
to campaigns in most present-day democracies” (Strömbäck 2007: 55). Strömbäck 
therefore proposes a Professionalised Campaign Index based on the index formulated by 
Gibson and Römmele. The index, however, is somewhat modified to better fit the Swedish 
case (cf. Strömbäck 2007: 54):  
• Use of campaign controlled opinion polling 
• Use of campaign controlled focus groups 
• Use of computerised databases 
• Use of in-house expertise and/or outside consultants in news management/public 
relations 
• Use of in-house expertise and/or outside consultants in analysing public opinion 
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• Use of in-house expertise and/or outside consultants in advertisements 
• Use of in-house expertise and/or outside consultants in voter segmentation 
• Use of direct mail to target groups 
• Use of direct mail to own members or campaign volunteers 
• Use of telemarketing for contacting target groups 
• Use of telemarketing for contacting own members or campaign volunteers 
• Conducting semi-independent research of strengths and weaknesses of their own 
campaign 
• Conducting opposition research 
• Use of rapid rebuttal-unit 
• Presence and use of an internal Internet communication system 
• Presence and use of an external Internet communication system 
• E-mail sign-up or subscription lists for regular news updates/news letters 
• Continuous campaigning 
• Centralised campaign headquarters able to coordinate the management of the 
campaign 
In a subsequent study, Strömbäck uses an index to measure campaign professionalisation 
that is more similar to the original index proposed by Gibson & Römmele (2001, 2009). 
Strömbäck (2009: 101) includes the following indicators:  
• Use of telemarketing 
• Use of direct mail 
• E-mail sign-up or electronic newsletters 
• Outside headquarters 
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• Use of external public relations/media consultants 
• Use of computerised databases 
• Use of opinion polling 
• Use of focus groups 
• Opposition research 
• Research of one’s own party or campaign 
• Continuous campaigning 
Tenscher and colleagues argue that in order to measure campaign professionalisation, “a 
model is needed that is independent of temporal or spatial conditions, allows international 
and longitudinal comparisons, and adequately reflects differences in the campaign efforts 
of political parties” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 148). They propose an additive index (cf. 
Tenscher et al. 2012: 161ff.) formerly introduced by Tenscher in his 2007 and 2011 articles 
(which then still included the indicators degree of privatisation and degree of negative 
campaigning) (cf. Tenscher 2007: 70; cf. Tenscher 2011: 72). The more the following 
elements are integrated into an election campaign, the more the campaign can be regarded 
as “professional“ (cf. Tenscher et al. 2012: 148): 
• Size of election campaign budget (election campaign expenditures of each 
individual party per eligible voter) 
• Staff size (number of institutionalised permanent and temporary staff members 
involved in the planning, organization, and implementation of the election 
campaign at the national level) 
• Degree of centralisation of campaign organisation (degree of the centralisation of 
the campaign management (i.e., the organisational, strategic, and thematic 
orientation) in the hands of party leaders on the national level) 
• Degree of externalization (basis of the number of temporary dedicated agencies and 
political consultants/experts occupied with general and/or specific election 
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campaign jobs, such as advertising, news and event management, media planning, 
opinion polling, targeting, Internet campaign, etc.) 
• Differentiation of internal communication structures (existence and the use of 
“new” communication media for internal campaign communication and the 
mobilisation of party members) 
• Nature and degree of feedback (use of two methods employed to test planned 
campaign techniques and to measure target group-specific and representative 
opinions) 
• Degree of opposition research (development of independent structures for the 
monitoring of political opponents) 
• Campaign duration (overall duration of the preparation, the planning, and the 
implementation of the campaign up to Election Day) 
• Degree of targeting (number of target groups that have been identified by the party 
and are to be specifically contacted and mobilised) 
• Degree of narrowcasting activities (number of activities aiming at direct 
communication with target groups) 
• Relevance of paid media (subjective assessment carried out by the campaign 
managers; the persons in charge are asked to rank the significance of different 
advertising media based on a 5-point scale questionnaire (1 = completely 
unimportant to 5 = very important)) 
• Relevance of free media (subjective assessment done by the campaign managers; 
the persons in charge are asked to rank the significance of the presence of their 
party or their front-runner in different media formats based on a 5-point scale 
questionnaire (1 = completely unimportant to 5 = very important)) 
• Relevance of talk shows (subjective assessment carried out by the campaign 
managers; the persons in charge are asked to rank the significance of the presence 
of their front-runner (1) in political talk shows and (2) in entertainment and other 
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non-political talk shows based on a 5-point scale questionnaire (1 = completely 
unimportant to 5 = very important)) 
• Degree of event and news management (subjective assessment carried out by the 
campaign managers; the persons in charge are asked to assess the degree of the 
management of media oriented “pseudo-events” in the party’s campaign) 
• Degree of personalisation (subjective assessment carried out by the campaign 
managers; the persons in charge are asked to assess the significance of their front-
runner compared to issues in the party’s campaign) 
While Tenscher and colleagues proposed using the indicators in an additive manner, they 
go on to propose that, “theoretically and empirically, it is unclear if an additive index 
adequately reflects degrees of professional campaigning” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165; see 
also Tenscher 2007: 70). “Perhaps single components have to be weighted accordingly – or 
perhaps intentional withdrawing of components may sometimes be a better indicator for 
professional campaigning than adding up the elements.” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165) 
Tenscher and colleagues also remark that “although campaign managers’ answers (the 
subjective dimension), in combination with the measurement of some objective 
information, seem to be an appropriate way to tackle the phenomenon of campaign 
professionalism, the set of indicators still has to be controlled for validity“ (Tenscher et al. 
2012: 160). They propose to continue with an additive, but standardised, index “as long as 
these questions of external validity are open” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165). 
 
1.2.2 Campaign professionalisation as an adaptation to a changing environment 
Several scholars dealing with the professionalisation of election campaigning conceptualise 
it as a process of adaptation to a changing environment of political communication. For 
some scholars, adaptation to a changing environment is the theoretical background of 
campaign professionalisation, or the main reason why campaigns become professionalised. 
For others, as we will see, adapting the campaign to a changing environment also is the 
essential component for defining the concept of campaign professionalisation (this is 
especially the case for the definitions by Negrine (2007) and Holtz-Bacha (2007)).  
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According to Tenscher, the professionalisation of political campaigning is a set of 
transformations that can be modelled as a necessary or even inevitable reaction to what can 
be subsumed by the modernisation process. Widespread changes in the political, socio-
cultural and mass media environment of political action, such as individualisation and 
secularisation, de-ideologisation of the electorate, the growing complexity of political 
decision making processes and the differentiation of mass media lead to changes in the way 
political actors communicate (cf. Tenscher 2007: 67). Tenscher and colleagues similarly 
refer to “changes and adaptations” that are “often assembled under the catchword 
‘professionalisation’” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 145).  
Lilleker and Negrine, while expressing scepticism in their 2002 article concerning the term 
professionalisation, argue that “the growing awareness of the need to ‘professionalize‘ political 
communication (…) may be little more than the longer term process by which political 
systems and political actors adapt to the emergence of new media of communication as 
well as to the increasing specialization of tasks common in modern societies” (Lilleker & 
Negrine 2002: 307f). Negrine picks up this idea in a later article by stating that “from the 
perspective of the political party, the professionalisation of political communication can be 
deemed to be the process of adaption by which they change their structures and practices 
in order to meet new and continually changing circumstances and their use of experts in 
order to achieve their goals” (Negrine 2007: 34). Negrine further explains that 
professionalisation may be considered a process of reflection and learning that leads to 
improvement and change. To be a professional, or to act in a professional manner, 
therefore means to engage in a set of practices that are accepted, at particular moments in 
time, as ‘the standards of the best’ and that are acknowledged to be the most appropriate 
for those circumstances (cf. Negrine 2007: 29). He specifies that transitions or 
transformations are, at the least, taking place in relation to “the ways in which political 
parties (…) communicate with their particular constituencies, i.e. displaying a more 
professional style or manner in the ways they communicate” (Negrine 2007: 33), “the 
nature and structure of the organisation, i.e. displaying a more professional organisational 
structure in how they organise their communication activities” (Negrine 2007: 33), and “the 
ways in which they use experts or ‘professionals’ from outside the organisation, be it a 
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political party or government body, to lend support or direct the nature and content of 
communication”, as well as in relation to “the labour market” (Negrine 2007: 33). 
A similar argumentation is followed by Holtz-Bacha (2007: 63):  
“(…) professionalisation of political communication is a process of adaptation to, and as such 
a necessary consequence of, changes in the political system on the one side and the media 
system on the other and in the relationship of the two systems. These changes follow from the 
modernisation of society, which is a development that is still going on and will take place in 
similar political systems sooner or later. Professionalisation in this sense is a general and not 
culture-bound concept. Its actual appearance and the degree of professionalisation in a given 
country are however dependent on a country’s specific social and political structures and 
processes.” 
While employing a less definition-like character in their argument, Esser and colleagues 
make similar references, stating that, “the need to professionalize campaign communication 
management can be traced back to changes in voting behaviour (i.e. dealignment) and 
changes in the media (i.e. expansion and diversification of mass media and the domination 
of politics through mass-communicated messages)” (Esser et al. 2000: 212).  
Papathanassopoulos and colleagues also propose that an important drive behind campaign 
professionalisation is “the need to confront a changing electorate with no particular 
allegiances, as well as the need to find ways to persuade and mobilise them” 
(Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007: 11).  
 
1.2.3 Professionalisation versus political marketing 
Like the professionalisation of election campaigning, the concept of political marketing has 
gained increasing attention in the field of political communication research. While the two 
concepts may bear a certain resemblance, it is of crucial importance to differentiate 
between political marketing and the professionalisation of election campaigns from both a 
theoretical and empirical perspective. In fact, they should be treated as “two separate 
dimensions” (Strömbäck 2007: 62). As I have observed in Chapter 1.2.1, the definitions 
and operationalisations of campaign professionalisation are mainly comprised of the 
characteristics of campaign communication and organisation. Political marketing, however, 
goes beyond these aspects and equally impacts the objectives and justifications underlying a 
campaign. As Strömbäck has convincingly argued, “the use of expertise in applying 
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marketing techniques is not viewed as the same as being politically market-oriented” 
(Strömbäck 2007: 55). Meaning, that while parties may include elements of political 
marketing in their campaign communication and organisation, it does not necessarily 
follow that the campaign will be market-oriented in principle: “political marketing is the 
application of marketing principles and procedures – not just marketing techniques and 
activities“ (Strömbäck 2007: 56). The essence of political marketing is that it is not only 
formulated by an intention to sell a political product (like a manifesto) to the voters with the 
help of marketing techniques, but also to design this political product in a way that will be 
successful, as it will be “‘in response to the needs and wants of people or groups targeted 
by the producers – the organizations or campaigns” (Strömbäck 2007: 56). Political 
marketing implies that parties determine their behaviour in response to voter demands and 
design their ‘product’ to suit the electorate (cf. Lees-Marshment 2001: 698). It is thereby 
concerned with “market intelligence, needs management, the design of the political 
product, and how political organizations and actors behave in relation to their markets, not 
just about campaigning.“ (Strömbäck 2007: 57) Therefore, the concept of political 
marketing has much broader applications than the concept of campaign professionalisation 
(cf. Strömbäck 2007: 63).  
It is important to note that in this dissertation analysis is confined to the subject of 
campaign professionalisation, leaving aside the concept of political marketing. This study is 
explicitly situated in tracking existing research on the professionalisation of election 
campaigns, both theoretically and empirically. Thus, the empirical section will analyse 
characteristics of the communication and organisation of the 23 campaigns under study 
here, all formulated to contribute to successfully selling, in marketing terms, a political 
product. Yet, aspects such as market intelligence and product adjustment that would have 
to be analysed in order to assess whether a party is not only sales, but also market-oriented, are 
left out of the analysis. 
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1.3 Synthesis 
From the preceding chapters we have observed that developments in campaign 
communication and organisation have been subsumed by political communication 
researchers utilising the concept of campaign professionalisation, thereby establishing a 
coherent research branch. However, two rather different approaches to defining the 
phenomenon of campaign professionalisation have emerged. First, attempts to define 
campaign professionalisation via certain campaign characteristics are assembled by way of 
additive indices. Often lacking from these approaches is a theoretical framework, one that 
reveals the wider context behind the indices. Securing the definition of professionalisation 
to the existence of very specific indicators has, not surprisingly, brought about substantial 
criticism. The comprehensiveness of existing indices in measuring campaign 
professionalisation has particularly been brought into question, due to allowing the 
legitimacy of individual indicators to remain unclear, for only applying criteria to election 
campaigning and not to political communication in general, for being time bound, and for 
being applicable only to party centred and not candidate centred campaigns (cf. Holtz-
Bacha 2010: 13f). Strömbäck, himself utilising an index, notes that, “it should be 
recognised that the list of dependent variables that make up the Professionalised Campaign 
Index is not exhaustive” (Strömbäck 2009: 113). “Other existing campaign techniques 
could be included, and new campaign techniques will certainly develop that should be 
incorporated in future versions of the index” (Strömbäck 2009: 113). Holtz-Bacha 
additionally remarks that linking professionalisation to the engagement of a broad range of 
campaign instruments and techniques forces the concept to be very dependent upon 
whether parties have enough resources to employ all of these instruments. Thus, it may 
become virtually impossible for smaller parties, generally operating with small budgets, to 
conduct a professionalised campaign. Thereby, available resources would then become the 
only explanatory variable for campaign professionalisation (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 14).  
The strength of utilising an operational definition of campaign professionalisation via 
certain indicators should be apparent: indices allow the measurement of campaign 
professionalisation and yield comparable results. Measuring campaign professionalisation 
by an index appears to be a scientific necessity if we want to move beyond the qualitative 
description of single cases and demand the production of comparable results.  
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Secondly, there are approaches that define campaign professionalisation as an adaptation to 
the changing environment of election campaigning. These approaches frequently fail to 
specify how these adaptations are formulated and by which indicators or characteristics 
they may be identified and measured. A criticism directed at the conceptualisation of 
campaign professionalisation as an adaptation is its failing as a definition, existing as a term 
which remains little more than a “self-defining, catch-all buzzword employed to explain the 
recent changes in political communication“ (Lilleker & Negrine 2002: 305; cf. also Donges 
2008: 224f). The strength of the definition of campaign professionalisation as an adaptation 
to changing environments is a universal applicability, not limited to spatial or temporal 
contexts. By addressing the embeddedness of parties into several environments, which 
influence how election campaigns are designed, this approach reveals at least a bit of the 
‘bigger picture’ or even of the theoretical foundation of campaign professionalisation, even 
if this is not elaborated upon further. 
I argue in Chapter 2 that both approaches to defining campaign professionalisation can be 
merged by conceptualising the professionalisation of election campaigns as an adaptation 
to changes in the relevant environments for election campaigning, with characteristics or 
indicators of professionalised campaigning being manifestations of this adaptation.  
What is more, two very noteworthy aspects concerning the conceptualisation of campaign 
professionalisation as an adaptation to a changing environment implicitly emerge from the 
existing research, but have not yet been elaborated upon in further detail. These aspects 
merit further inquiry: first, while there is a broad consensus among researchers concerning 
the establishment of a general concept of the professionalisation of election campaigning as 
an adaptation of campaigns to a changing environment, the theoretical and empirical 
implications this might have for professionalisation research has, regrettably, not been 
discussed in further detail. As campaign professionalisation research has, thus far, been a 
rather weakly theorised research area, no efforts have yet been made to use the perspective 
of professionalisation as an adaptation in order to develop a theoretical framework for 
campaign professionalisation research. Subsequently, if we take a closer look at the 
interpretations of scholars presented in this chapter, it becomes clear that they mention 
several different environments that campaigns are adapted to. Tenscher refers to the 
political, socio-cultural and mass media environment (cf. Tenscher 2007: 67), while Lilleker 
39 
 
and Negrine mention the “emergence of new media of communication and (…) the 
increasing specialization of tasks common in modern societies” (Lilleker & Negrine 2002: 
307f). Holtz-Bacha refers to “changes in the political system on the one side and the media 
system on the other and in the relationship of the two systems media” (Holtz-Bacha 2007: 
63). Esser and colleagues similarly mention “changes in the media” (Esser et al. 2000: 212), 
as well as changes in voting behaviour, which is also raised by Papathanassopoulos and 
colleagues (cf. Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007: 11). Picking up these two interrelated 
strands in Chapter 2, I will further elaborate on the existence of several differentiable 
environments for electoral campaigning, by proposing a theoretical foundation for 
professionalisation research based on this reasoning. 
Second, a characteristic that merits elaboration in further detail is the subjectivity that 
appears to be inherent to the concept of campaign professionalisation. Papathanassopoulos 
and colleagues argue that “[the idea of professionalisation of political communication] 
suggests the creation of a more ‘rational’ and more streamlined organisational structure or a 
more ‘appropriate’ set of practices” (Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007: 10). The authors also 
note that “what is deemed ‘rational’ and ‘appropriate’ may be time bound” and that “what 
is deemed to be ‘appropriate’ professional behaviour is never fixed” (Papathanassopoulos 
et al. 2007: 24). Negrine states, following a similar argument, that “to be a professional or 
to act in a professional manner thus means to engage in a set of practices that are accepted, 
at particular moments in time, as ‘the standards of the best’ and acknowledged to be the 
most appropriate in those circumstances” (Negrine 2007: 29). This means that from the 
position of a party, leading a professionalised campaign requires following the standards of 
what is currently accepted as rational and appropriate in campaigning as well as complying 
with the standards of best practice. Connecting with this argumentation, and situating my 
reasoning within sociological neo-institutionalism, I will argue in Chapter 2.2 that campaign 
professionalisation must be conceptualised as an adaptation of campaigns, by which parties 
respond to pressures and changes in their electoral environments by employing methods 
they consider rational and appropriate. 
   
40 
 
2. Proposing a theoretical foundation 
As we recall from Chapter 1.2.2, campaign professionalisation research refers to the 
changes in parties’ environments as the reason for the professionalisation of electoral 
campaigning. Several environments such as the voters, media, etc., have been identified to 
be the source of changes in campaigning. However, this reasoning has not been elaborated 
upon or theoretically validated. The argument of this dissertation is that by drawing on 
sociological neo-institutionalism I may further refine and confirm the concept of campaign 
professionalisation as a response to changing environments for election campaigning. In 
this chapter, I will draw on sociological neo-institutionalism in order to propose a 
theoretical foundation for the professionalisation of election campaigning.2 In Chapter 2.1, 
the reader is presented with an introduction to sociological neo-institutionalism as a 
theoretical approach. Campaign professionalisation will then be considered from a neo-
institutionalist perspective and three main conclusions are drawn (Chapters 2.2.1 to 2.2.3). 
It will be suggested that by professionalising their campaigns parties adapt to real or 
perceived pressures to change in relation to their four most important electoral 
environments (voters, members, media and other parties). For reason of argument, the 
causal conditions that influence campaign professionalisation will be briefly introduced 
here and then discussed in further detail in Chapter 3. Summing up the theoretical 
reasoning presented to this point, I finally propose a definition for the professionalisation 
of election campaigns (Chapter 2.2.4). Chapter 2.3 turns to the measurement of campaign 
professionalisation and first discusses two conclusions that follow from theoretical insights 
presented thus far and from existing research: measurement of campaign 
professionalisation should differentiate between environments (Chapter 2.3.1) and take the 
context that the campaign is organised in into consideration (Chapter 2.3.2). Chapter 2.3.3 
then presents the measuring instrument for campaign professionalisation to be used in this 
study.  
                                                 
2 Several theoretical approaches describe the relation between parties and their environments. They range 
from conceptions of parties as completely dependent from and determined in their actions by changes their 
environment to parties as strategic actors. The sociological neo-institutionalism models parties to be 
embedded in and inextricably entangled with their institutional environments. At the same time, the 
sociological neo-institutionalism recognises that pressures and incentives from the institutional environment 
of the parties have to be processed by them and parties have a certain margin to decide whether an adaptation 
to the environment is considered necessary or whether opting out would also be in order. Because of this 
dualism of context-induced and independent action, the sociological neo-institutionalism is evaluated and 
proposed in this dissertation as a useful and plausible theoretical foundation for campaign professionalisation. 
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2.1 Sociological neo-institutionalism  
Throughout the past 40 years, institutions as a subject of research have gained increasing 
attention within the social sciences and economics. As a critical response to rational choice 
approaches, several neo-institutionalist research areas have emerged focusing on the role of 
institutions in social, political and economic processes (for an overview cf. DiMaggio & 
Powell 1991: 2ff). Sociological neo-institutionalism is based on the central reasoning that 
organisations are embedded in institutional environments, adapting to and accommodating, 
the inherent expectations of environments in order to survive.  
Neo-institutionalist understanding of how an ‘institution’ may be defined is broad and 
comprehensive. Ultimately, it covers all forms of (permanently) reproduced social practices, 
which have been empirically proven to be meaningful for organisations (cf. Senge & 
Hellmann 2006: 18). While a systematisation of institutions is lacking, several forms of 
institutions have proved to be important (cf. Senge & Hellmann 2006: 18). Among these 
are institutional entities such as the state and professional bodies, which provide guidance 
to organisations operating in specific environments by way of laws, rules and constraints. 
Moreover, even abstract points of reference like values and norms, as well as commonplace 
and even unconscious routines of action, also function as institutions, which organisations 
accommodate in their structures and action (cf. Senge & Hellmann 2006: 18). Examples of 
environments in which these kinds of institutions are inherent, and which therefore 
provide rules and constraints for how organisations are designed include legislation and 
politics, other organisations (as peers or partners), the sciences, consultancy, public 
opinion, and relevant stakeholders (clients, shareholders, professional associations, trade 
unions) (cf. Hasse 2013: 71). The embeddedness perspective of sociological neo-
institutionalism suggests that organisations, first, adapt to existing environmental influences 
and second, are willing to change if a discrepancy between organisation and environment 
occurs (cf. Hasse 2013: 73). Hence, the environmental context and those institutions 
integrated within this context, largely determine how those organisations embedded within 
these institutions are designed and structured, as well as how they act (cf. Senge & 
Hellmann 2006: 18). 
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The works of Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), and Zucker (1977) 
may be considered the core scholarship within sociological neo-institutionalism (cf. Hasse 
& Krücken 1999: 13; Hasse & Krücken 1999: 18). Their propositions are introduced in 
subsequent paragraphs, followed by a more general discussion of the principles of 
sociological neo-institutionalism. 
The aim of Meyer’s and Rowan’s (1977) seminal article, “Institutionalized Organizations: 
Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony”, was to suggest what accounts for formal 
organisational structures. While Meyer and Rowan propose that, “the observation is not 
new that organizations are structured by phenomena in their environments and tend to 
become isomorphic with them” (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 346), they offer an alternative 
explanation for the parallelism between organisations and their environments. While the 
prevailing argument has been that formal organisations become matched with their 
environments through technical and exchange interdependencies, Meyer and Rowan argue, 
based on Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) “The Social Construction of Reality”, that 
“organizations structurally reflect socially constructed reality” (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 346). 
The central argument of the paper is that “the formal structures of many organizations in 
postindustrial society dramatically reflect the myths of their institutional environments 
instead of the demands of their work activities” (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 341). Meyer and 
Rowan argue that institutionalised rules are inherent in the environments of organisations. 
They define these institutionalised rules as “classifications built into society as reciprocated 
typifications or interpretations” (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 341) which came to assume an 
institution-like character, in that they are either simply taken for granted or supported by 
public opinion or the force of law (cf. Meyer & Rowan 1977: 341). Institutionalised rules 
can take the form of products, services, techniques, policies, and programs (cf. Meyer & 
Rowan 1977: 340). Organisations seek conformity with institutionalised rules and strive to 
incorporate them by forming their structures in order to become isomorphic with them.  
According to Meyer and Rowan, the main reason why organisations adapt to 
institutionalised rules is not due to the demands of technical or economic efficiency or the 
goal of performance accomplishment. Rather, organisations incorporate institutional rules 
to gain legitimacy, resources, stability, and enhanced survival prospects: “organizations are 
driven to incorporate the practices and procedures defined by prevailing rationalized 
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concepts of organizational work and institutionalized in society” (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 
340). “Organizations that do so increase their legitimacy and their survival prospects, 
independent of the immediate efficacy of the acquired practices and procedures.” (Meyer & 
Rowan 1977: 340) Thus, institutionalised rules, “function as powerful myths and many 
organizations adopt them ceremonially” (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 340). As Meyer and 
Rowan argue, “by designing a formal structure that adheres to the prescriptions of myths in 
the institutional environment, an organization demonstrates that it is acting on collectively 
valued purposes in a proper and adequate manner” (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 349). A formal 
structure that reflects institutional rules protects an organisation from having its conduct 
questioned because it acts as an account of its activities (cf. Meyer & Rowan 1977: 349). 
“The organization becomes, in a word, legitimate, and it uses its legitimacy to strengthen its 
support and secure its survival” (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 349). Therefore, a failure to 
incorporate institutionalised elements of structure, “is negligent and irrational; the 
continued flow of support is threatened and internal dissidents are strengthened” (Meyer & 
Rowan 1977: 350).  
Meyer and Rowan (1977: 344) offer several examples consolidating their approach and 
argue that, 
“(…) technical procedures of production, accounting, personnel selection, or data processing 
become taken-for-granted means to accomplish organizational ends. Quite apart from their 
possible efficiency, such institutionalized techniques establish an organization as appropriate, 
rational, and modern. Their use displays responsibility and avoids claims of negligence.” 
Similarly, “the rise of professionalized economics makes it useful for organizations to 
incorporate groups of economists and econometric analyses” (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 350). 
Econometric analyses help to legitimate an organisation’s plans in the eyes of investors, 
customers, or internal participants, even if they are unable to read and comprehend them 
(cf. Meyer & Rowan 1977: 350). Such analyses may also function as retrospective excuses. 
Even if an economic venture fails, managers can still “demonstrate to investors, 
stockholders, and superiors that procedures were prudent and that decisions were made by 
rational means” (Meyer & Rowan 1977: 350).  
Meyer and Rowan thereby explain why organisations adapt to their environments, while 
leaving open the processes that lead to parallelism between organisation and environment. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) fill this gap by differentiating three mechanisms or processes 
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by which an organisation conforms to institutional expectations. In doing so, they adopt a 
more organisation-centred perspective of organisational environments than Meyer and 
Rowan. While Meyer and Rowan employ a more macro-sociological perspective on the 
environment (cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 198), DiMaggio and Powell stress the role of 
other organisations as a part of an organisation’s environment. According to DiMaggio and 
Powell, organisations “respond to an environment that consists of other organizations 
responding to their environment, which consists of organizations responding to an 
environment of organizations’ responses” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 149). Hence, 
DiMaggio and Powell stress not only the parallelism between organisation and 
environment, but in addition argue, “that rational actors make their organizations 
increasingly similar as they try to change them” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 147). DiMaggio 
and Powell argue that three isomorphic processes can be analytically differentiated (while 
acknowledging that they are not necessarily empirically distinct): the coercive, mimetic, and 
normative (cf. DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 150).  
Coercive isomorphism results, first, from both formal and informal pressures that organisations 
exert on other organisations, which are dependent upon them. Second, it arises from the 
cultural expectations of the society within which organisations function. Coercive 
isomorphism may be felt as a force, but also as a persuasion or invitation to be linked in 
collusion (cf. DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 150). Examples of the direct and explicit 
imposition of organisational models on dependent organisations can be found in 
government mandates within which, “manufacturers adopt new pollution control 
technologies to conform to environmental regulations” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 150). 
Outside the governmental arena, for example, “a variety of service infrastructures, often 
provided by monopolistic firms – for example, telecommunications and transportation – 
exert common pressures over the organizations that use them” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 
151). A less explicit example is, “the need to lodge responsibility and managerial authority 
at least ceremonially in a formally defined role in order to interact with hierarchical 
organizations,” which acts as a “constant obstacle to the maintenance of egalitarian or 
collectivist organizational forms” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151). 
Mimetic isomorphic processes can be traced back to uncertainty, which is a powerful force that 
encourages imitation. Organisations may feel the incentive to model themselves after other 
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organisations in situations where organisational technologies are poorly understood, when 
goals are ambiguous, or when there is a general uncertainty created by the environment (cf. 
DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151). Mimetic behaviour can be an economical option for an 
organisation in the search for an approach to a problem (be it related to an ambiguous 
cause or an unclear solution), since a, “problematic search may yield a viable solution with 
little expense” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151). Therefore, faced with uncertainty, 
organisations “tend to model themselves after similar organizations in their field that they 
perceive to be more legitimate or successful” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152). As an 
example of “the most dramatic instances of modelling” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151) the 
two researchers mention, “the efforts of Japan’s modernizers in the late nineteenth century 
to model new governmental initiatives on apparently successful western prototypes” 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 151). Equally, within the category of mimetic processes, 
DiMaggio and Powell refer to the fact that with regard to organisational structures, 
“despite considerable search for diversity there is relatively little variation to be selected 
from” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152). This is the case for large organisations, which are 
forced to choose from a relatively small number of major consulting firms that “spread a 
few organizational models throughout the land” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152).  
Normative pressures towards isomorphism primarily stem from professionalisation 
(understood as the “collective struggle of members of an occupation to define the 
conditions and methods of their work, establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their 
occupational autonomy” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152)). Within this reasoning, there are 
two sources for isomorphism. The first source is the “resting of formal education and of 
legitimation in a cognitive base produced by university specialists” (DiMaggio & Powell 
1983: 152). For example, “universities and professional training institutions are important 
centers for the development of organizational norms among professional managers and 
their staff” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152). Second, is the “growth and elaboration of 
professional networks that span organizations and across which new models diffuse 
rapidly” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152), for example, professional and trade associations 
functioning as vehicles "for the definition and promulgation of normative rules about 
organizational and professional behaviour” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152).  
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In retrospect, Zucker’s 1977 article, “The Role of Institutionalization in Cultural 
Persistence” has come to be recognised as a complementary approach within sociological 
neo-institutionalism, introducing the concept of cognitive change into its framework (cf. Hasse 
& Krücken 1999: 18). In her article Zucker aims to provide an adequate explanation of 
cultural persistence. She opts for an experimental design and “investigates the effect of 
different degrees of institutionalization in constructed realities on cultural persistence in 
three distinct experiments, each focusing on a different aspect of persistence” (Zucker 
1977: 727). The three different aspects of persistence are transmission from one generation 
to the next, maintenance of the culture, and resistance to attempts to change (cf. Zucker 
1977: 727). An important element in Zucker’s argument is that an institutional status is not 
simply either present or absent, but that different degrees of institutionalisation exist: “acts 
are not simply either institutionalized or not institutionalized” (Zucker 1977: 728). “The 
meaning of an act may be perceived as more or less exterior and objective, depending on 
the situation in which the act is performed and/or depending on the position and role 
occupied by the actor.” (Zucker 1977: 728) Regarding cultural persistence, Zucker 
proposes that the higher the degree of institutionalisation, higher also will be the degree of 
transmission, maintenance, and resistance.  
To summarise Zucker’s experimental design, she tested whether participants judgment 
standard of the autokinetic effect3 are influenced by settings that are institutionalised to 
varying degrees. While the experiment utilised was the same in all three versions, different 
instructions (or different “cover stories” (Hasse & Krücken 1999: 20)) were read to the 
participants at the beginning of the experiment. In the personal influence condition participants 
were informed that the study involved problem solving in groups and were presented to 
each other as private persons. In the organisational context condition the study was presented as 
being an inquiry into problem solving in model organisations and participants were paired 
into two-member organisations. The office condition was built on the operational context condition 
but additionally appointed an office (“Light Operator”) to one of the participants. 
Furthermore, participants were no longer introduced by name but as, “Member 1,” etc. In 
this manner, Zucker operationalised different levels of institutionalisation, with the office 
                                                 
3 The autokinetic effect is a visual illusion in which the judgment standard of the apparent movement of a 
pinpoint of light in a dark room is particular to the individual. It has therefore been used to analyse processes 
of opinion formation in groups.  
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condition representing the highest degree of institutionalisation. Zucker (1977: 742) then 
proposed that:  
“(…) the findings reported in three experiments provide strong and consistent support for the 
predicted relationship between degrees of institutionalization and cultural persistence. As 
predicted, it was found that the greater the degree of institutionalization, the greater the 
generational uniformity of cultural understandings, the greater the maintenance without direct 
social control, and the greater the resistance to change through personal influence.” 
Zucker’s article therefore complements the neo-institutionalist framework by stressing the 
importance of individual patterns of perception and information processing for the 
regulation of social action. Environmental expectations and rules must be processed, 
whether by individuals or small groups (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 18). In contrast to the 
macro-sociological perspective on the relation between organisation and environments in 
Meyer and Rowan’s and DiMaggio and Powell’s work, Zucker’s work represents the micro-
foundation (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 18) of neo-institutionalism. Furthermore, Zucker’s 
work is important in sociological neo-institutionalism as it challenges the assumption that 
rules must be either institutionalised or not institutionalised and suggests that there are 
different degrees of institutionalisation. Therefore, researchers have assumed, based on 
Zucker’s work, that the efficacy of institutionalised rules may differ over time (cf. Hasse & 
Krücken 1999: 22). 
Based on these three foundations of sociological neo-institutionalism a coherent research 
area has been consolidated throughout the last four decades. It is important to note that 
sociological neo-institutionalism should be considered a research programme and 
theoretical approach, rather than a consistent theory of society such as systems theory (cf. 
Hasse & Krücken 2005: 195). As Hasse and Krücken remark, sociological neo-
institutionalism lacks a consistent examination of its conceptual foundations and central 
notions, a fact readily acknowledged by neo-institutionalist researchers (cf. Hasse & 
Krücken 2005: 195).  
Hasse and Krücken identify three features (Wesensmerkmale) which are characteristic of 
sociological neo-institutionalism and that differentiate it from other institutionalist 
research. Firstly, sociological neo-institutionalism stresses the importance institutional 
factors in the organisational environment have for the reproduction of organisations (as 
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elaborated by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983))4 (cf. Hasse & 
Krücken 1999: 63). Social processes or obligations that have come to take on a rule-like 
status in social thought and action (cf. Meyer & Rowan 1977: 341) and that are considered 
rational become myths pertaining to how organisations should design their formal structure 
and their actions. Organisational action is inextricably entangled with organisational 
environment(s) (cf. Senge & Hellmann 2006: 19) and organisations strive to accommodate 
their societal environment. Therefore, they adapt to the rational myths inherent within 
them. What organisations do, and how they are structured, may therefore be considered 
reflections of, or responses to, rules, beliefs, and conventions built into the wider 
environment (cf. Powell & Colyvas 2008: 975). 
The second characteristic of sociological neo-institutionalism is that it underlines the 
importance of taken-for-granted assumptions, and therefore, of active forms of perception 
and the interpretation of institutional factors (as elaborated by Zucker (1977)) (Hasse & 
Krücken 1999: 63). This leads to the premise that institutionalisation is “the process by 
which individual actors transmit what is socially defined as real” (Zucker 1977: 728) and 
that, as a logical consequence, “at any point in the process the meaning of an act can be 
defined as a more or less taken-for-granted part of the social reality” (Zucker 1977: 728). 
Scott (1987: 496) concluded, drawing on the works of Zucker (1977) and Meyer and 
Rowan (1977), that:  
“The common feature in all of these definitions is that institutionalization is viewed as the 
social process by which individuals come to accept a shared definition of social reality – a 
conception whose validity is seen as independent of the actor’s own views or actions but is 
taken for granted as defining the ‘way things are’ and/or the ‘way things are to be done’.” 
This means that once social structures or activities are institutionalised and have become, as 
DiMaggio and Powell put it, “taken for granted expectations” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991: 
10), not accommodating them becomes a tough choice for organisations, because it would 
mean acting against the “rules of appropriateness” (March & Olsen 1984: 741). However, it 
can be assumed, drawing from Zucker’s work, that there are different degrees of 
institutionalisation and that the regulating effect of institutions differs according to this 
degree. First, processes, structures and practices exist that are institutionalised to such a 
                                                 
4 This macro-perspective and the micro-foundation following from the work of Zucker (1977) complement 
each other and constitute the spectrum of neo-institutionalism (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 64). 
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degree that it seems practically unthinkable not to comply with them and any alternatives 
appear to be beyond reasonable imagination. Second, there are institutions that act upon 
positive or negative incentives that follow on from compliance or non-compliance. Acting 
in compliance with the institution becomes a question of consideration and choice. Other 
institutions rather resemble traditions and conventions. Non-compliance with them may 
create friction and the need to justify actions, but will not likely create outrage or result in 
punishment (cf. Hasse 2013: 67f.). The degree of institutionalisation, as the binding force 
of processes, structures and practices, can evolve over time. What may have been self-
evident decades ago may today be subject to explicit incentives; what was once sanctioned 
may today merely constitute a traditional status. In extreme cases, institutions may vanish 
while others emerge (cf. Hasse 2013: 68). 
The third characteristic of sociological neo-institutionalism is that it relativises the 
importance of explicit norms as the rules and regulations of modern society (Hasse & 
Krücken 1999: 64). Neo-institutionalists argue that it is not (primarily) ‘hard’ factors such 
as laws, regulations, technological preconditions, budgets and resources that shape the 
behaviour and decisions of organisations, rather that ‘soft’ factors like values, norms and 
standards of good practice are the crucially influencing factors upon organisations. 
Accordance to these factors may be recommended to organisations by the professions and 
consultants, learned from successful competitors (cf. Hasse 2013: 72), or, to put it more 
generally, may be perceived to be what relevant environments demand and expect from the 
organisation. Sociological neo-institutionalism therefore, “shows how organizational 
behaviours are responses not solely to market pressures, but also to institutional pressures 
(e.g., pressures from regulatory agencies, such as the state and the professions, and 
pressures from general social expectations and the actions of leading organisations)” 
(Greenwood & Hinings 1996: 1025). The driving force behind organisations’ choices is 
thus not efficiency or technical performance, but rather to receive legitimacy and support 
from the environments they are embedded within. In a neo-institutional context legitimacy 
is a result of social attribution by several actors in the environment of the organisation, 
namely stakeholders (e.g. customers, employees, voters), moral authorities (e.g. scientists or 
social movements) or the public sphere (such as the press and social media) (cf. Hasse 
2013: 69). Therefore, organisations’ choices do not necessarily represent the most efficient 
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or rational option, but rather reflect what appears to be the most rational option in relation 
to the expectations an organisation may feel confronted by (i.e., as Meyer and Rowan 
argued, rational myths). 
While Meyer and Rowan (1977), “theorized about the general effects of rationalized 
institutional structure as though there were only one such structure” (Scott 1987: 498), 
“through the use of many and diverse examples (…) they underscored [the] multiplicity 
and diversity of institutional sources and belief systems found in modern societies” (Scott 
1987: 498). More recent research has followed this insight and “moved away from a 
conception of the institutional environment to one of multiple institutional environments” 
(Scott 1987: 498). Therefore, a challenge for organisations rests in the fact that they are 
embedded, not only in one but several, institutional environments whose expectations, 
rules and requirements, “may be in competition if not in conflict” (Scott 1991: 167). 
According to Scott, organisations, “may be expected to exercise ‘strategic choice’ (see Child 
1972) in relating to their institutional environments” (Scott 1991: 170), while “the choices 
available to organizations may range (...) to, at the extreme, selecting the type of 
institutional environment with which to connect” (Scott 1991: 170). From an organisational 
perspective, the possibility to decide which expectations to meet is certainly a source of 
freedom and independence, but it may also become a source of insecurity. Following 
DiMaggio and Powell’s argumentation that other organisations constitute a part of an 
organisation’s environment, and that mimetic isomorphic processes can be traced back to 
uncertainty, several neo-institutionalist researchers have argued that, as a means to 
overcome insecurity, organisations adjust to other organisations that are considered 
successful, exemplary and efficient. Hasse and Krücken argue that neo-institutionalist 
analyses of markets and competition stress processes of reciprocal orientation between 
competitors. The providers of similar products orient their strategies according to the 
strategies of their competitors (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 45). DiMaggio and Powell 
transfer this logic to the individual level: “Individuals face choices all the time, but in doing 
so they seek guidance from the experiences of others in comparable situations and by 
reference to standards of obligation” (DiMaggio & Powell 1991: 10). 
As we have seen, sociological neo-institutionalism implies that organisations tend to be 
similar (isomorphism) and that there are two reasons for this. First, organisations that are 
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embedded in the same environments are confronted with the same expectations and 
should respond similarly to them. The second source of isomorphism is mimetic behaviour 
as a strategy to face uncertainty. Despite this tendency towards isomorphism, sociological 
neo-institutionalism leaves room for organisations to react differently to institutional 
expectations. This approach acknowledges that the trend towards isomorphism can be 
refracted by factors specific to single organisations, such as age and history, micropolitical 
interests, convictions and opinions that involved persons have, but also functional 
requirements and routines (cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 200). The approach also recognises 
that systemic differences between groups of organisations may occur (cf. Hasse & Krücken 
2005: 200). These can, first, stem from certain particularities such as differences between 
organisations belonging to different industrial sectors. Second, systemic differences may 
arise due to regulative frameworks and thus may occur, for example, between organisations 
based in different locations. Third, systemic differences can be traced back to 
organisational specialists and consultants. Exerting a certain amount of normative pressure 
on organisations to follow their assumed standards of good practice (cf. DiMaggio & 
Powell 1983), organisational specialists and consultants often only address a certain type of 
organisation (like medium-sized enterprises, universities, the public sector, etc.) (cf. Hasse 
& Krücken 2005: 200).  
In the following chapter, I will show that three conclusions can be drawn from transferring 
these insights from neo-institutionalism to campaign professionalisation: First, combining 
the macro-sociological perspective on organisations and their environments and the 
organisational sociological perspective in neo-institutionalism, parties can be expected to 
design their campaign practices and structures in compliance with perceived expectations 
from the environments that they are embedded in. Second, if there are differences in the 
design of campaign practices and structures, these can be explained by explanatory factors 
at the systemic and at the party level. Third, the most important environments that parties 
are embedded in during election campaigns are the voters, the members, the media, and 
other parties. Fourth, campaign professionalisation can be defined as the parties’ adaptation 
to expectations from and changes in these relevant environments.  
 
52 
 
2.2 Campaign professionalisation from a neo-institutionalist perspective 
2.2.1 Parties adapt to expectations from their relevant enviroments 
Following the macro-sociological perspective on organisations and their environments as 
originally proposed by Meyer and Rowan (1977), I argue that political parties are embedded 
within several environments and that their structures and practices are inextricably bound 
with these environments. During election campaigns, the most relevant environments for 
parties from this perspective are the voters, party members and the media (see Chapter 
2.2.3 for detailed argument). Parties design their campaign practices and structures in 
compliance with institutions fundamental to these environments, perceive expectations to 
comply with these institutions (hereafter referred to as institutional expectations) and take 
actions (which they consider to be appropriate) in order to gain support and legitimacy 
from these environments. Consolidating this macro-sociological perspective with the 
organisational sociological perspective proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), I add a 
fourth environment that is crucial for parties during election campaigns: other parties. 
Monitoring other parties’ campaigns is a means to reduce uncertainty as to the design of an 
effective campaign and it is an easy way to stay abreast of developments and innovations in 
campaign strategy. From the theoretical perspective of neo-institutionalism, campaigns are 
designed in accordance with institutions and the expectations inherent to relevant 
environments, as well as based on the example of successful peers and competitors (cf. 
Donges 2008: 225).  
I choose the macro-sociological perspective within sociological neo-institutionalism 
(focusing on the relation between organisation and environments) over the micro-
foundation (stressing the role of the individual processing environmental expectations) as a 
theoretical framework of this study for the following reasons. The database for the 
subsequent comparative analysis of campaign professionalisation consists (as we will see in 
further detail in Chapter 4) of Swiss cantonal (i.e. regional) election campaigns. The 
cantonal party branches only have limited human and financial resources. Most of the staff 
that work for the parties during an election campaign are volunteers. In Switzerland, where 
even national parliamentarians – at least officially – execute their political functions as 
volunteers (Milizparlament), this is not considered a shortcoming, but is rather appreciated 
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in what could be called a culture of amateurism. While most parties have a professional – in 
the sense of ‘paid’ – head of office who normally also takes an important part in the 
organisation of the cantonal election campaigns, these persons usually are not trained 
campaign specialists, spin doctors, etc. Rather, they are all-rounders who perform a wide 
range of tasks for the party and who usually get trained on the job. How their predecessors 
designed and organised campaigns and what other parties do can be assumed to be 
important sources of knowledge for them. What is more, participant observations of the 
organisational campaign activities in the cantonal parties (carried out during the preparation 
of the project that provides the data for the present dissertation) showed that the election 
campaigns were organised by groups of party members who made decisions in a team. The 
margin of action for the individual campaign manager in the cantonal party branches is 
hence rather small and cannot be expected to exceed the latitude of the party’s financial 
and ideological framework. Strom’s (1990: 574f.) estimation of the margin of action for 
party leaders can also be assumed to be true for the cantonal campaign managers:  
“Regardless of their own preferences, [party] leaders are constrained by the organizational 
properties of their parties. That is to say, they have to take into account the preferences of 
other individuals in their party organization, and their hands may also be tied to varying 
degrees by the institutional environment in which their parties operate.”  
I therefore assume that parties are, via the individual perceptions of the party officials and 
campaign managers, definitively able to perceive, process and react to expectations and 
influences from their environments (cf. Zucker 1977; cf. also Jun 2000: 348). Campaign 
professionalisation is not action without agents. However, due to the constraining influence of 
the parties as organisations and to the specific situation of the Swiss cantonal party 
branches described above, the analysis of the factors responsible for differences in the 
degree and profile of campaign professionalisation will include party characteristics, but will 
not take characteristics of individual campaign managers into consideration as explanatory 
factors.  
Real or perceived changes in the relevant environments for campaigning urge parties to 
react and to adapt their campaigns accordingly in order to ensure on-going support and 
legitimacy. These changes can consist, for example, in changing or additional 
environmental expectations, which for their part are rooted in manifest changes in the 
environments themselves. Changes can also concern the institutional status of a campaign 
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structure or a campaign practice. From a neo-institutionalist perspective, parties cannot 
elude changing institutional expectations and rational myths for longer periods. However, 
they have a certain margin of action and selectivity in deciding which institutional 
expectations they want to follow. We can thus assume that campaign professionalisation 
mirrors real and perceived institutional expectations to election campaigning, without 
degrading political parties to purely reactive adaptors (Adaptierer) (cf. Bukow 2009: 218).  
If we take the emergence of social media in the electoral environment that is formed by the 
media as an example, parties have to decide which way of adapting to this change is most 
appropriate. We can expect that there will be parties that actively use social media in their 
campaigns because they want to gain additional young voters. Others may not think social 
media will be of immediate use to them but may rather be “motivated by conformity 
pressures or a concern to appear up-to-date” (Scott 1987: 504). Another group of parties 
may decide to ignore social media for the upcoming election and put them on their to-do-
list for the next one. What is more, the degree of institutionalisation of social media in 
election campaigning can also be expected to change over time – and so can parties’ 
reactions to it. While we can imagine a first phase in which there is an incentive to include 
social media in the election campaign because it could result in some extra votes, social 
media might reach very high user rates and prove to be an effective tool in say, 
environmental activists’ campaigns, so that it might become unthinkable for political 
parties not to include social media in their campaign instruments.  
Hence, the sociological neo-institutionalism also allows us to theoretically corroborate the 
subjectivity that existing research finds to be inherent in the concept of campaign 
professionalisation. Whether certain campaign practices or ways to organise the campaign 
can be considered best practice or the most professional way to go and thus be included or 
excluded from campaign professionalisation indices has been an unanswered question 
among professionalisation scholars – a fact that becomes obvious not least in the different 
versions of campaign professionalisation indices. When modelling campaign 
professionalisation as a party’s response to environmental expectations however, it 
becomes less important whether this response can objectively be considered to be the best 
or the most professional one. The important insight from sociological neo-institutionalism is 
that campaigns are designed in accordance to that which parties perceive to be most 
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appropriate in order to gain legitimacy and support from their environments. 
Characteristics of professionalised election campaigning – including the elements of 
campaign communication and campaign organisation that existing research assembled in 
the professionalisation indices – can then be modelled as manifestations of what the parties 
consider to be an appropriate adaptation. Furthermore, the design of an election campaign 
is constrained by financial budgets, by law and by political culture (I will return to this last 
point in Chapter 2.3.3). I thus conclude, in accordance with Strömbäck and colleagues, that 
“the use of campaign strategies and tactics should be conceived of as a matter of perceived 
utility in combination with the costs and need for expertise associated with them (Shaw, 
2006), within the confines of the regulatory environment and the political culture in which 
political parties operate (Plasser and Plasser, 2002; Lees-Marshment et al., 2010)” 
(Strömbäck et al. 2013: 43). 
By complying with what they perceive to be state of the art campaigning, parties also 
protect themselves against criticism and the need for justification. In case the party 
performs poorly at the polls, party officials can still argue that they tried everything deemed 
possible and that adverse conditions must be blamed for the result (see also Schimank 
2002: 49).  
The theoretical perspective of sociological neo-institutionalism on campaign 
professionalisation also allows corroboration of the fact that campaigns, which display 
characteristics of professionalised campaigning, are not necessarily the most successful or 
efficient campaigns. Altogether, professionalisation of election campaigns can thus, rather 
than solely being associated with efficiency or best practice, be considered a rational myth 
or, as Green and Smith put it, “professionally crafted communication is a way to 
demonstrate one’s seriousness of purpose” (Green and Smith 2003: 335). 
By the same token, the neo-institutional perspective on campaign professionalisation takes 
into consideration that it depends on different political cultures and formal rules. While the 
campaign professionalisation index by Tenscher (2007, 2012; see Chapter 1.2.1) implicitly 
includes televised campaign activities (relevance of paid and free media, relevance of talk 
shows) as indicators for professionalised campaigning, there are several countries that do 
not allow political advertising on television (Switzerland is one of them). The neo-
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institutional perspective supports Strömbäck’s evaluation that “this does not, however, 
mean that campaigns in such countries, by definition, are less professionalized” (Strömbäck 
2007: 52).  
 
2.2.2 Explanatory factors for campaign professionalisation are located on the party level and 
on the systemic level 
The margin of action that parties have with regard to campaign professionalisation from 
this theoretical perspective also allows one to model and explain differences with regard to 
the degree and profile of professionalised campaigning between parties or regional entities 
(countries, federated states, etc.). For the present study, this means that the basic 
assumption is that all cantonal campaigns included in this study should display the same 
characteristics of professionalised campaigning due to the trend towards isomorphism 
induced by similar environmental expectations and mimetic behaviour caused by 
uncertainty (see Chapter 2.2.3 for a detailed discussion of environmental changes and 
expectations). If, however, the trend towards isomorphism in campaign professionalisation 
between cantonal election campaigns is refracted, this is due to factors on two levels: the 
systemic level and the party level. This is, first, in line with existing professionalisation 
research where professionalisation is discussed to differ with regard to the systemic 
environment in which the campaign takes place (cf. e.g. Tenscher et al. 2012) and with 
regard to the characteristics of the party that organises the campaign (cf. e.g. Gibson & 
Römmele 2001, 2009; Strömbäck 2007). As Strömbäck (2007: 98) posits,  
“party behaviour at any point in time should be perceived as a combination of systemic and 
environmental factors, and internal factors tied to specific party types and party goals. In the 
context of political campaigning, the degree of professionalisation can partly be explained by 
systemic and environmental factors – some of which affect all parties roughly to the same 
extent – and internal factors – which vary across parties within a particular political 
system.”  
Thus, while the reasons why parties professionalise their campaigns in the first place have 
to be located in the parties’ relevant electoral environments, the degree and profile of 
professionalisation in a given campaign is determined both by factors at the immediate 
systemic (or environmental) level as well as on the party level. 
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Second, the existence of explanatory factors on the party level and at the systemic level is 
also in line with Hasse and Krücken (2005: 200), arguing that sectorial particularities like 
differences between organisations belonging to different industrial sectors are comparable 
to differences between parties belonging to different ideological families. Systemic 
differences that are due to different regulative frameworks and occur, for example between 
organisations at different locations, (cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 200) can be compared to 
differences between campaigns that were organised in cantons with different regulative and 
geographical characteristics. 
To be more precise, I expect that if the degree and profile of campaign professionalisation 
differs between cantonal election campaigns, the differences will be caused by the size of 
the canton, the degree of urbanisation of the canton, and the degree of competitiveness of 
the political situation in the canton where the campaigns took place (explanatory factors at 
the systemic level), the political position of the left-right political spectrum and the status as 
a catch-all party of the party that organised the campaign (explanatory factors at the party 
level). If I find that there are differences in regard to the degree and profile of 
professionalised campaigning between the cantonal election campaigns that cannot be 
explained by the systemic or the party level, one possible explanation might be that the 
differences are influenced by characteristics that Hasse and Krücken identified to be 
specific to single organisations (age and history, micropolitical interests, convictions and 
opinions of the involved persons, functional requirements and routines) (cf. Hasse & 
Krücken 2005: 200). For a detailed discussion of the explanatory factors – or, in correct 
QCA terms that will be introduced at a later point, of the causal conditions – that will be 
tested in this study please refer to Chapter 3. 
 
2.2.3 Political parties and their changing environments in election campaigns 
In Chapter 2.2.1, I modelled professionalisation of election campaigns to be the process 
during which political parties adapt their campaigns to real or perceived changes in the 
relevant environments for campaigning in order to ensure on-going support and legitimacy 
from the environments. These environments are the voters, the members, the media, and 
other parties. In the following, I will outline why it is those four environments that are 
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most relevant for parties during election campaigns. Second, I will discuss which changes 
took place in the four environments that parties adapt to by professionalising their 
campaigns.  
As it goes without saying, the central objective of parties during election campaigns is to 
motivate and to convince as many potential voters as possible to vote for them. The 
electoral environment formed by potential voters is the most obvious relevant environment 
for political parties in election campaigns. However, it is not the only one. The central 
arena in which to create public attention for their positions during election campaigns is 
the media, which allows for maximising the number of potential voters that are reached by 
the campaign. Political organisations react to structural changes in the media system since 
the media are an essential part of their environment (cf. Donges 2008: 31). 
Papathanassopoulos therefore found the professionalisation of political communication to 
be “inextricably bound up with developments in the media” (Papathanassopoulos 2007: 
11). Electoral success depends on whether parties adapt as adequately as possible to the 
voters and the media (cf. Strohmeier 2004: 51). What is more, electoral campaigns also 
have an internal function and aim at mobilising and activating the membership (cf. Jarren 
& Donges 2011: 218). Even members that do not wish to participate actively in the party’s 
activities are relevant as a part of the electoral environment formed by the members and 
supporters, because they have to be convinced of new party objectives and strategies (cf. 
Donges 2008: 148). Finally, an important electoral environment is constituted by other 
parties; that is, a party’s competitors and peers (cf. for e.g. Bukow 2009: 219). Parties do 
not organise their election campaigns in a self-governed way, but always take the 
communication strategies of other parties into account – be it the communication 
strategies they observe or the strategies they ascribe to their competitors (cf. Jarren & 
Donges 2011: 224). 
Strömbäck has argued that although “political parties are often implicitly assumed to have 
only one strategic goal – electoral victory – and being active in only one arena – the 
electoral arena” (Strömbäck 2007: 59), “political parties in moderate or extreme multi-party 
systems, theoretically, (…) are active in at least four different arenas” (Strömbäck 2007: 59). 
These four arenas are the parliamentary arena, the electoral arena, the internal arena and 
the media arena and parties pursue strategic goals in all of them (cf. Strömbäck 2007: 59). If 
59 
 
we assume that from the strategic perspective of the parties the most important actors in 
these arenas during election campaigns are other parties (parliamentary arena), potential 
voters (electoral arena), the members (internal arena), and the media (media arena), 
Strömbäck’s four arenas become congruent with the four electoral environments that were 
identified to be most relevant for parties during election campaigns in the preceding 
paragraph. 
Now, which general developments did or do take place in these environments – resulting 
in changing or additional environmental expectations and changing institutional statuses of 
campaign structures or practices – that might induce political parties to adapt their election 
campaigns to them? 
In the electoral environment formed by the voters, electioneering has become more 
complex and contested. This is, on the one hand, due to a growing number of voters that 
do not have any or only a weak party affiliation. This tendency seems to occur in the 
majority of western European democracies (cf. Mair et al. 1999: 15) as a consequence of 
underlying processes like individualisation, secularisation, and de-ideologisation (cf. e.g. 
Tenscher 2007: 67). The weakening of traditional ties with the parties “has not only 
reduced the impact of party identification on electoral choice, but has also led citizens to 
rely more heavily on information delivered during the electoral campaigns when making up 
their minds” (Lachat & Sciarini 2002: 41). What is more, as the definitive election decision 
is more and more often made only at a late stage of the campaign, the window of 
opportunity for the parties to gain attention and support is becoming larger (cf. Tenscher 
2011: 88). From the perspective of the parties, this means that campaigning becomes more 
important and that there is more at stake – more voters to win, as well as to lose. Mair and 
colleagues argue that even in contexts where voting shares have been relatively stable, 
parties have noticed that the support of their voters depends more and more on their 
ability to react strategically and organisationally to new challenges. Parties have to make a 
bigger effort and to prepare their campaigns more thoroughly to maintain their existing 
voter support (cf. Mair et al. 1999: 14). According to Römmele, parties can no longer count 
on the wholehearted loyalty of ‘their’ voters and supporters, but have to earn this loyalty 
with attractive political products and merits. This also means that they have to maximise 
their communication with the electorate (cf. Römmele 2005: 30). Hence, election 
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campaigning in the media is becoming more important. Parties feel growing pressure to 
present themselves in the mediated public sphere (cf. paragraph on the environment 
formed by the media) and to make maximum use of the media for political communication 
in order to bind their clientele and to compensate weakening party identification (cf. 
Steiner & Jarren 2009: 252). The higher the share of swing voters or the weaker the overall 
party identification is, the more the external, mediated party communication becomes 
extended and the more professionalised must the parties present themselves in their 
campaigns (cf. Römmele 2005: 47).  
Yet, increasing the intensity of their campaigns can indeed be a means by which parties can 
influence voter behaviour. In the case of Switzerland, Lachat and Sciarini (2002: 55) found 
that the patterns of opinion formation vary with campaign intensity, as very intense 
campaigning prompted even party identifiers to use new information to reassess their 
partisan preferences. To sum up, I assume that parties perceive, on the one hand, a certain 
pressure to extend their campaigns in order to reach more potential voters and over a 
larger period of time. On the other hand, parties might conclude that they need to intensify 
their campaigns in order to react to the more problematic mobilisation of the individual 
voter, for example by communicating more directly to the voters and by providing 
campaign communication that is tailored and focused to specific target groups. 
The changes that were outlined for the environment constituted by the voters generally 
also apply to the environment constituted by the members. The decreasing party 
identification leads to decreasing numbers of party members. The members that remain 
have become harder to mobilise and, as it has been noted for the voters, the support of the 
members can no longer be taken for granted but has to be earned (cf. Steiner & Jarren 
2009: 261). The pressures resulting for the parties that have been formulated for the 
environment of the voters can thus be transferred to the environment of the members: 
Parties perceive a certain pressure to communicate even more with their members and 
supporters during election campaigns and with as many of them as possible. They also 
need to communicate more directly and specifically with their members in order to 
mobilise them to actively participate in the campaign and – a more modest objective – to 
really go the polls on Election Day.  
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In the electoral environment formed by the media, two main changes have been taking 
place – and are still going on respectively – that severely affect election campaigning. These 
are on the one hand mediation and mediatisation (or medialisation) processes, and on the other 
hand technological change, including the introduction and establishment of the so called 
new media and social media. Mediation of politics “refers to a situation in which the media 
have become the most important source of information and vehicles of communication 
between the governors and the governed” (Strömbäck 2008: 230). It is of less importance 
what type of media is dominant – whether radio, newspapers, television, or the Internet – 
the important characteristic of mediated politics is that “the media constitute the most 
important channels for information exchanges and communication between the people and 
political actors” (Strömbäck 2008: 231). The mediation of politics is thus not new but 
rather an “old phenomenon” (Strömbäck 2008: 230). It is, however, an old phenomenon 
that nonetheless has tremendous importance for election campaigning. Election 
campaigning via the media, or, in other words, the presence of parties in the media during 
election campaigns, can be considered a highly institutionalised practice. We can assume 
that (at least in the context of most western European and US elections) campaigning that 
does not include a presence in the media is practically unthinkable. In addition to that, this 
highly institutionalised campaign practice has recently gained even more importance from 
the perspective of the parties due to decreasing party affiliations and a higher number of 
swing voters (cf. the paragraph on the environments of members and voters in this 
chapter). What is more, political parties have been found to increasingly adapt their 
communication strategies to the logic of the media (which is one dimension of the 
multidimensional concept of mediatisation, see e.g. Strömbäck & Dimitrova 2011). The 
adaptation of political language to the media’s commercial patterns has been observed with 
regard to the communication outlook of political actors, the communication techniques 
that are used and the content of political discourse (cf. Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999). More 
concretely, adaption to media logic may affect, for example, the timing in which parties 
present information to the media (before editorial deadlines, at any time including 
weekends, etc.), the format of the information (sound bites instead of lengthy statements, 
catchy quotes, etc.), but also the style in which information is presented (simplification, 
polarisation, intensification, personalisation, etc. (cf. Strömbäck 2008: 233). While it is at 
least questionable whether mediatisation – as a comprehensive and aggregated 
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phenomenon – of political communication in general, and of election campaigning in 
particular, has reached the same degrees of institutionalisation and pervasiveness as 
mediation, there are nevertheless very strong incentives for parties to adapt their campaign 
communication to media logic. Assuming that parties want to, first, place their campaign 
communication contents in the media, and, second, have their content reproduced one-to-
one or at least with minimal alterations, there is a strong incentive to present content that is 
compatible to media logic with regard to style, form and timing.  
Beyond the processes of mediation and mediatisation the technological change in the 
environment of the media – bringing along new forms of mediated communication via the 
so-called new media and social media – challenges political parties to react. Karlsen 
suggests that, “technological development is identified as a driving force behind the 
professionalization of campaigning in general and the increasing involvement of campaign 
professionals in particular“ (Karlsen 2010: 193). Be it the broad establishment of the social 
media, with Facebook leading the way, or the possibility to produce seemingly personal 
letters in no time and at high scale – on the one hand, the technological change has offered 
parties new possibilities to mobilise members and voters. On the other hand, these new 
means of communication also put pressure and insecurity on political parties. Integrating all 
possible channels of communication into the campaign can soon become too costly and 
time-consuming, especially for parties with limited resources. The effectiveness of new 
forms of communication for election campaigns may still be unclear and integrating them 
into the campaign may turn out to be a waste of effort. Yet, not including new 
communication channels may also have negative consequences that are difficult to predict 
– a decisive mobilisation potential might be left untapped, or an image of not being a 
“modern” party, of not keeping up with the times, might be produced (see also the short 
discussion of the example of Facebook in Chapter 2.2.1). 
When the level of competition between parties increases due to weaker party affiliations 
and a higher share of swing voters, the importance of the environment formed by the other 
parties increases likewise. As they compete for the same potential voters, parties begin to 
observe and copy, or adapt to each other (mimetic behaviour) (cf. Steiner & Jarren 2009: 
261; cf. Hasse & Krücken 2005: 192). What is more, the closer the competition is, the more 
important becomes both the external communication in the struggle for public attention as 
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well as the internal maintenance of member support (cf. Steiner & Jarren 2009: 262). But 
which media, or more generally, which channels of communication from the large pool of 
possible options are best? Is campaigning on Facebook really necessary? Do other parties 
cooperate with a public relations bureau in their campaign? As parties seek answers to 
these questions and wish to reduce uncertainty, they turn to observe the strategies of their 
competitors and peers in order to copy them, if they deem them to be promising or 
successful. With regard to specific questions like the use of communication channels in 
election campaigns, as well as more generally, we can assume that “the more uncertain the 
relationship between means and ends the greater the extent to which an organization will 
model itself after organizations it perceives to be successful” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 
154).  
To sum up, changes and alterations in the four most relevant environments for election 
campaigning demand reactions and – ultimately – adaptions by political parties in Western 
Europe. I assume that these changes also affect Swiss parties and Swiss cantonal election 
campaigns (a detailed discussion of the Swiss context will follow in Chapter 4 and Chapter 
6 presents how professionalisation is used as a strategy of adaptation from the perspective 
of the cantonal campaign managers). What is more, as we remember from Chapter 2.1, 
being embedded not only in one, but several institutional environments whose 
expectations, rules and requirements “may be in competition if not in conflict” (Scott 1991: 
167) poses a challenge to parties. According to Scott, organisations may therefore “be 
expected to exercise ‘strategic choice’ (see Child 1972) in relating to their institutional 
environments” (Scott 1991: 170), while “the choices available to organizations may range 
(...) to, at the extreme, selecting the type of institutional environment with which to 
connect” (Scott 1991: 170). Transferring this rationale to the concept of campaign 
professionalisation as an adaptation to changing environments, I argue that election 
campaigns are not necessarily equally adapted to all electoral environments (and not to the 
same degree). Rather, election campaigns become professionalised with regard to those 
environmental expectations that a party perceives to be most urgent in the specific context 
of the election, against the background of its goals or its ideology, etc. However, existing 
professionalisation indices combine all indicators – which refer to different relevant 
environments – in one index. They measure an overall degree of campaign 
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professionalisation. An aggregated index cannot differentiate in what regard, or in relation 
to which, electoral environment a party has professionalised its campaign. This might 
create inaccurate results, if we imagine that a party may have professionalised its campaigns 
very strongly with regard to the voters and the members, but not in regard to the media 
and to other parties. In an aggregated index, this party would only achieve a medium degree 
of professionalisation, obscuring the selective adaptation to two environments. 
Consequently, an aggregated measurement may hamper the analysis of the causal 
conditions for different degrees and profiles of campaign professionalisation. I therefore 
propose to measure campaign professionalisation with four different indices – one for each 
electoral environment (for a detailed presentation of the measurement instrument see 
Chapter 2.3). 
 
2.2.4 Summing up: Defining campaign professionalisation 
Based on the theoretical reasoning that has been presented in the preceding chapters, I 
propose to define campaign professionalisation as follows:  
Professionalisation of election campaigns is the process by which political parties adapt 
their campaigns to real or perceived changes in, and institutional expectations from, the 
relevant environments for campaigning in order to ensure on-going support and legitimacy 
from these environments. The most relevant environments for campaigning are constituted 
by the voters, the members, the media, and other parties. Professionalisation is also the 
degree to which election campaigns are professionalised at a certain point in time (cf. 
Zucker 1977). Professionalisation with regard to the four electoral environments should be 
analysed separately, because different environments exert different expectations and 
pressures on the campaigns, so that there are different causal conditions for each 
environment. Campaign professionalisation becomes manifest in several characteristics of 
campaign communication and campaign organisation. These characteristics or indicators 
for campaign professionalisation are dependent from the regulative, systemic and cultural 
environment in which the campaigns are planned and realised. In contrast to political 
marketing, professionalisation mainly encompasses characteristics of campaign 
communication and organisation that are meant to contribute to the success of selling a 
65 
 
political product, in marketing terms, while political marketing goes beyond these aspects 
and equally affects the objectives and the justification underlying the campaign and implies 
that parties determine their behaviour in response to voter demands and design their 
“products” to suit the electorate (cf. Lees-Marshment 2001: 698).  
Strömbäck (2007: 53) formulated, as expectations to a definition of professionalised 
political campaigning, that it “should focus on the planning for and the conduct of 
campaigns, and not on system-specific factors that the campaigns themselves cannot 
control”. What is more, “the definition should be operationalizable in order to make 
comparative studies possible” (Strömbäck 2007: 53). With the underlying logic of 
professionalised campaigning as an adaption to the expectations of the electoral 
environments that becomes manifest in several characteristics of campaign communication 
and campaign organisation, the definition proposed here complies in principle with the first 
demand to focus on the planning for and the conduct of campaigns. However, it depends 
strongly on how campaign professionalisation will be operationalised, that is, which 
indicators of professionalised campaigning are included in the measurement. The proposed 
definition partly complies with the second demand that it should be operationalisable in 
order to make comparative studies possible, because it proposes a common theoretical 
framework and analytical perspective for comparative analyses. However, it implies a 
context-specific operationalisation of campaign professionalisation, making comparability a 
difficult matter.  
To sum up, this definition adds to existing research in three ways. Based on the theoretical 
foundation of sociological neo-institutionalism two central characteristics of campaign 
professionalisation that emerged from existing research can be integrated into the 
conceptualisation of campaign professionalisation. The first concerns the existence of 
several different environments for election campaigning. While there is a broad consensus in 
existing research about the general concept of professionalisation of election campaigning 
as an adaptation of campaigns to a changing environment, and while scholars have 
mentioned different environments that campaigns are adapted to, these aspects had not yet 
been drawn on in order to build a theoretical framework for campaign professionalisation. 
Sociological neo-institutionalism allows for the theoretical substantiation of both aspects 
(i.e., professionalisation as an adaptation to changing environments and the differentiability 
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of environments) and the integration of them into a theoretical framework for campaign 
professionalisation. The second aspect concerns the amount of subjectivity that seemed to 
be inherent in the concept of campaign professionalisation from existing research but had 
not yet been theoretically substantiated. By conceptualising campaign professionalisation as 
an adaption of parties by which they react to pressures and changes in their relevant 
electoral environments in ways that they consider to be the most rational and appropriate 
(i.e., a rational myth), sociological neo-institutionalism also allows for the theoretical 
integration and substantiation of the subjectivity aspect.  
Finally, the proposed conceptualisation provides a common, context-independent 
theoretical framework for campaign professionalisation. Based on the presented definition, 
campaign professionalisation can be treated as a functional equivalent in different contexts 
as it has the same meaning and purpose in each context. This is a fundamental requirement 
of comparative research. At the same time, the neo-institutional perspective reinforces an 
emic operationalisation of campaign professionalisation as it underlines the importance of 
context factors and a context-adequate measurement. Therefore, it clearly represents a step 
away from a comparable measurement rather than a move towards it. Depending on the 
research interest this can also be regarded a disadvantage, especially for larger comparative 
research projects that aim at collecting and comparing data on campaign communication 
from different countries or other regional contexts. To conclude, the neo-institutionalist 
perspective contributes to defining campaign professionalisation in a functional equivalent 
way, but it does not contribute to elaborating a comparable measurement and 
operationalisation of campaign professionalisation.  
The following chapter will propose a measurement instrument for the context of the Swiss 
cantonal election campaigns that are analysed in this study, discuss why an emic 
measurement is preferred over an etic one and provide a rationale for each indicator.  
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2.3 Measuring campaign professionalisation 
2.3.1 Measurement should differentiate between environments  
Which consequences for the measurement of campaign professionalisation follow from the 
neo-institutional perspective? First, it was deducted utilising the neo-institutionalist 
theoretical foundation of this study that election campaigns are not necessarily 
professionalised to the same degree with regard to all four relevant electoral environments, 
and that different environments provide different pressures and incentives to adapt 
campaigns activities in accordance to institutional expectations. Hence, an aggregated 
measurement instrument (or, in other words, an aggregated professionalisation index) bears 
the risk of creating inaccurate results, both with regard to the degree of professionalisation 
of election campaigns and with regard to the causal conditions that lead to campaign 
professionalisation (the independent variables or explanatory factors in correlational terms). 
Therefore, I propose to measure campaign professionalisation with four different indices – 
one for each electoral environment. 
Based on this insight, I argue that the indicators that have been assembled to date in 
aggregated indices (mainly the CAMPROF index by Gibson & Römmele, its modified 
version by Strömbäck and the index by Tenscher (and colleagues)) can be differentiated 
and refer in fact to the four relevant electoral environments constituted by the media, the 
members, the voters and other parties. Hence, it should be possible to re-assemble the 
indicators in four different environment-related indices and to re-evaluate existing studies 
with regard to the environments that the campaigns have been adapted to the most. To 
date, there has only been a moderate number of studies that assess the degree and profile 
of professionalisation in a systematic and comparable way. Those are on the one hand 
Gibson and Römmele (2009), who apply their CAMPROF index (see chapter 1.2.1) to the 
German election to the federal parliament of 2005. Strömbäck (2009) uses a modified 
version of the CAMPROF index to measure the professionalisation of the election to the 
Swedish national parliament in 2006. Tenscher (2007, 2011) applies his professionalisation 
index to the German election to the federal parliament of 2005 and 2009. Lisi (2011) 
measures the degree of professionalisation of the Portuguese campaigns in the 2009 general 
election by using the index from Strömbäck (2009) (though leaving out the indicator 
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“research of own party or campaign” and labelling the parties’ activities to conduct 
opposition research “negative campaign” (cf. Lisi 2011: 121)). Tenscher and colleagues 
(2012) analyse campaign professionalisation in the campaigns for the European 
Parliamentary Elections in 2009 organised by several parties in Germany, Austria, Finland 
and Sweden. As this latter study does not reveal the results for each indicator separately it 
will not be included in the following meta-analysis. 
For the purpose of this limited meta-analysis of campaign professionalisation differentiated 
by environment, the indicators that were included in the respective studies were assigned to 
the four electoral environments of the voters, the members, the media, and other parties 
(see Chapter 2.2.3.) and the scores that each party reached for the same indicator were 
added. Finally, the scores for each indicator belonging to the same environment were 
added (for an overview see Appendix A)). A weak point of this procedure lies in the fact 
that the existing indicators put different emphasis on the four environments. Among the 
ten indicators Gibson and Römmele (2009) include in their measurement instrument there 
is only one that refers to the environment of the media, namely whether PR or media 
consultants were involved in the campaign, while among the 17 indicators proposed by 
Tenscher (2007, 2011), eight refer directly or indirectly to the media. It should also be 
noted that in contrast to the indicator used in the measurement instrument of this study, 
existing studies exclusively analyse whether parties monitored rival parties’ campaigns but 
do not take a general monitoring of other parties’ campaigns into consideration. What is 
more, a fewer number of indicators relates to the environment of rival parties than to the 
other environments. This should be kept in mind when reading the results of this analysis. 
Despite this, a general overview is offered by the results gained.  
Starting with the study by Gibson and Römmele (2009) on the 2005 federal election in 
Germany, the parties professionalised their campaigns to a similar degree with regard to the 
voters, the members and the competitive parties (71, 72 and 71 per cent respectively of the 
maximum scores were achieved by the parties), and to a lesser degree (58 per cent) with 
regard to the media. As it was mentioned earlier the weaker result for the media should, 
however, be treated with caution, since there is only one indicator (“use of outside public 
relations/media consultants”) that refers to this environment. If we take a look at the study 
by Strömbäck (2009), the overall scores are lower than those achieved in the German 
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elections analysed by Gibson and Römmele (2009) but show a similar pattern. The Swedish 
campaigns achieved 38 per cent of the maximum score for the environment of the voters, 
35 per cent for the members, 29 per cent for the competitive parties and 12 per cent for 
the media. In the first study conducted by Tenscher (2007) the campaigns for the 2005 
German federal election5 achieved 61 per cent of the maximum score for the environment 
of the voters, 75 per cent for the members, 68 per cent for the media and 67 per cent for 
the environment formed by the competitive parties. For the 2009 German federal elections 
analysed by Tenscher (2011) the scores were 65 per cent for the voters, 69 per cent for the 
members, 60 per cent for the media and 75 per cent for rival parties. In the study 
conducted by Lisi (2011) the Portuguese campaigns resulted in 42 per cent of the 
maximum score for the environment of the voters, 48 per cent for the members, 33 per 
cent for the environment of the media and 17 per cent for the rival parties.  
In order to draw meaningful conclusions from this brief meta-analysis, it would of course 
be necessary to validate the comparability of the original data and the significance of the 
results. In addition, more in-depth knowledge would be necessary in order to link the 
results back to the environmental conditions in Sweden, Germany and Portugal. Some 
background information about the Swedish case is provided by Strömbäck who reports 
that the former stability in Swedish voter behaviour has weakened during the last decades 
as the “proportion of voters switching parties between elections has increased (…) to 31.8 
per cent in the 2002 election“ (Strömbäck 2009: 105f.) and “the proportion of voters 
switching party during the election campaign has increased (…) to 19.1 per cent during the 
same period“ (Strömbäck 2009: 106). What is more, the “proportion of late deciders has 
also increased significantly“ (Strömbäck 2009: 106) with 57 per cent of the voters making 
their final voting decision during the election campaign in 2002. Finally, “party 
identification has also decreased“ (Strömbäck 2009: 106) from 65 per cent (identification) 
and 39 per cent (strong identification) in 1968 to 40 per cent and 19 per cent respectively in 
2002. Strömbäck assumes that “the increasing uncertainty facing parties creates strong 
incentives for them to professionalise their campaigning” (Strömbäck 2009: 106). Limited 
as the reliability of this re-assessment of professionalisation per environment may certainly 
                                                 
5 The campaigns for the elections to the European Parliament analysed by Tenscher were left out of this 
overview due to comparability considerations, as the campaigns in the remaining studies are national 
campaigns.  
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be, I argue that the fact that the Swedish campaigns were professionalised most intensively 
with regard to the environments constituted by the members and by the voters can be 
explained by an especially strong incentive for parties to professionalise their campaigns 
with regard to these two environments.  
To sum up, the fact that campaigns have achieved very different degrees of 
professionalisation with regard to the different environments throughout the five studies 
further supports the assumption that measurement of professionalisation should 
differentiate between environments. 
 
2.3.2 Measurement should take the context into consideration 
Second, defining professionalisation of election campaigns as the process by which political 
parties adapt their campaigns to real or perceived changes in, and institutional expectations 
from, their relevant environments means that measurement of campaign 
professionalisation should take the context into consideration. We remember from 
Chapters 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 that campaign professionalisation as an adaptation to electoral 
environments becomes manifest in several characteristics of campaign communication and 
campaign organisation. While the theoretical concept underlying campaign 
professionalisation is the same in all countries, regions, etc., its manifestation differs 
depending on the regulative, systemic and cultural environment in which the campaigns are 
planned and realised.  
In all comparative research, researchers have to make sure that they analyse the same 
construct in all contexts instead of comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. Construct 
equivalence is established “if an equivalent structure of subdimensions can be found in 
every country [canton, region, etc., S.K.] in question” (Wirth & Kolb 2004: 94). If this is 
the case, researchers should opt for the etic strategy of operationalisation. Since the 
construct consists of the same dimensions it can be measured with the same instrument in 
different contexts. If, however, the researcher’s in-depth analysis shows that construct 
equivalence is missing, the strategy of choice is an emic approach. The operationalisation for 
the measurement of the construct is then developed context-specifically, to “provide for a 
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highly adequate, culturally specific national [cantonal, regional, etc., S.K.] instrument” 
(Wirth & Kolb 2004: 94). This procedure “will also be possible if one or more national 
[cantonal, regional, etc., S.K.] instruments already exist and the instruments for the other 
countries [cantons, regions, etc., S.K.] have to be developed separately” (Wirth & Kolb 
2004: 94). A disadvantage of the emic approach is, however, that “as measurement differs 
from culture to culture, the integration of the national [cantonal, regional, etc., S.K.] results 
can be very difficult” (Wirth & Kolb 2004: 94). Quantitative comparisons, like statements 
about the degree to which a construct occurs in different contexts, are ineligible if the 
construct has been measured with different indicators and/or different scales.  
While using the same measurement instrument for campaign professionalisation in 
different countries, regions, etc. may produce results that can be integrated more easily and 
also compared in a quantitative manner the results bear the risk of being inaccurate because 
they are prone to context-specific distortions. For example, when applying the CAMPROF 
index developed by Gibson and Römmele to the Swedish elections, Strömbäck found that 
several indicators (“research of one’s own party or campaign”, “use of telemarketing”) are 
uncommon in Swedish election campaigns (cf. Strömbäck 2009: 108). If we consider 
professionalisation to be an adaption to relevant environments, it is context-specific by 
definition. The lack of these elements in the Swedish campaigns is due to the national 
political culture and should not be interpreted as indicating a lower overall degree of 
campaign professionalisation. As Holtz-Bacha notes, by using the example of the German 
national elections of 2009, the weak role of online campaigning in these elections could be 
interpreted not as a lack of professionalisation but rather as an adaption to the fact that 
online communication is still a less effective instrument to reach potential voters in 
Germany (cf. Holtz-Bacha 2010: 17f.). Strömbäck (2007: 63) concluded similarly that  
“(…) it would be wrong to view campaigns in countries where the political parties are strong, 
and where the expertise in polling, news management, and voter segmentation, therefore, is in-
house, as inherently less professionalized than in countries where the parties are weaker and 
where they make more use of outside consultants.“  
This study will therefore opt for an emic procedure and use a measurement instrument that 
is adapted to the context of the Swiss cantonal election campaigns in order to make sure 
that campaign professionalisation is adequately captured in the campaigns that are included 
in this study. For the subsequent comparative analysis of cantonal election campaigns I 
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therefore propose a measurement instrument that is in several ways adapted to the Swiss 
cantonal conditions. 
 
2.3.3 The measurement instrument 
Taking the indices proposed by Gibson and Römmele, Tenscher and Strömbäck (cf. 
Chapter 1.2.1) as starting points and applying them to the case of the Swiss cantons, the 
data show that several indicators do not play any role at all in the cantonal campaigns 
included in this study. This affects, on the one hand, indicators that are very time-
consuming or imply a high level of resources. Swiss parties do not receive financial support 
from the state; and the budgets for the cantonal elections are even lower than for the 
national elections. Opinion polling (cf. Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285; Strömbäck 2007: 54; 
Tenscher et al. 2012: 162), conducting opposition research (cf. Gibson & Römmele 2009: 
285; Strömbäck 2007: 54; Tenscher et al. 2012: 162), the use of a rapid rebuttal-unit (cf. 
Strömbäck 2007: 54), semi-independent research of strengths and weaknesses of the 
campaign (cf. Strömbäck 2007: 54) and the use of campaign controlled focus groups (cf. 
Strömbäck 2007: 54) were not employed in any of the 23 campaigns. It can be assumed 
that their use by far exceeds the cantonal campaign budgets and resources, as individual 
cantonal campaign managers suggested. What is more, political advertising on the radio and 
on television (“paid media” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 163)) is not permitted in Swiss elections.  
The absence of further indicators of professionalised campaigns is rooted in Swiss political 
culture. Telemarketing as a means of campaign communication was not employed in any of 
the campaigns analysed in this study. In the interviews the campaign managers explained 
that they do not believe it is a campaign technique that would be accepted by the voters. A 
survey among party members in the three cantons of Bern, Aargau and Neuchâtel revealed 
that indeed telephone calls are, together with direct canvassing, the least appreciated way 
that party members wish to be contacted by their parties. Telephone calls would be 
accepted only by an average 9% of them as a means of contact with their party (cf. Knocks 
& Fraefel 2013: 93). From the theoretical perspective of this study that conceptualises 
campaign professionalisation as the best possible adaption to the political and social 
environment, there is no incentive for the parties to employ campaign instruments, 
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strategies or techniques which are not accepted by voters and members, since they would 
not be of any help.  
Another Swiss particularity affects the indicators “externalisation” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 
162), “outside headquarters” and “use of outside public relations/media consultants” 
(Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285), which could not be found in any of the campaigns. As it 
is the case in many European countries (cf. Mancini 1999; Holtz-Bacha 2010; 
Papathanassopoulos et al. 2007; Strömbäck 2007: 63), experts inside the party, that is party 
members or sympathisers with professional knowledge, carry out the vast majority of the 
strategic and executive work in election campaigns in Switzerland. What is more, 
Switzerland has a tradition of a wide range of political and administrative posts not 
executed by paid staff but rather by volunteers in honorary posts (“Milizsystem”). Thus, 
there has been a culture of professional amateurism in Swiss politics, which is still present 
today especially at the political levels below the national level. Campaign characteristics 
which are included in existing indices but were found not to play any role in the cantonal 
election campaigns due to budgetary and legal constraints and to particularities of the Swiss 
political culture were thus not included as indicators in the measurement instrument for 
campaign professionalisation of this study.  
Second, those indicators that proved impossible to collect for all parties involved due to 
confidentiality concerns were also left aside. This concerns questions concerning the 
campaign budget (“size of election campaign budget” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 161)). 
Third, the interviews showed that the conditions for the use of television and radio 
programmes for campaign communication (“relevance of free media” (Tenscher et al. 
2012: 163)) were not comparable between the cantons and were hence not included in the 
comparative analysis. According to the interviewees, regional television and radio in Aargau 
offered very few programmes concerning the upcoming election (not even upon the 
request of the parties), while the Neuchâtel channels seemed to be rather active in offering 
slots for debates, round-tables, etc. The use of television in the campaign is thus not under 
the control of the parties, but rather depends on the broadcasters’ inclination. As such, the 
relevance of the free media in the campaign was considered a system-specific factor that 
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the campaigns themselves cannot control (cf. Strömbäck 2007: 53) and was not included in 
the measurement instrument.  
The presented rationale for leaving out certain indicators that had been included in other 
analyses of campaign professionalisation from the measurement instrument is closely 
linked to the theoretical approach to campaign professionalisation that is proposed in this 
study. Note that from a theoretical approach that does not consider campaign 
professionalisation a context-specific concept and therefore opts for an etic measurement 
instrument, the absence of several campaign characteristics (political advertising on 
television, telemarketing, etc.) would be interpreted as indicators of a lower level of 
professionalisation of Swiss cantonal campaigns all in all.  
In the following, I will discuss the characteristics of campaign organisation and campaign 
communication that were included as indicators for professionalised campaigning in the 
measurement instrument of this study. A rationale for each indicator will also be provided. 
The operationalisation of the presented measurement instrument will be discussed in 
Chapter 4.1. 
The first indicator for professionalised campaigning included in the measurement 
instrument of this study was whether there was at least one professional for technical support (e.g. 
for the design of the commercial material; or a photographer) mandated in the campaign. 
Second, it was analysed whether there was at least one professional for strategic, conceptual or 
ideological support (e.g. a public relations agency) mandated in the campaign. All forms of 
mandating – from hiring in the sense that the professionals received full payment for their 
services to mandating a volunteer with professional knowledge – are encompassed here. 
These indicators correspond to the indicators “use of outside public relations/media 
consultants” (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285), “use of in-house expertise and/or outside 
consultants in news management/public relations; (…) in analyzing public opinion; (…) in 
advertisements; (…) in voter segmentation” (Strömbäck 2007: 54), and “degree of 
externalization” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 162) in the existing operationalisations of campaign 
professionalisation. I propose to differentiate between the employment of campaign 
professionals for technical and for strategy assistance, following Karlsen’s (2009: 196) 
argument that  
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“(...) there is a significant difference between technical services, for example the design of the 
commercial material, and services that involve influence on the campaign strategy as such. 
Hence, regarding the type of service provided, I differentiate between technical assistance and 
strategy assistance. Technical assistance is services that the parties (might) need, but has little 
influence on strategic planning, for example website design. Strategy assistance covers influence 
on the campaign strategy, for example the creation of the campaign message.”  
From the theoretical perspective of this study, mandating professionals can be considered a 
means of internal reorganisation which parties seize if they are confronted with pressures 
and challenges resulting from changes in their relevant electoral environments (cf. Mair et 
al. 1999: 21). What is more, the mandating of campaign professionals can be expected to 
follow the same motivation as hiring management consultants: Considerations concerning 
efficiency and effectiveness left aside, mandating professionals is a means to distinctly 
demonstrate modern campaign management and ensure internal and external legitimacy 
(for the argumentation concerning management consultants see Hasse & Krücken 1999: 
14). 
Third, it was analysed whether training for candidates and/or party members in campaign 
practices or campaign messages were provided on at least one occasion during the 
campaign. Training could take the form of a course, but also of a manual that was 
distributed to the candidates and/or the volunteers. This indicator, which is not included in 
any of the existing measurement instruments, was analysed because the existing indices for 
campaign professionalisation do not take into account that the candidates play a central 
role in European campaigns as they carry out most of the campaign communication (cf. 
Holtz-Bacha 2010: 14). This was definitively the case in the cantonal election campaigns 
according to the interviews with the campaign managers conducted for this dissertation. 
Thus, training for candidates and/or party members was included as an indicator. In line 
with the theoretical approach to campaign professionalisation I have adopted, it can be 
modelled as a further means of internal reorganisation by which the parties react to 
changes in their electoral environments (cf. Mair et al. 1999: 21). 
The fourth indicator for professionalised campaigning included in the measurement 
instrument of this study was whether there were campaign headquarters installed or whether 
there was a campaign team designated for the campaign. This indicator corresponds to the 
indicators “outside headquarters” (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285), “centralized campaign 
headquarters able to coordinate the management of the campaign” (Strömbäck 2007: 54), 
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and “degree of centralization of campaign organization” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 161). As I 
proposed earlier, this indicator was adapted to the European and Swiss context respectively 
and no longer requires externalisation. Mair and colleagues argue that centralising decisions 
and planning in the hands of campaign experts is a second approach to internal 
organisational which parties seize if they are confronted with pressures and challenges 
resulting from changes in their relevant electoral environments (cf. Mair et al. 1999: 21).  
Fifth, it was analysed whether the campaign featured a centrally elaborated basic joint campaign 
that was implemented in all constituencies of the cantonal party branch. In addition to the 
indicator regarding training for candidates and volunteers, this is the second indicator that 
was not included in existing measurement instruments. It is added due to the particularities 
of cantonal election campaigns. As I discussed in Chapter 2.2.3, the window of opportunity 
for election campaigning has become larger from the perspective of the parties as party 
identification decreases, the number of swing voters increases and electoral decisions tend 
to be made later. Parties have to make a bigger effort, prepare their campaigns more 
thoroughly, and intensify their campaigns with regard to potential voters. In Switzerland 
there are large numbers of commuters whose way to work and back home leads them 
through different constituencies. At the same time, the regional sub-organisations of the 
cantonal parties in the constituencies are, in theory, completely independent in their design 
of their campaign components, be it the graphic design of the posters, the key topics of the 
campaign or the choice of campaign events. As the campaign work is done on a voluntary 
basis the party branches in the constituencies cannot be forced to design their campaign in 
accordance with cantonal guidelines. In order to create memorable campaigns that have 
recognition value, even for voters who travel through several constituencies, parties have to 
ensure that their campaigns feature consistent traits like a uniform poster design and 
uniform key messages. Therefore, a centrally elaborated basic joint campaign that was 
implemented in all constituencies was included in the measurement instrument as a means 
to intensify campaigning with regard to potential voters in the Swiss commuter context. 
As a sixth indicator for campaign professionalisation it was analysed whether parties opted 
for continuous campaigning, i.e. whether the campaign lasted longer than the ‘hot phase’ of 
campaigning (which can differ between countries and elections). As campaigns become 
more continuous or permanent, the amount of activities like events or mailings goes 
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beyond the usual sporadic mailings to members and supporters or party officials taking part 
in panel discussions. Activities meant to inform, convince or bind potential and existing 
voters take place throughout the year. This indicator corresponds to the indicators 
“continuous campaigning” (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285; Strömbäck 2007: 54) and 
“campaign duration” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 162) in the existing operationalisations of 
campaign professionalisation. Theoretically, this indicator – like the implementation of a 
joint campaign – reflects changes in the electoral environment formed by the voters, where 
electioneering has become more complex and contested. As the definitive election decision 
is increasingly often made only at a late stage of the campaign, the window of opportunity 
for the parties to gain attention and support is widening and the number of potential voters 
that could be convinced or lost is growing. Continuous campaigning can thus be 
considered a reflection of the parties’ efforts to make their campaigns more intensive and 
far reaching in order to to maximise the number of people that are reached by the 
campaign.  
Seventh, it was analysed whether there were means of online communication, notably video 
clips, participative web content (e.g. blogs, bulletin boards) and social networks employed 
at least once during the campaign. Or, in other words, it was analysed whether the cantonal 
parties made use of the participative and interactive functions of the Internet in their 
campaigns. This corresponds to the indicator “differentiation of internal communication 
structures (existence and the use of ‘new’ communication media for internal campaign 
communication and the mobilization of party members)” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 162), while 
the use of new modes of online campaigning is expanded to the campaign communication 
in total and is not analysed exclusively for internal campaign communication. Participative 
and interactive online formats are a means by which parties can “improve the efficiency 
and scope of their election campaign through ‘an architecture of participation’” (Lilleker & 
Jackson 2011: 97). What is more, “the online user can be mobilised to support a campaign, 
sign a petition, and reinforce the political messages through social networks” (Lilleker & 
Jackson 2011: 97). Basic party websites were not included in the analysis as they can be 
expected to allow mostly for static and hierarchical one-way communication from the 
parties to the voters and therefore do not have the mobilising potential that participative 
and interactive formats have been assumed to produce. From the theoretical perspective of 
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campaign professionalisation, as an adaption to changes in the relevant electoral 
environments that underlies this study, there are several viable approaches as to why parties 
include means of online communication in their campaigns. On the one hand, it can be 
considered a measure to maximise the number of communication channels in the campaign 
and hence to maximise the number of potential voters that are reached by the campaign. 
On the other hand, including means of online communication into the campaign can also 
be the consequence of mimetic behaviour with regard to peer or competitive parties. 
Theoretically, if a party decides to opt for online campaigning other parties will copy this 
behaviour, either because they are unsure about their own position towards online 
campaigning or because they consider the party to be generally successful and thus a good 
indicator for the potential success of online campaigning. Also, they may not want to stay 
behind with regard to innovative campaigning and create a competitive disadvantage. What 
is more, regardless of the actual gain in voter contacts or successful mobilisations, new 
means of online communication like video clips, participative web content and social 
networks may be considered a means by which to give the campaign, and thus the party 
which is organising the campaign, a more modern appearance. 
As an eight indicator for campaign professionalisation it was analysed whether means of 
so-called direct communication or narrowcasting, notably direct mail, direct e-mail and text 
messages, were employed at least once during the campaign. This campaign characteristic 
corresponds to the indicators “use of direct mail to own members or outside target 
groups” (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285), “use of direct mail to target groups”, “use of 
direct mail to own members or campaign volunteers” (Strömbäck 2007: 54), and “degree of 
narrowcasting activities” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 163) in the existing operationalisations of 
campaign professionalisation. From the theoretical perspective of this study, the use of 
direct communication channels or narrowcasting is a means to simultaneously intensify and 
expand campaign communication with regard to the environments formed by both the 
voters and party members, where electioneering has become more complex and contested 
and mobilisation more difficult. Direct mail, direct e-mail and text messages can be sent to 
a large number of potential voters and supporters and are thus very far reaching means of 
communication. At the same time, content and messages can be tailored to central target 
groups. What is more, direct means of communication can be created in a quasi-
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personalised manner, using automated signatures or personalised forms of address (cf. 
Römmele 2005: 40), thereby creating the impression of a more personal and hopefully 
more mobilising appeal. For the case of Germany, Römmele also found direct mailing to 
be especially effective where the organisational structures of the parties were 
underdeveloped and where party identification was at a rather low level (cf. Römmele 2005: 
143). Hence, the means of so-called direct communication can also serve as a substitute for 
face-to-face communication between party members and/or officials in the regional 
branches and the electorate. 
Finally, it was analysed whether the campaign featured monitoring of the campaign activities of 
other parties (at least on one occasion during the campaign). This campaign characteristic is 
based on the indicators “conducting opposition research” (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 285; 
Strömbäck 2007: 54) and “degree of opposition research” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 162) in the 
existing operationalisations of campaign professionalisation. Based on the theoretical 
insights from within sociological neo-institutionalism, this indicator was extended to a 
general monitoring of the campaign activities of other parties and is not restricted to 
opposition or rival parties. While there are processes of reciprocal orientation between 
competitors and providers of similar products (cf. Hasse & Krücken 1999: 45), 
organisations can equally behave mimetically with regard to organisations in their field that 
they perceive to be more legitimate or successful (cf. DiMaggio & Powell 1983: 152) – 
which are not necessarily competitors. From the theoretical perspective of this study, 
monitoring of the campaign activities of other parties is thus a means by which to react to 
increasing uncertainty caused by changes in the environments for campaigning, not to miss 
innovations and to model their own campaign on the campaigns of other – presumably 
successful – parties.  
In order to enable an environment-sensitive measurement, four differentiated indices for 
campaign professionalisation with regard to the electoral environments constituted by the 
members, by the voters, by the media and by other parties are created based on the 
indicators which have been introduced in the preceding paragraphs. For some of the 
indicators, assigning them to the four environments is an obvious procedure. This is the 
case for the indicator “monitoring other parties’ campaigns”, which obviously is a reaction 
with regard to the environment formed by other parties, rivals as well as peers or partners; 
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implementing a basic joint campaign for all constituencies serves to make the campaign 
more recognisable for potential voters as well as for members.  
For other indicators, I analysed from the transcripts of the interviews with the campaign 
managers which of the four electoral environments the campaign characteristic (or 
indicator) could be assigned to. If, for example, the training that was offered to candidates 
aimed at improving their skills to canvass voters on the street, the training was coded as 
professionalisation with regard to the electoral environment formed by the voters. If the 
training served to prepare the candidates for newspaper interviews or to improve their 
social media performance, the training was coded as professionalisation with regard to the 
environment formed by the media. If a professional was mandated explicitly for the 
purpose of helping with the party’s representation in the media (say, an IT specialist who 
was asked to create a website or to improve an existing one, or a cameraman for the 
production of video clips), this was also coded as an indicator for campaign 
professionalisation with regard to the environment formed by the media. Text messages 
that were sent to all listed members were coded as belonging to the environment of the 
members; if, however, text messages were sent to everyone listed in a commercial address 
file that was purchased by the party, this was coded as an indicator for campaign 
professionalisation with regard to the environment formed by the voters. The 
differentiated measurement instruments resulting from this procedure can be found in 
Chapter 4.1.  
The empirical analysis with fsQCA utilised in Chapter 8 tests whether there are different 
paths that lead to professionalisation with regard to different environments. If this is 
indeed the case, I argue that this can be interpreted – to begin with, in the theoretical and 
empirical framework of this dissertation – as evidence that campaign professionalisation 
should be conceptualised and measured in a differentiated manner (i.e., taking into account 
the four different electoral environments) rather than considering it an aggregated 
construct.  
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3. Causal conditions for campaign professionalisation 
The theoretical reasoning of this study suggested that if the trend towards isomorphism in 
campaign professionalisation (that is, all parties display the same characteristics and the 
same level of professionalised campaigning) is refracted, this is due to factors on two levels: 
the systemic level and the party level (cf. Chapter 2.2.2). I briefly discussed that the degree 
and profile of campaign professionalisation is expected to differ with regard to the size of 
the canton, the degree of urbanisation of the canton, and the degree of competitiveness of 
the political situation in the canton where the campaigns took place, as well as with regard 
to the political position on the left-right political spectrum and to the status as a catch-all 
party of the party that organised the campaign. After presenting the current state of 
research with regard to influence factors for campaign professionalisation (3.1), the five 
causal conditions that will be analysed in this study are introduced, including their 
theoretical derivation (Chapters 3.2 and 3.3; the concrete operationalisation and calibration 
of the causal conditions can be found in Chapter 8). The hypotheses underlying this study 
are deduced and presented in Chapter 3.4. Finally, in Chapter 3.5 I will outline the general 
theoretical model underlying the present dissertation and the hypothesised relations 
between the outcomes and the causal conditions in two schemes. 
 
3.1 Current state of research 
In existing studies that systematically test the influence of explanatory variables on 
campaign professionalisation, factors at the party level dominate factors at the systemic 
level. This is due to the fact that the only existing theory on campaign professionalisation, 
the party-centred theory originally proposed by Gibson and Römmele (2001), focuses on 
explanatory variables at the party level. While equally recognising that parties are responsive 
to their external environments, Gibson and Römmele (2001, 2009) as well as Strömbäck 
(2007, 2009) have stressed the important role that the parties themselves play in 
professionalising their campaigns. They have argued theoretically and empirically that 
parties’ decisions and actions are not unalterably determined by their environments, but 
that parties have a certain capacity for making strategic decisions about their campaign 
organisation and communication. Gibson and Römmele as well as Strömbäck recognise 
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that “systemic arrangements remain important” (Gibson & Römmele 2001: 35) and that 
“the systemic environment needs to be recognised both because it is important and 
because it is part of the original formulation of the theory (Gibson and Römmele 2001)” 
(Strömbäck 2009: 107). While factors at the systemic level are included, notably in different 
compositions, in the schematic illustrations of the model underlying the party-centred 
theory (cf. Gibson & Römmele 2001: 38; Gibson & Römmele 2009: 281; Strömbäck 2009: 
107), these factors are not systematically tested or discussed. Gibson and Römmele (2009) 
and Strömbäck (2009) explicitly base their analyses on this theory, while the study by 
Tenscher and colleagues (2012) also includes references to it.  
Gibson and Römmele (2009) apply the party-centred theory that they developed in an 
earlier paper (cf. Gibson & Römmele 2001) to the case of the 2005 German federal 
election. The study includes the priming variables vote seeking as a primary goal; right-wing 
ideology, internal centralisation (i.e., hierarchical structure), high level of resources and the 
intervening variables: external shock (i.e., a heavy electoral defeat) and internal shock (i.e., a 
change in leadership). These variables are expected to lead to a higher degree of campaign 
professionalisation. The high scores of the “well-resourced, centralized, vote-seeking” 
(Gibson & Römmele 2009: 283) SPD and CDU on the CAMPROF index and the lowest 
ranking of the Greens, a “small, less well-resourced left-wing party focusing on intra-party 
democracy” (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 284), are interpreted as affirmations of the 
presumed effects on campaign professionalisation. The finding that the left-wing SPD 
scores most highly is interpreted to suggest that “while ideology may influence a party’s 
uptake of professionalized campaigning, electoral performance may be the more important 
driver” (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 284), as the SPD was “the only party to have suffered a 
significant loss of votes” (Gibson & Römmele 2009: 282).  
Strömbäck (2009) tested the party-centred theory of professionalised campaigning in the 
context of the 2006 Swedish election. In contrast to Gibson and Römmele (2009) he 
modelled the variables loss of incumbency, vote loss in the previous election and the 
changing of the party leader to have the same status as all other independent variables and 
not as intervening variables like Gibson and Römmele proposed. Comparing the scores the 
seven parties achieved on the dependent variable (i.e., campaign professionalisation) and on 
the seven independent variables, Strömbäck concludes that, “while the degree of 
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professionalised campaigning is indeed shaped by the independent variables suggested by 
the party-centred theory of professionalised campaigning, it is not determined by them” 
(Strömbäck 2009: 111). While the paper does not provide a detailed discussion of the 
influence of the individual independent variables, the assumption that right-wing parties 
produce more professionalised campaigns is implicitly dismissed by concluding that the 
Social Democrats ran the most professionalised campaign while the Christian Democrats 
ran a less professionalised campaign than expected (cf. Strömbäck 2009: 111). 
Tenscher (2007) compared the campaigns of six German national parties for the federal 
election of 2005 and the European parliamentary election of 2004 and concluded that the 
context in which elections take place influences the degree of campaign professionalisation. 
The campaigns for the federal election, which were much more important from the 
perspective of the parties, were significantly more professionalised that those of the 
European parliamentary election, which they considered a second-order election. Tenscher 
also found differences in campaign professionalisation with regard to the parties (with the 
campaigns of the two biggest parties being most professionalised), whose significance and 
theoretical interpretation were, however, not discussed. In his 2011 study, Tenscher added 
the German federal election of 2009 and the European parliamentary election of 2009 to 
the existing data set. Comparing the four elections, he concluded that the campaigns have 
become more professionalised over time and that campaigns for the European 
parliamentary elections were still less professionalised than those for the federal elections. 
The four elections do not allow for consistent interpretation with regard to 
professionalisation differences between right-wing and left-wing parties (cf. Tenscher 2011: 
87). As was the case for the federal election of 2005 and the European parliamentary 
election of 2004, the campaigns of the two biggest parties (SPD and CDU) were most 
professionalised in the two 2009 elections. 
Tenscher and colleagues (2012) tested whether the degree of professionalisation of the 
campaigns for the European parliamentary election of 2009 by the 28 parties in Austria, 
Germany, Finland and Sweden differs due to factors on the party level (size of the party, 
catch-all party, right-wing party, experience of an external or internal shock) and at the 
systemic level (country, Northern and Central Europe). Based on a comparison of means 
they found that “central European parties are clearly ahead in building professionalized 
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campaign structures by comparison with the Northern European parties” (Tenscher et al. 
2012: 155). What is more, “the campaign structures of big parties were twice as 
professionalized compared with small parties” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 155). With regard to 
the strategic elements of campaign professionalisation, however, “country and party size 
were not relevant factors in explaining the parties’ strategic choices” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 
158). Also, “the catch-all dimension, party ideology, and change of party leadership failed 
to produce the predicted results and seem to be unrelated to campaign professionalism” 
(Tenscher et al. 2012: 159). While the study by Tenscher and colleagues was not designed 
as a test of the party centred theory of campaign professionalism, the researchers conclude 
that the “analysis produced results that fit quite poorly or only partially with the party 
centered theory of campaign professionalism (Gibson & Römmele 2001; Strömbäck 
2009)” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 159).  
Hence, while existing research does find variance in campaign professionalisation between 
parties, countries and elections, there is not yet a consistent interpretation of these – partly 
unrelated, partly contradictory – findings. Or, to put it more simply, “the search for good 
explanatory variables continues” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 159). What is more, it remains 
unclear from the research conducted to date how the systemic and the party level are 
related. In which way do factors from both levels interact? Do the systemic factors 
determine a framework in which the party level factors have an effect? Or is it the other 
way around?  
The aim of the empirical part of this dissertation is to give an answer to these questions 
based on fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). This method allows for 
testing the influence of several explanatory variables (or, in correct QCA terms, causal 
conditions) at the same time. The analysis will not only reveal whether the factors I 
hypothesise to be causal conditions for campaign professionalisation are indeed necessary 
or sufficient conditions for professionalised campaigning, it will also identify whether the 
conditions produce the outcome (i.e., professionalised campaigning) on their own or in 
combination with one or several of the other conditions. Also, the analysis will reveal 
whether there are different combinations of causal conditions that lead to the same 
outcome. With its foundations in set theory, formal logic, Boolean algebra and fuzzy 
algebra, QCA has a terminology different from that of standard correlational analysis. It 
85 
 
should therefore be noted that the remainder of this dissertation will refer to “(causal) 
conditions” (which are comparable to explanatory variables or independent variables in 
standard or correlational analysis), to the “outcome” (comparable to the dependent 
variable) and the “solution formula” as well as to the “solution terms” (comparable to the 
equation in regression analysis). 
 
3.2 Causal conditions on the systemic level 
As we remember from Chapter 2.3.3, Römmele (2005: 143) discovered, in the case of 
Germany, that direct mailing was especially important where the organisational structures 
of the parties were underdeveloped and where party identification was at a rather low level. 
We may therefore assume at a more general level that the means of so-called direct 
communication can serve as a substitute for face-to-face communication between party 
members and/or officials in the regional branches and the electorate. Similarly, parties and 
other political organisations with a geographically dispersed audience can be expected to 
have greater incentive to use the possibilities of online communication (cf. Ward und 
Gibson 2009: 36). What is more, the necessity to implement a centrally elaborated basic 
joint campaign in all constituencies increases with the number of constituencies if the risk 
of a patchy campaign with a low recognition value is to be reduced. In general, one could 
argue that the bigger a campaign a party needs to control, the more important do the 
means to control the campaign become – like relying on professional support, making sure 
that candidates and volunteers are well informed and fit to meet potential voters, as well as 
relying on skilled and prepared headquarters and campaign teams. I therefore assume that 
if campaigns and their organising parties are confronted with a changing environment for 
campaigning and if they face at the same time a large and geographically scattered target 
audience, a large group of candidates that have to be handled, a greater effort to organise a 
recognisable campaign in a large number of constituencies, etc., these challenges urge them 
to adapt the campaign to the changing circumstances by professionalising it in an all-
embracing manner. I therefore include the large size of the canton in which the campaign is 
organised as a causal condition for campaign professionalisation in the fsQCA analysis 
following in Chapter 8.  
86 
 
The use of the Internet in Switzerland still varies strongly depending on a person’s 
educational background. Currently 95 per cent of Swiss inhabitants with a university 
diploma and 58 per cent of those who completed only the mandatory nine years of 
schooling use the Internet several times per week.6 Combined with the fact that there are 
more inhabitants with a high educational status in cities than in rural areas,7 online 
communication becomes a more promising means of campaign communication in urban 
than in rural areas in the Swiss context. We can furthermore assume that the degree of 
individualisation tends to be higher and party affiliations tend to be weaker in urban 
contexts. Thus, in general, we may assume that an urban electorate will be more 
heterogeneous and therefore more difficult to reach and mobilise from the strategic 
perspective of the parties, while voting behaviour is potentially more volatile. Due to these 
particularities of the urban context the degree of urbanisation of the canton in which the 
campaign is organised can be expected to have an influence on the degree of campaign 
professionalisation. Being organised in an urban canton is therefore included as a causal 
condition for a professionalised campaign in the subsequent analysis. 
The two causal conditions of the size and level of urbanisation in the context in which a 
campaign is organised have not been tested in existing studies. Nonetheless, I expect them 
to have an influence on the degree of campaign professionalisation due to the assumed 
relations between them and several of the indicators for campaign professionalisation that 
were outlined above. 
What is more, I assume that in those cantons where there is no clear domination of one 
party but rather a competitive situation, that there will be a higher overall degree of 
campaign professionalisation. Most notably, this is because the higher the degree of 
competition the more that is at stake for the parties and the more important it is to win as 
many votes as possible. Similarly, the more that is at stake for the parties the larger the 
feeling of uncertainty will be for them and the more important it then becomes to monitor 
the campaign activities of other parties. I will therefore include a high level of competition 
                                                 
6 Cf. Swiss Federal Statistical Office: 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/16/04/key/approche_globale.indicator.30106.301.
html?open=7#7 
7 Cf. Swiss Federal Statistical Office: 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/regionen/thematische_karten/gleichstellungsatlas/ausbildun
g/bildungstand.html 
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as a third and last causal condition for campaign professionalisation at the systemic level. In 
order to assess the majority situations in the cantons, the analysis will draw on the 
distribution of seats in the cantonal parliaments in the legislative periods before the 
cantonal elections that are the focus of this study. Concretely, I take the percentage of seats 
claimed by the strongest party and subtract the percentage of seats claimed by the second 
strongest party. While this causal condition has not been tested in existing studies, its logic 
ties in with Tenscher’s finding that first-order elections tend to be more professionalised 
than second-order elections. When the election is more important from the perspective of 
the parties, either in Tenscher’s case because it is a first-order election or, in our case 
because it is more contested, I assume that this is positively related to the degree of 
campaign professionalisation. 
 
3.3 Causal conditions on the party level 
Existing research on campaign professionalisation has assumed that campaigns organised 
by catch-all parties are more professionalised than campaigns organised by small or mid-
sized parties because “catch-all parties are encouraged to use as many media channels as 
possible in order to get in touch with their voters, while niche parties might concentrate on 
a few channels” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 150). What is more, the party-centred theory of 
professionalised campaigning by Gibson and Römmele predicts that parties with a high 
level of resources – which is the case for catch-all parties rather than for niche parties – will 
have more professionalised campaigns. Tenscher and colleagues pick up this argument and 
assume that with regard to professionalised campaign structures, “bigger parties benefit 
from their size, both in regard to financial resources and the number of party members” 
(Tenscher et al. 2012: 150). Against this background, being organised by catch-all parties 
will be included as a causal condition at the party level and tested in the subsequent analysis 
with fsQCA.  
Gibson and Römmele’s party-centred theory of professionalised campaigning further states 
that parties with a right-wing ideology exhibit higher levels of campaign professionalisation 
than left-wing parties. They underpin their assumption by arguing that “the upward and 
outward movement of power inherent within professionalisation would meet with less 
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resistance in an organization with existing norms of internal hierarchy“ (Gibson & 
Römmele 2001: 37). What is more, “the principles of marketing and use of outside 
consultancy firms underpinning professionalized campaigning are more consistent with the 
principles of a right-wing party” (Gibson & Römmele 2001: 37), while “a left-wing or 
socialist party (...) would be expected to oppose the use of these business-type practices” 
(Gibson & Römmele 2001: 37). As we remember from Chapter 2.1, most of the existing 
comparative studies found that the ideological position of the party that organised the 
campaign has an influence on the degree of campaign professionalisation. There is, 
however, no clear tendency as to whether left-wing or right-wing parties produce more 
professionalised campaigns. For the purpose of testing the influence of the ideological 
position of the organising party on the degree of campaign professionalisation in the 
subsequent analysis I take up Gibson and Römmele’s original assumption and include the 
right-wing ideology of an organising party as a causal condition for campaign 
professionalisation. As we will see in Chapter 8., the analysis will still be able to indicate – if 
this is the case – that it was the absence of the causal condition right-wing ideology of the 
organising party that contributed to producing the outcome (i.e., professionalised 
campaigning).  
 
3.4 Hypotheses 
As I proposed in Chapter 2.2, the central assumptions of the present dissertation are the 
following: All cantonal election campaigns included in this study should display the same 
characteristics and degree of professionalised campaigning due to the trend towards 
isomorphism induced by similar institutional expectations stemming from changes in the 
most relevant environments for campaigning and by mimetic behaviour (i.e., observation 
and copying of other parties’ behaviour) caused by uncertainty as to how to react 
adequately to these changes. If the degree and profile of campaign professionalisation 
differs between cantonal election campaigns the differences will be caused by the size of 
the canton, the degree of urbanisation of the canton, and the degree of competitiveness in 
the cantonal parliament in the canton where the campaigns were organised (causal 
conditions at the systemic level), as well as by the political position on the left-right political 
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spectrum and by the status as a catch-all party of the party that organised the campaign 
(causal conditions on the party level). Previous studies have suggested that explanatory 
variables interact and may compensate for each other (cf. e.g. Gibson & Römmele 2009: 
283f). However, it remains unclear from the research conducted to date as to how exactly 
the conditions at the systemic and the party level are related. I will therefore perform a 
fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA), a method for data analysis that has 
proved to be particularly valuable for analysing complex causal patterns even in the 
presence of rather few cases (cf. Emmenegger 2011: 343).  
What is more, I inferred from the theoretical foundation of this study that election 
campaigns are not necessarily equally adapted to (or, in other words, professionalised with 
regard to) all electoral environments, and that the different environments confront the 
campaigns with different changes and hence with different incentives or conditions to 
organise a professionalised campaign. Therefore, the following fsQCA will test whether 
there are different combinations of causal conditions that lead to campaign 
professionalisation as an aggregated concept and to campaign professionalisation with 
regard to each of the four relevant electoral environments. As we will learn in detail in 
Chapter 5.3 (fs)QCA establishes a causal relation between the causal conditions and the 
outcome by analysing whether the causal conditions are necessary or sufficient conditions 
for the outcome. Hypotheses for (fs)QCA should therefore “consist of statements about 
sufficient and/or necessary conditions“ (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 400). In the 
following, statements will be provided in QCA terms that concern, first, the hypothesised 
relations between the causal conditions and the aggregated concept of professionalisation 
and second, the hypothesised relations between the causal conditions and each of the 
environment-related dimensions of professionalisation (voters, members, media, other 
parties) .  
 
3.4.1 Professionalisation as an aggregated concept 
If a causal condition is necessary for an outcome, this means that a causal condition will 
produce the outcome by itself, or, in other words, that it is the only causal condition that is 
needed in order to produce the outcome. This is in contrast to sufficient causal conditions, 
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which produce the outcome in combination with other causal conditions (see Chapter 5.3.4 
for a detailed presentation of these principles). Based on existing findings on explanatory 
variables for campaign professionalisation in which none of the tested variables protruded 
as having a specifically strong explanatory potential for campaign professionalisation (see 
Chapter 3.1), I assume that among the five causal conditions that will be included in the 
analysis none will produce the outcome by itself. This leads to hypothesis 1:  
H1: There are no necessary conditions for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept. 
We remember from the discussion of the causal conditions in Chapters 3.2 and 3.3 that all 
three conditions at the systemic level and two conditions at the party level may be assumed 
to contribute to campaign professionalisation equally. Or, in QCA terms, they can all be 
expected to be causal conditions for professionalised election campaigns. It is also 
reasonable – based on existing research – to assume that these conditions probably interact 
and can counterbalance each other or compensate for each other. However, there are too 
few empirical findings and theoretical insights as yet to allow for the formulation of 
assumptions about the precise interactions between these conditions. Hence, no 
speculative assumptions on specific combinations of conditions will be made and 
hypothesis 2 is therefore formulated as follows: 
H2: Being organised in a large canton, being organised in an urbanised canton, being organised in 
a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament, being organised by a right-wing party 
and being organised by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for professionalised campaigning. 
While this approach may appear somewhat under theorised and perhaps little help in 
explaining the relation between conditions and outcome, standards of good practice in 
QCA demand that the researcher (as we will see in further detail in chapter 5.3.8) discuss 
“whether or not the results generated by the logical minimization [i.e., the QCA analysis, 
S.K.] make sense, both theoretically and empirically” (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 410). 
Hence, a statement concerning whether or not the previously proposed hypotheses are 
found to be true or false is not the essential part of presenting the results and it should not 
be the end point of a QCA. Also, “the solution formula alone should not be taken as 
demonstrating an underlying causal relationship between the conditions and an outcome” 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 412). Therefore, it is in accordance with the methodological 
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framework of this study that the obtained results – the causal links between the solution 
formulas and the outcome – are explained and discussed in detail with reference to the 
theoretical background of the analysis after having obtained them in the empirical analysis 
– rather than formulating specific causal links based on rather speculative reasoning and 
merely reporting that they were found to be correct after the analysis. The results will be 
discussed and interpreted in Chapters 8.2, 8.3 and 8.5.  
 
3.4.2 Professionalisation per environment 
Similarly to the assumptions I made concerning the necessary conditions for the aggregated 
concept of campaign professionalisation, I hypothesise that of the five causal conditions 
that will be included in the analysis none will produce campaign professionalisation in 
relation to a specific environment. Hypothesis 3 therefore proposes:  
H3: There are no necessary conditions for campaign professionalisation with regard to any of the 
four relevant environments.  
What I stated earlier about the sufficient conditions for professionalisation as an aggregated 
concept also holds true for professionalisation with regard to the four relevant electoral 
environments: Formulating hypotheses in the form of precise combinations of causal 
conditions would be a very speculative undertaking. However, we can formulate more 
precise assumptions based on the theoretical reasoning behind the causal conditions (see 
Chapters 3.2 and 3.3) and the indicators for campaign professionalisation (Chapter 2.3.3) 
by hypothesising which causal conditions will be sufficient conditions for campaign 
professionalisation with regard to a specific environment – either in their presence or in 
their absence.  
As we have seen in Chapters 3.2 and 3.3 as well as in Chapter 2.3.3, communicating to and 
mobilising voters is especially challenging when parties are confronted with a large, rather 
dispersed and volatile electorate, which is the case in large and/or urbanised cantons. What 
is more, each vote becomes more important when competition in the cantonal parliament 
is close and the result of the election is hence more uncertain. Furthermore, including 
communicative and organisational features and measures into the campaign that are meant 
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to communicate to and handle a large and diverse electorate is more important to catch-all 
parties than to small or mid-sized niche or clientele parties. Also, catch-all parties have the 
financial means to stem rather costly measures like, for example, hiring professionals to 
conceptualise and realise an online campaign meant to attract young voters. I therefore 
hypothesise that these conditions will be included in the solution formula for campaigns 
that are professionalised with regard to the voters. For the environment constituted by the 
voters I formulate the following hypothesis: 
H4: Being organised in a large canton, being organised in an urbanised canton, being organised in 
a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament, and being organised by a catch-all 
party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the 
environment constituted by the voters. 
Drawing on my argument and theoretical reasoning thus far, it may be assumed that 
professionalising the campaign with regard to the party members is more important when 
there is a close competition in the cantonal parliament. Faced with a very uncertain election 
outcome, parties may no longer content themselves with the expectation that their 
members would vote for them regardless, but rather professionalise their campaigns with 
regard to the members in order to mobilise them and with the hope of increasing their 
electoral success. What is more, I hypothesise that differences in the degree of 
professionalisation with regard to the members can be attributed to the parties’ ideological 
positions. I assume non right-wing parties to organise campaigns that are more 
professionalised with regard to the members since these tend to have a more important 
role in left-wing or socialist than in right-wing parties. If parties perceive, for example, that 
mobilisation in general has become more difficult or have noted that the number of 
members is declining, left-wing rather than right-wing parties may see a viable solution in 
paying more attention to the members during election campaigns (e.g. by sending a series 
of mobilising e-mails to all members). What is more, I propose that campaigns can be 
expected to be more professionalised with regard to the members in catch-all parties, 
because members are so numerous that they can actually change an election outcome. Also, 
the more members there are, the less feasible it becomes to inform, activate or mobilise 
them via personal communication at party meetings or campaign gatherings and the more 
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parties then have to rely on (again, possibly costly) the means of so-called direct or online 
communication. Hypothesis 5 is stated as follows: 
H5: Being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament, not being 
organised by a right-wing party, and being organised by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions 
for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members. 
I propose furthermore that professionalising the campaign with regard to the media to be 
more important in large cantons, when campaign communication has to reach more 
potential voters and where the means of so-called direct communication and online 
communication can be employed by the parties as substitutes for personal face-to-face 
communication with a large electorate. What is more, I assume due to the interdependence 
of internet-use and urbanisation in Switzerland that the means of online communication 
(like social media) are more widely used and accepted in urbanised cantons (see Chapter 
3.2). Also, catch-all parties depend more heavily on the media in order to reach a large 
electorate and membership base. I therefore propose in hypothesis 6:  
H6: Being organised in a large canton, being organised in an urbanised canton, and being 
organised by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with 
regard to the environment constituted by the media. 
Based on the theoretical reasoning I have presented to this point I expect that 
professionalising the campaign with regard to other parties is especially important when 
parties are confronted with a competitive situation. Also, I assume that monitoring other 
parties’ campaigns is more important for smaller parties with smaller budgets, as it may be 
less expensive to check other parties’ campaigns for innovations, “must haves”, etc., than 
to assess and research the possibilities of online campaigning or utilising an effective 
combination of media. Based on this reasoning, hypothesis 7 is formulated as follows:  
H7: Being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament and not being 
organised by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with 
regard to the environment constituted by other parties. 
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3.5 Schemes 
The following schemes show the central assumptions of the present dissertation. Figure 1 
depicts the general theoretical framework; Figure 2 visualises the assumption that campaign 
professionalisation with regard to different environments is explained by different causal 
paths. 
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Figure 1: Theoretical model of the present dissertation 
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Figure 2: Explanation of campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and as a 
differentiated concept 
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Part II: Database and Methodological Approach 
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4. Database 
The Swiss cantons, i.e. the regional entities below the national level, are of particular 
value to comparative research, because they form, as Vatter puts it, an “extraordinary 
research laboratory within a small space” (Vatter 2007: 148). Belonging to the same 
national entity of Switzerland, the 26 Swiss cantons nevertheless differ considerably 
with regard to their political systems, socio-economic structures and political legacies 
(cf. Vatter 2007: 148), thus offering a strong degree of comparative equivalence and 
variation in context factors at the same time. Data from various cantons thus provide 
ideal grounds for a comparative analysis across different contexts (cf. Lachat & 
Sciarini 2002: 45). As there was few systematic data on the degree and shape of 
professionalisation of Swiss cantonal election campaigns available at the time of this 
dissertation project, I created a database for this study’s outcome by conducting 37 
semi-structured interviews with the campaign managers of the 23 cantonal parties 
included in this study (cf. chapter 4.1). The interviews were transcribed and the 
transcripts were systematically analysed with a codebook covering the indicators for 
professionalised campaigning that were presented in Chapter 2.3.3. The causal 
conditions were attributed to the campaigns with the help of secondary data (cf. 
chapter 4.2). 
The resulting database hence consists of 23 cantonal election campaigns that were 
organised by the cantonal branches of five Swiss parties in five cantons8. 23 election 
campaigns is a reasonable number of cases for performing a data analysis with the 
help of fsQCA. QCA has been proven to work for settings and populations of 
interest with an N between 10 and 50 cases (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 12). A 
smaller number of cases is not excluded but bears the risk of confronting the 
researcher with QCA’s version of the too many variables too few cases-problem, that is, 
limited diversity and logical remainders (see Chapter 5.3.5). While fsQCA is in theory 
                                                 
8 The data used in this study were collected in the research project „Professionelle Freiwillige? Die 
Mitgliederkommunikation Schweizer Kantonalparteien in Wahlkämpfen“ (Professional volunteers? The 
internal communication of Swiss cantonal parties during election campaigns) that was funded by the Swiss 
National Science Foundation (project number 100012-122278) and by the Schweizerische 
Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft (Swiss society for the benefit to the public). While five campaigns in five cantons 
should of course add up to 25 campaigns, two cantonal sections of the Swiss People’s Party (Aargau 
and Appenzell Ausserrhoden) were unfortunately not willing to give interviews about their campaign 
communication. 
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also suitable for larger numbers of cases, it can only be performed in a proper 
manner if the researcher has a sufficient amount of in-depth knowledge about the 
cases, as we will see in Chapter 5.2. What is more, standards of good practice require 
that researchers link the solution formulas obtained by the fsQCA back to the cases 
and discuss “whether or not the results generated by the logical minimization make 
sense, both theoretically and empirically” (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 410). 
Within the framework of this dissertation, these qualitative requirements can best be 
met with a moderate number of cases, as it would be very time-consuming to 
assemble in-depth knowledge about, and link the solution formulas back to, for 
example, 50 cases.  
 
4.1 Database for the outcome 
In order to gather information on the campaign organisation and campaign 
communication in the 23 election campaigns included in this study, 37 designated 
campaign managers and other persons that had a position of responsibility in the 
cantonal election campaigns were interviewed. Since the election organisation and the 
distribution of tasks and responsibilities differ between parties, the interviewees were 
chosen with a two-step positional approach. First, the cantonal offices of the 23 
parties included in the study were contacted in order to find out how the cantonal 
election campaigns were organised and how the tasks and responsibilities were 
distributed. Then the interviewees were randomly chosen from the members of the 
highest electoral organisational entity at the cantonal level and also at the local level, 
if the local party organisations (i.e., the organisational level below the cantonal party) 
held a role of responsibility in the electoral organisation. Every interviewee was a 
campaign manager in that he or she held a role of responsibility in the campaign, but 
their respective formal roles differed from each other (cantonal secretary, cantonal 
president, campaign manager, candidate, etc.). While the aim was to conduct two 
interviews in each cantonal party branch, this did not always prove possible due to 
restrictions in the availability of the campaign managers. Table 1 gives an overview of 
the 37 interviews that were conducted.  
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Table 1: List of interviews 
Canton Date of 
election 
Interview period Number of interviews 
   Greens SP CVP FDP SVP 
Aargau 8 March 2009 May-August 
2009 
2 2 2 2 -9 
Neuchâtel 5 April 2009 June-August 
2009 
1 2 2 2 2 
Bern 28 March 2010 April-July 2010 2 2 1 2 1 
Zürich 3 April 2011 May-August 
2011 
2 1 2 1 2 
Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 
3 April 2011 May–July 2011 1 1 1 1 - 
 
The interviews were semi-structured; the questions referred to the electoral 
organisation and campaign communication. The selection of questions that were 
relevant for the present dissertation can be found in Appendix B) (translated from 
German)10. The dates of the interviews were fixed so that enough time was given 
after the elections for the campaign managers to reflect on the campaign, at the same 
time making sure that the campaign was still sufficiently close to remember it 
correctly. The interviews were recorded digitally and transcribed.  
I then content analysed the interview transcripts (assisted by software for content 
analysis of qualitative data (MAXQDA)) with a codebook that contained those 
campaign characteristics that were presented and theoretically substantiated as 
indicators for campaign professionalisation in Chapter 2.3.3. It should be noted that 
only activities initiated by or referring to the cantonal parties were coded, but not the 
aspects that the interviewees mentioned in regard to individual candidates or other 
party levels. This would affect statements like “Facebook was not an element in our 
                                                 
9 As it has been mentioned before, the cantonal section of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in Aargau 
was not willing to speak about their campaign communication. 
10 Recall that the data used in this study were collected in the research project „Professionelle 
Freiwillige? Die Mitgliederkommunikation Schweizer Kantonalparteien in Wahlkämpfen“ (Professional 
volunteers? The internal communication of Swiss cantonal parties during election campaigns) was funded by the 
Swiss National Science Foundation (project number 100012-122278) and by the Schweizerische 
Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft (Swiss society for the benefit to the public). 
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campaign but individual candidates used it for their personal campaign anyway” (a 
fictional example). This may have created a limitation in the comprehensiveness of 
the data, but it was a necessity to ensure its comparability. 
In the following, the codebook for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated 
concept is presented. The campaign received one point on the aggregated 
professionalisation index whenever it featured one of the following campaign 
characteristics:  
1. Mandate at least one professional for technical support; examples: design of  
commercial material, photographer 
2. Mandate at least one professional for strategic/conceptual/ideological 
support; example: public relations agency 
3. Provide training for candidates and/or party members in campaign practices 
or campaign messages on at least at one occasion; examples: organising a 
course, distribution of a manual 
4. Central elaboration and implementation of a basic joint campaign for all 
constituencies of the cantonal party branch 
5. Installation of campaign headquarters or a designated campaign team 
6. Continuous campaigning 
7. Employment of the following means of so-called direct communication or 
narrow casting on at least one occasion during the campaign (1 point per 
means) 
a. Direct mail 
b. Text message 
c. Direct e-mail 
8. Employment of the following means of online communication at least once 
during the campaign (1 point per means) 
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a. Social networks 
b. Participative web content (e.g. blogs, bulletin boards) 
c. Video clip/video channel 
9. Monitoring campaign activities of other parties at least once during the 
campaign 
While the decision whether campaign characteristics would have to be coded as 
present or absent did not turn out to be difficult or interpretative for the other 
indicators, the decision of whether a campaign was a permanent one and hence could 
be coded as “continuous campaigning” was not so straightforward. It proved to be 
impossible, for all 23 campaigns included in this study, to obtain reliable and 
comparable data on the number of months that the campaign was running prior to 
the elections (as operationalised for the similar indicator “campaign duration” by 
Tenscher and colleagues (cf. Tenscher et al. 2012: 162)), or on the number of 
campaign activities the party was engaged in six months prior to the official 
campaign period (as operationalised by Gibson and Römmele (2009: 271) and 
Strömbäck (2009: 104)). Hence, in the framework of this study continuous 
campaigning figures among the “subjectively measured variables” (Gibson & 
Römmele 2009: 271). A campaign was coded as qualifying as continuous 
campaigning when, first, the campaign managers stated that the party had engaged in 
continuous campaigning and this was corroborated by the judgement of the author 
based on the characterisation of continuous campaigning in Chapter 2.3.3. A 
campaign was, second, also coded as continuous when the author came to the 
conclusion that the campaign qualifies as continuous campaigning based on implicit 
statements by the interviewees. This was necessary because campaign managers may 
have failed to label the campaign as continuous due to understatement or a poor 
understanding of the concept, even if activities meant to inform, convince or bind 
potential and existing voters were reported to take place throughout the entire year 
and not only during defined campaign phases.  
104 
 
This first phase of the content analysis resulted in a score for each campaign that 
reflects how professionalised it is on an aggregated level. The maximum score on this 
aggregated index is 13.  
In order to determine the campaigns’ degree of professionalisation with regard to 
each of the four relevant electoral environments, the interview transcripts were 
content analysed based on four different codebooks (one for each relevant electoral 
environment). During the coding process, it became obvious that some of the 
parties’ communication activities were directed at both voters and members and that 
parties did not always differentiate between the two target groups. This was especially 
the case in regard to the means of online communication – notably Facebook 
profiles, participative web content (like blogs), and video clips or video channels – 
which were open to all interested users and were intended both to mobilise members 
and to attract and convince new potential voters. What is more, some activities affect 
– by definition – all potential voters (i.e., including members), like hiring a PR agency 
to design a catchy campaign slogan. Thus, several activities had to be coded as 
belonging to both the members’ index and the voters’ index. Therefore, an additional 
variable was included in order to ameliorate the differentiation between the two 
environments. It was analysed from the interview transcripts whether the campaign 
mainly targeted members and sympathisers (resulting in the campaigning receiving 
one point on the index measuring professionalisation with regard to the members) or 
the wider public (resulting in the campaigning receiving one point on the index 
measuring professionalisation with regard to the voters). Certainly, some campaign 
managers stated that the campaign targeted both groups, resulting in one point on 
both indices. I will discuss the possible consequences of this partially difficult 
differentiation between the environments formed by the voters and members in the 
conclusion. 
Other indicators that are part of the aggregated professionalisation index were not 
included in the content analysis aiming to measure the amount of professionalisation 
in regard to the four electoral environments, because they can be assumed to affect 
all four relevant electoral environments and would thereby not contribute to a 
differentiated pattern of campaign professionalisation. This was especially the case 
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for the indicators that have an organisational character like mandating professionals, 
installing campaign headquarters and designating a campaign team. If the interviewed 
campaign managers did not specify for which purpose a professional was mandated 
or a campaign team was installed, it can be assumed that the commissioning referred 
to an all-embracing mandate – that is one that includes a strategy to win votes, 
mobilise members, deal with the media and to monitor (and copy) other parties at 
the same time.  
When assessing how professionalised the 23 cantonal election campaigns are with 
regard to other parties, the analysis focused on a single variable, notably the 
monitoring of other parties’ campaigns, by following a two-step approach. It was 
analysed, first, whether a campaign featured the monitoring of other parties’ 
campaigns (resulting in one point on the other parties index), and, second, whether 
there were consequences drawn from the monitoring that led to the adjustment or 
adaptation of their own campaign (resulting in an additional point on the other 
parties’ index). 
In the following paragraphs the coding schemes for each environment will be 
displayed in further detail. Again, the campaign received one point on the respective 
environment-related index whenever it featured one of the following campaign 
characteristics: 
Professionalisation with regard to the voters: 
1. Mandate at least one professional to work on the external communication or 
the contents of the campaign; examples: define the ideological and creative 
baseline of the campaign, create slogans, create a communication concept 
2. Provide candidates and/or members with training on at least at one occasion 
that would allow them to improve their direct contact with potential voters at 
campaign booths, on the street, etc. 
3. Central elaboration and implementation of a basic joint campaign for all 
constituencies of the cantonal party branch that will ensure the campaign is 
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recognisable to voters (especially for those who live and work in different 
constituencies) 
4. Continuous campaigning 
5. Employment of the following means of so-called direct communication or 
narrow casting to communicate with voters at least once during the campaign 
(1 point per means) 
a. Direct mail 
b. Text message 
c. Direct e-mail 
6. Employment of the following means of online communication to 
communicate with voters at least once during the campaign (1 point per 
means) 
a. Social networks 
b. Participative web content (e.g. blogs, bulletin boards) 
c. Video clip/video channel 
7. Identification of the voters as a particular target group of the campaign and 
the creation of at least one campaign element for this group 
 
Professionalisation with regard to the members: 
1. Mandate at least one professional to work on the internal communication or 
the contents of the campaign; examples: define the ideological and creative 
baseline of the campaign, create slogans, create a communication concept 
2. Provide candidates and/or members with training on at least at one occasion 
that will allow them to improve their mobilisation skills with regard to other 
members 
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3. Central elaboration and implementation of a basic joint campaign for all 
constituencies of the cantonal party branch that will ensure the campaign is 
recognisable by the members (especially for those who live and work in 
different constituencies) 
4. Employment of the following means of so-called direct communication or 
narrow casting to communicate with members at least once during the 
campaign (1 point per means) 
a. Direct mail 
b. Text message 
c. Direct e-mail 
5. Employment of the following means of online communication to 
communicate with members at least once during the campaign (1 point per 
means) 
6. Social networks 
a. Participative web content (e.g. blogs, bulletin boards) 
b. Video clip/video channel 
c. Identification of members as a specific target group of the campaign 
and the creation of at least one campaign element for this group 
 
Professionalisation with regard to the media: 
1. Mandate at least one professional for the purpose of helping with the party’s 
representation in the media (both “old” and “new” media); examples: mandate 
an IT specialist to create a new website or improve an existing website; mandate a 
cameraman to produce video clips 
2. Provide candidates and/or members with training on at least at one occasion 
in order to improve their performance and appearance in the mass media or 
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in relation to the use of new media (course or manual); examples: presentation 
techniques, familiarity with central topics, social media strategies 
 
Professionalisation with regard to other parties: 
1. Monitoring of other parties’ campaign activities 
2. Adjusting own campaign activities based on the monitoring of other parties’ 
campaign activities 
 
The maximum score on the index reflecting the professionalisation of the campaign 
with regard to the environment of the voters (voters index) was 11 and the maximum 
score with regard to the members was 10. In the indices reflecting the 
professionalisation of the campaign in regard to the media and other parties index, 
both had a maximum score of 2.  
 
4.2 Database for the causal conditions 
The five cantons Aargau, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Bern, Neuchâtel and Zürich were 
included in this study because they offer an interesting pattern of variation across the 
three causal conditions for campaign professionalisation at the systemic level that will 
be tested in this study – size of the canton (i.e. population), degree of urbanisation 
(i.e. the percentage of population living in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants)11 
and degree of competitiveness (this was operationalised, as we remember from 
Chapter 3.2, by the percentage of seats claimed by the strongest party minus the 
percentage of seats claimed by the second strongest party, in the legislative periods 
before the cantonal elections that are the focus of this paper (cf. Table 2).  
 
                                                 
11 This operationalisation was chosen in accordance with the definition of a city by the Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office that defines a city as a community with more than 10,000 inhabitants (see e.g. 
Schuler, M., Dessemontet, P., Joye; D. (2005): Eidgenössische Volkszählung 2000. Die 
Raumgliederungen der Schweiz, 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/news/publikationen.Document.64476.pdf) 
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Table 2: Causal conditions at the systemic level: Size, degree of urbanisation and 
competitiveness 
Canton Population12 
Degree of 
urbanisation13 
Difference in seats claimed by 
strongest and second strongest 
party14 
Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 
53,000 29% 
28% 
Aargau 611,500 19% 11.43% 
Bern 979,800 40% 3.13% 
Neuchâtel 172,100 53% 0.87% 
Zürich 1,373,100 66% 11.1% 
 
Also, these cantons held elections to the cantonal parliaments within a two-year span 
of each other. The cantonal campaigns which are analysed in this study were 
organised on the occasion of the elections to the cantonal parliaments that took place 
on 8 March, 2009 in the canton of Aargau, on 5 April, 2009 in the canton of 
Neuchâtel, on 28 March, 2010 in the canton of Bern, and on 3 April, 2011 in the 
cantons of Zürich and Appenzell Ausserrhoden. The shift in years is due to the fact 
that not all elections to the cantonal parliaments take place in the same year. 
The five parties included in the study are the GP (Grüne Partei/Green Party), the SP 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei/Social Democrats), the CVP (Christlichdemokratische 
Volkspartei/Christian Democrats), the FDP (FDP.Die Liberalen/Liberal 
Democrats) and the SVP (Schweizerische Volkspartei/Swiss People’s Party). These 
five parties have been – at least during the last decade (as the recent emergence of 
new parties will be bringing about changes) – the five major parties at the national 
                                                 
12 As published for the year 2010 by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (see 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/01/02/blank/key/raeumliche_verteilung/ka
ntone__gemeinden.html) 
13 The percentage of the population living in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants was calculated 
based on the document “Bilanz der ständigen Wohnbevölkerung (Total) nach Bezirken und 
Gemeinden, 2009”, published by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (see 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/01/02/blank/key/raeumliche_verteilung/ka
ntone__gemeinden.html). 
14 The difference in the percentages of seats claimed by strongest and by second strongest party was 
calculated based on the document “Kantonale Parlamentswahlen: Mandatsverteilung nach Parteien 
und Kanton”, published by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (see 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/02/blank/key/kantonale_parlemente/m
andatsverteilung.html). As the cantonal parliaments have different numbers of seats, the difference in 
the absolute number of seats would not be an appropriate indicator. The legislative periods in 
question are 2005-2009 in Aargau and Neuchâtel, 2006-2010 in Bern and 2007-2011 in Zürich and 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden. The result was approximated to two decimal places. The seats held by the 
two liberal parties FDP and LPS (or, in French terms, PLR and PLS) in Neuchâtel were combined in 
this calculation, as the two party branches merged in 2008 to form one party branch of the Liberal 
Democrats (FDP).  
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political level. All have cantonal party branches in the cantons included in this study. 
Although the Social Democrats, the Liberal Democrats, the Christian Democrats and 
the Swiss People’s Party are all represented in the consociational government of 
Switzerland, their representative strength in the cantonal parliaments varies 
considerably (see Table 3).  
What is more, these parties differ from each other with regard to their position on 
the left-right ideological continuum. In general, the parties included in this study can 
be subdivided into right-wing (or in Swiss terms, bürgerliche) parties (Liberal 
Democrats (FDP), Christian Democrats (CVP), Swiss People’s Party (SVP)) and left-
wing parties (the Greens (Grüne), Social Democrats (SP)) (cf. Ladner 2004: 144), 
while the Swiss People’s Party is at the far right of the ideological continuum while 
the Liberal Democrats are generally considered centre-to-right. The Christian 
Democrats also form part of the political camp labelled as bürgerlich but are generally 
even more at the centre than the Liberal Democrats. However, in addition to these 
broad classifications, the federal political system of Switzerland allows for an 
individual positioning of the parties’ cantonal politics and thus for nuances in the 
position of the cantonal party branches on the left-right ideological continuum. Thus, 
I have to draw on additional sources in order to determine the ideological position of 
the individual party branches. These are a survey from 2002/03 where cantonal party 
presidents were asked to assess their own party’s ideological position (cf. Geser et al. 
2003) and an analysis of the political profiles of candidates in the online voting 
advice application “smartvote” (cf. Ladner et al. 2008)15. The combination of those 
two sources gives us a more differentiated picture of the ideological position of the 
individual party branches. We should not pay too much attention to fine nuances 
present in the results, as the numbers displayed in Table 3 are the exact results of the 
mathematical combination of the data provided by Geser et al. (2003) and Ladner et 
al. (2008). It is not excluded, for example, that a 0.1 difference between two parties 
reflects a random measurement artefact rather than a real ideological difference. The 
                                                 
15 Unfortunately, this was the most recent information available when writing this dissertation. While 
the political profiles that Ladner and colleagues (2008) analysed were filled out by candidates for the 
elections to the Swiss federal parliament (Nationalrat) in 2007, this data is nevertheless useful for my 
purposes, as these elections are organised in constituencies formed by the cantons and candidates 
specify which cantonal party branch they are active in. I thank Andreas Ladner for pointing me to 
these two sources.  
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important information is, however, that the cantonal party branches of the Social 
Democrats and of the Green Party, with values between 1.7 and 2.5 (0 marking the 
left and 10 marking the right end), are located at the left of the political spectrum. 
The Christian Democrats (values between 4.6 and 5.3) take a centre position. The 
cantonal party branches of the Liberal Democrats cover values between 6.3 and 6.9 
and can thus be considered centre-to-right parties, while the Swiss People’s Party’s 
party branches are located at the right of the ideological spectrum (values between 
7.1 and 7.4). For detailed results see Table 3.   
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Table 3: Causal conditions at the party level: Electoral strength and political position 
Canton 
Party 
Percentage of seats16 
Political position17 
0 (left) – 10 (right) 
Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 
Christian Democrats 
5 5 
 Green Party 0 1.8518 
 Liberal Democrats 40 6.42 
 Social Democrats 6 2.5 
Aargau Christian Democrats 19 5.28 
 Green Party 5 1.88 
 Liberal Democrats 17 6.795 
 Social Democrats 21 2.15 
Bern Christian Democrats 1 5.26 
 Green Party 12 2.06 
 Liberal Democrats 16 6.31 
 Social Democrats 26 2.455 
 Swiss People’s Party 29 7.055 
Neuchâtel Christian Democrats 0 4.64 
 Green Party 9 1.69 
 Liberal Democrats 35 6.305 
 Social Democrats 36 2.04 
 Swiss People’s Party 15 7.36 
Zürich Christian Democrats 7 4.955 
 Green Party 11 1.775 
 Liberal Democrats 16 6.87 
 Social Democrats 20 1.835 
 Swiss People’s Party 31 7.4 
 
                                                 
16 The table displays the percentage of seats in the cantonal parliament held by the cantonal party 
branch in the legislative period before the elections studied in this dissertation (as the cantonal 
parliaments have different numbers of seats, the absolute number of seats would be misleading). The 
percentage of seats was calculated based on the document “Kantonale Parlamentswahlen: 
Mandatsverteilung nach Parteien und Kanton”, published by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (see 
http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/17/02/blank/key/kantonale_parlemente/m
andatsverteilung.html). 
17 Ladner et al. (2008) use an index representing political ideology in which 100 indicates the left 
ideological pole and 0 indicates the right ideological pole. The scale presented in Geser et al. (2003) 
ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 indicating the right ideological pole. In order to make both scales 
comparable, the parties’ values in Ladner and colleagues’ study were subtracted from 100. Hence, the 
direction of the scale changed to 0 indicating a left ideological position. The values were then divided 
by ten. Finally, the arithmetic mean between the modified values from Ladner et al. (2008) and Geser 
et al. (2003) was calculated. 
18 Please note that neither of the two studies specifies a value for the Green Party in Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden. Therefore, an approximate value for this party branch was calculated by taking the 
arithmetic mean of the other four party branches of the Green Party. Before doing this, it was 
checked whether the values obtained by the cantonal party branches of the Social Democrats, the 
Christian Democrats and the Liberal Democrats in Appenzell Ausserrhoden deviated in a certain 
pattern from the arithmetic mean of the values obtained by these parties in the other cantons. This 
could be an indicator that, for example, the ideological positions in Appenzell Ausserrhoden are in 
general more to the right than in the other cantons. The arithmetic mean of the other four party 
branches of the Green Party would then have to be corrected for this factor. However, this was not 
the case.  
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5. Methodological approach: Fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis 
This chapter presents the methodological approach to the data analysis of the study 
in hand. The data sheet resulting from the interviews and the content analysis was 
the basis for a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA). As we remember 
from Chapter 3, I expect five explanatory factors to have an influence on the degree 
of campaign professionalisation, or, to be more precise, to be causal conditions for 
campaign professionalisation. These factors are located at both the systemic and 
party level. Therefore, I expect that these factors could be interlinked and 
complement each other. The research interest of the present dissertation is thus 
dealing with potentially complex causal arguments with only a medium number of 
cases to consider (23 election campaigns). What is more, as we will see in greater 
detail in Chapter 8.1.1, the relation between the outcome (professionalised 
campaigns) and the five causal conditions can be modelled as subset/superset 
relations. For these reasons, I will perform a fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative 
Analysis (fsQCA). QCA is a set-theoretic method that has proved to be particularly 
valuable for analysing complex causal patterns in the presence of few cases (cf. 
Emmenegger 2011: 343). Its version fuzzy set (fs) QCA offers another 
methodological advantage for the analysis of explanatory factors behind different 
degrees of campaign professionalisation. It allows for the calibration of both the 
causal conditions and outcome. This means that we can refine both the set 
membership of the 23 cases in the outcome and in the causal conditions based on 
empirical and theoretical evidence, resulting in a multi value scale (we will see in 
Chapter 5.2 exactly what this means). This reflects the empirical reality of a database 
representing degrees of campaign professionalisation better than a dichotomous 
measurement that only differentiates between “professionalised” and “not 
professionalised” campaigns. 
As the analysis performed along the principles and method of (fs)QCA is at the core 
of the empirical part of this dissertation, and because readers are probably less 
familiar with this approach, I offer a methodological introduction to (fs)QCA in this 
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chapter. However, as the application of the method is so closely linked to the results 
of the analysis, both can be comprehended much easier when presented in direct 
sequence. How the principles and method of fsQCA were utilised in the present 
dissertation will therefore be demonstrated when I present the results in Chapter 8. 
To be more precise, I will give the reader a general introduction to modelling causal 
relations as subset and superset relations in Chapter 5.1, while I will show how the 
professionalisation of election campaigns and the conditions influencing them are 
modelled as subset/superset relations within the framework of this dissertation 
Chapter 8.1.1. Similarly, Chapter 5.2 features a general introduction to the calibration 
procedure, while Chapter 8.1.2 and 8.1.3 shows how the outcome and the causal 
conditions are calibrated in the specific analysis performed in the present 
dissertation. The methodological principles that are outlined on a general level in 
Chapters 5.3 to 5.8 will be utilised again when presenting the results of the analysis in 
Chapters 8.2 and 8.3. 
Since its first publication by Charles C. Ragin in 1987, QCA has been used by an ever 
larger number of scholars in order to “strike a balance between qualitative and 
quantitative methods” (Emmenegger 2011: 337) in comparative research. 
Comparative research has mainly sought to explore questions of causation with 
correlational techniques or by case studies. While these approaches have proved 
valuable, they are limited in regard to small and medium numbers of cases and tend 
to remain at the descriptive level respectively. QCA is, on the one hand, a variable-
oriented approach in that it reveals necessary and sufficient conditions for an 
outcome, deals with causal complexity by showing different combinations of causal 
conditions that lead to the outcome and aims at a causal analysis by making use of 
truth tables and the principles of logical minimisation (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 
8f.). On the other hand, QCA is also a case-oriented approach due to the fact that, 
“familiarity with cases is a requirement before, during and after the analytical 
moment of a QCA“ (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 400) in order to identify relevant 
causal conditions, to select parameters of fit and to facilitate the interpretation of 
results. Scholars are advised, as a standard of good practice, to not simply report the 
obtained solution formulas as such and leave the rest to the reader, but to provide 
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“theoretically meaningful interpretations” (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 402) of the 
empirical results.  
With its foundations in set theory, formal logic, Boolean algebra and fuzzy algebra, 
QCA has a unique terminology from that of standard correlational analysis. As I 
mentioned earlier, the analysis will refer to (causal) conditions, which are comparable 
to explanatory or independent variables in standard or correlational analysis, and to 
the outcome, which is comparable to the dependent variable. The solution formula 
and the solution terms are the results of a QCA.  
While a detailed introduction to fsQCA including its above mentioned theoretical 
and mathematical foundations would exceed the possibilities of this dissertation, the 
fundamental principles of fsQCA will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Where these principles apply not only to the version fsQCA but are valid for QCA in 
general, referring to “QCA” will reflect this. 
 
5.1 Modelling causal relations as subset and superset relations 
QCA can be considered the “most developed form of set-theoretic method” 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 1). Its foundation in set-theory has two main 
implications. First, QCA models causal relations as subset and superset relations. 
While this may seem unfamiliar at first glance, Schneider and Wagemann have 
pointed out that, “(…) set theoretic notions are invoked in social science research 
more often than is usually recognized” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 2f). “The 
notion of sets and their relations is almost unavoidably invoked when forming 
concepts or when verbally formulating (causal) relations between social phenomena.” 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 2f.) Sets represent nothing more than social science 
concepts. Let us look at some examples to clarify this. If we hypothesise, for 
example, that individuals with a low socioeconomic status use television as their main 
medium of information, this describes a subset relation. The set of individuals with a 
low socioeconomic status (a social science concept) that use TV as their main 
medium of information is a subset of the set of all individuals that use TV as their 
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main medium of information (another concept). This means that being an individual 
with a low socioeconomic status is a sufficient condition for choosing TV as the 
main medium, as we will see in Chapter 5.3. For the purposes of this study, this 
would mean that if I hypothesise that being organised in an urbanised canton is a 
causal condition for a professionalised campaign, campaigns that were organised in 
urbanised cantons would be a subset of professionalised campaigns. Therefore, 
taking place in an urbanised canton would be a sufficient condition for a 
professionalised campaign.  
The second implication of QCA as a set-theoretic method is that the data on which it 
operates are “membership scores of cases in sets which represent social science 
concepts” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 3). Set membership scores define whether – 
and in the case of fsQCA also to which degree – a case is described by a concept. This is 
the case for both the conditions and the outcome. Each case is assigned a 
membership score in the outcome and in each of the conditions. Crisp set QCA 
operates on dichotomous set membership and thus obliges the researcher to define 
for the set membership in the outcome and in each of the conditions, whether a case 
is either described by a set and will thus be assigned a set membership score of 1, or 
whether it is not and will be assigned a set membership score of 0. Crisp set QCA 
has been criticised for the obligation to dichotomise which leads to the loss of 
empirical information. Dichotomisation was also considered to “reduce the 
robustness of the results due to the sensitivity of QCA findings to decisions on 
where to put the threshold for dichotomization, as the latter is often subject to a 
relatively large degree of discretion” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 25). As a reply to 
these critiques Charles C. Ragin developed fuzzy set QCA, which allows for partial 
set membership. If, say, the election campaign of the Social Democrats in Aargau is 
assigned a set membership score of 0.8 in the set of professionalised campaigns, this 
means that the researcher has come to the conclusion that the campaign is mostly 
but not fully described by the concept of professionalised campaigns – or, in other 
words, that the campaign is mostly but not fully professionalised. The process of 
assigning the set membership score is called calibration and will be discussed in 
further detail in the following chapter.  
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It is crucial to note that fuzzy set membership scores do not reflect a lack of 
empirical information on the cases. This means that the 0.8 membership score of the 
campaign of the Social Democrats in Aargau in the set of professionalised campaigns 
does not mean that we are not sure how professionalised this campaign really was 
and therefore assigned it a score of 0.8 as a rule of thumb estimate. Rather, fuzziness 
is a numerical expression of the non-sharp conceptual boundaries that are inherent in 
virtually all social science concepts (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 3f). A common 
example from political science is democracy. While there certainly are political 
systems, which can be defined as “democratic” and others that are “not democratic 
at all”, the decision is less definitive for others. While most political scientists would 
not assign Russia the same democratic equivalence as, say, Denmark, not all would 
probably declare Russia “not a democracy at all”. Campaign professionalisation, the 
central subject of this study, is clearly a concept with blurry boundaries, as there is no 
evidence or rule that defines that a campaign with, say, a score of 14 on an index for 
professionalised campaigning with a maximum score of 30 is not professionalised 
while another campaign with a score of 16 is.  
A clear definition of the (fuzzy) sets that follow from the concepts guiding the 
investigation is of crucial importance for QCA. The definition of the sets has to be 
closely linked to and guided by the research question. Based on the same data, several 
different set definitions are possible, depending on the research interest. For some 
research questions, for example, it may be reasonable to define the “set of highly 
professionalised election campaigns” as the outcome, while for other questions the 
best definition outcome would be the “set of election campaigns that show at least a 
basic level of campaign professionalisation”. Another example would be the 
definition of the set of poor people in a given country based on the household 
income. It has to take into consideration the general social economic situation in that 
country (as being poor is reflected by another household income in, say, Switzerland, 
than it is in the Dominican Republic), as well as the aspect of poverty that is to be 
studied (because being poor in the sense of suffering hunger is reflected by another 
household income than being poor in the sense of not having enough money to 
participate in social and cultural activities).  
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5.2 Calibration of the conditions and of the outcome 
The calibration of set membership scores is a key concept of fsQCA and may be 
defined as the “process of using empirical information on cases for assigning set 
membership to them” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 32). Through the calibration 
of set membership, fsQCA has proved to be, “especially appropriate for the study of 
diversity precisely because they capture both kinds of difference, qualitative and 
quantitative, in a single instrument“ (Ragin 2000: 149f). In relation to the factors 
explaining professionalised campaigning this means that fsQCA allows for 
differentiation between cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised and not 
professionalised (i.e. a qualitative difference or a difference-in-kind) as well as 
between cantonal election campaigns that have full membership in the set of 
professionalised campaigns and cantonal election campaigns that are mostly, but not 
fully a member of the set of professionalised campaigns (i.e. a quantitative difference 
or a difference-in-degree).  
There are three methods by which to assign calibrated set membership scores to the 
cases. The direct and the indirect methods of calibration have been introduced by 
Ragin (2008: 90ff) and can be applied if the database consists of interval or ratio scale 
data. Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 35) describe a more qualitative procedure 
based on the work of Emmenegger (2011). In all three procedures, set membership 
scores higher than 0.5 indicate that cases are described by a set while membership 
scores below 0.5 indicate that a case is not described by a set (qualitative differences 
between cases). Membership scores above 0.5 but below 1 indicate partial set 
membership. All cases with these membership scores are described by the set but to 
a differing degree (quantitative differences between cases). The same applies to 
membership scores below 0.5 but above 0 indicating partial non-membership. All 
cases with these membership scores are not described by the set but to a differing 
degree (quantitative differences between cases). 
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5.2.1 The direct method of calibration 
The first step to calibrate membership scores with the direct method of calibration is 
the definition of three qualitative anchors. The threshold for full set membership is 
the empirical value that defines when a case can be considered a full member of the 
set (which is indicated by a membership score of 1). For example, if we have 
specified the set of countries with a high gross domestic product (GDP) per capita as 
our outcome, we have to specify, based on theoretical and substantive knowledge, 
what it takes to warrant full membership in this set (cf. Ragin 2009: 93f). We may set 
the threshold – based on external knowledge, as we will discuss later in this chapter - 
at 50’000 USD per year. All cases in our sample of countries that have a GDP per 
capita equal to or higher than 50’000 USD per year would then be assigned a 
membership score of 1. The threshold for full non-membership in the set is the 
empirical value that defines when a case can be considered a full non-member of the 
set (which is indicated by a membership score of 0). Again, we have to specify, based 
on theoretical and substantive knowledge, what it takes to be warranted full non-
membership in this set. In line with the example cited before, we could decide based 
on external knowledge to set the threshold for full non-membership at 2’500 USD 
per year. All cases in our sample of countries that have a GDP per capita equal to or 
lower than 2’500 USD per year would then be assigned a membership score of 0 in 
the set of countries with a high GDP per capita. The third qualitative anchor is the 
crossover point. This is the point where cases “cross” the line from membership to 
non-membership. It is also the point of maximum ambiguity (or maximum 
fuzziness), because the decision of whether a case is a member of the set or whether 
it is not is least clear-cut here. The researcher therefore has to evaluate what 
constitutes the maximum ambiguity and whether a case is more in or out of the 
target set (cf. Ragin 2009: 94). The crossover point is indicated by the set 
membership score of 0.5.  
When working with the fsQCA 2.0 computer software the programme calculates the 
set membership scores for the membership of each case in each of the conditions 
and in the outcome by using a logistic function to fit the raw data inbetween the 
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three qualitative anchors that the researcher has defined for each set. For a detailed 
description of this procedure please refer to Ragin (2008: 89ff). 
 
5.2.2 The indirect method of calibration 
When applying the indirect method of calibration, the researcher initially groups the 
cases according to their membership scores, depending on his or her estimation of 
the cases’ membership in the target set. Choosing the number of groups reflected by 
the number of set membership scores that are assigned is at the discretion of the 
researcher. A common grouping is by a six-value scheme: The value of 1 represents 
full membership in the set. A membership score of 0.8 indicates that the case is 
mostly but not fully a member of the target set. 0.6 is assigned to cases that the 
researcher considers to be more in than out of the set and 0.4 to cases that are, on 
the contrary, more out of than in the set. 0.2 means that the case is mostly but not 
fully a non-member of the target set and 0 indicates full non-membership. This is, 
however, only one possible scheme. More or less categories are possible. The 
decisive aspect is that each category has to be legitimised by substantive knowledge: 
“The stronger the empirical basis for making qualitative assessments of set 
membership, the more precise the calibration of the values of the interval-scale 
indicator as set membership scores.” (Ragin 2008: 96) When the researcher has 
defined the preliminary membership scores, they are regressed against the raw data 
using a fractional logit model. The predicted values are then used as the membership 
scores. For detailed information on this procedure please refer to Ragin (2008: 96f).  
 
5.2.3 The theory-guided method of calibration 
Relying partially on statistical models, both the direct and indirect methods of 
calibration lead to fine-grained set membership scores. This level of precision has 
been criticised as misleading because it “usually goes well beyond the available 
empirical information and the conceptual level of differentiation that is possible” 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 37). As Schneider and Wagemann have pointed out, 
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using the example of Emmenegger (2011), if the original values are close to 
qualitative assessments themselves “a complicated mathematical transformation, 
such as a logit function, might be a less appropriate way of reflecting the (partial) 
presence of a concept in given cases” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 40). As an 
alternative to the semi-automated calibration strategies introduced by Ragin, they 
refer to Emmenegger’s (2011) calibration as a good standard of calibration practice 
(cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 35). Emmenegger’s raw data consists of an 
additive index and he uses conceptual and case knowledge for imposing the 
qualitative anchors. For example, when calibrating set membership scores in the 
condition, “many institutional veto points”, he assigns a membership score of 0 to all 
cases that have the same or a lower score than the United Kingdom, based on case 
knowledge about the country. Furthermore, he uses a prominent gap on the index 
between two raw values (5.05 and 6.75 on an index with a maximum score of 10) to 
establish the crossover point (point of ambiguity). The level of transparency makes it 
possible to follow Emmenegger’s reasoning and if deemed necessary, to make 
specific suggestions for an alternative calibration (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 
35). 
 
5.2.4 The role of theoretical and substantive knowledge in calibration 
The definition of the three qualitative anchors in the direct method of calibration and 
of the preliminary membership scores in the indirect method are the most important 
steps when calibrating set membership scores, even in semi-automated direct and 
indirect calibration techniques (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 419). As I have 
briefly pointed out earlier, it is the “responsibility of the researcher to find valid rules 
for assigning set-membership scores to cases” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 32) 
and to present a rationale for each qualitative anchor. The calibration has to be based 
on the combination of theoretical knowledge and empirical evidence (cf. Ragin 2000: 
150). Since the “fuzzy set membership scores do not simply rank cases relative to 
each other” (Ragin 2009: 90), a valid calibration may never systematically assign 
membership scores to cases based solely on empirical distribution. This also applies 
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to research in which raw data is measured with an interval scale. While it may appear 
convenient to transform the interval scale into fuzzy sets this procedure disregards 
standards of good practice in QCA and does not lead to valuable results. The 
decision of where to set the qualitative anchors has to reflect theoretical 
considerations and empirical information external to the data in hand. This may 
include obvious facts, generally accepted notions in the social sciences, and 
knowledge that the researcher accumulated in a specific field of study or specific 
cases (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 32). The distribution of cases on the raw 
data can also be taken into consideration but the researcher has to make sure that it is 
“another piece of evidence, but certainly not the sole guidance when calibrating” 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 33). Finally, especially when using a semi-automated 
calibration strategy, it is important to thoroughly check whether each case’s 
membership score in each of the sets makes sense based on the researcher’s 
theoretical concepts and specific knowledge about the cases. What is more, if 
theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that the intervals between 
membership scores are not even but different, this has to be included in the analysis. 
Thus, “it is perfectly fine if a fuzzy set shows membership scores of, say, 0.1, 0.4, 0.6 
and 1, if theoretical considerations warrant it” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 29). 
While the calibration decisions are based on the researchers’ thorough reasoning and 
theoretical considerations, there is – inevitably – a certain margin of discretion for 
the individual calibration decisions. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that the 
calibration procedure is made transparent to the reader: Where were the qualitative 
anchors set and which theoretic, conceptual or empirical reasoning were they based 
upon? A high level of transparency “allows readers to follow the reasoning behind 
calibration decisions and to either agree or to disagree and, if the latter, to make 
specific suggestions for change in the calibration” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 
35).  
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5.2.5 Robustness of calibration 
Given that there are several decisions concerning the calibration procedure that have 
to be taken by the researcher and that allow for a certain degree of discretion, how 
does this affect the robustness of the analysis? How much does the final calibration 
result (to reiterate, the assignment of membership scores to cases) depend on where 
the qualitative anchors are set, and is the solution formula that is produced the result 
of one specific calibration that would look completely different if the calibration had 
been different? Schneider and Wagemann assert that “as long as the locations of the 
qualitative anchors are carefully chosen and thus not subject to changes in the 
calibration strategy (theory-guided, direct, indirect, etc.) or the functional form used 
in the semi-automated procedures (logistic, quadratic, linear, etc.), then the 
differences in the set-membership scores will not be of major substantive 
importance” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 38). If a case’s membership is altered 
slightly – as the result of the slightly different position of a qualitative anchor or a 
different assignment of a membership score in the indirect or theory-guided method 
of calibration – this will cause most results to “rarely vary in important ways” 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 40). In practice, analytical results derived from QCA 
are thereby generally robust in reaction to slight changes in the calibration method 
(cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 40).  
 
5.3 Analysing necessary and sufficient conditions 
As I have mentioned before, QCA is a set theoretic method and subset relations are 
linked to ideas concerning sufficient and necessary conditions. I will elaborate on the 
analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions in further detail in the following 
paragraph.  
In set-theoretic reasoning, necessity and sufficiency are modelled as superset and 
subset relations respectively. For example, “being a democracy is a necessary 
condition for being a NATO member, for the latter is a subset of the former” 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 4). The set of NATO members is smaller than the set 
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of democracies. This means that every NATO member is also a democracy and 
being a democracy is thus a necessary condition for being a NATO member. Let me 
visualise this in a more general way using the following Venn diagram (Figure 3). A 
stands for a set that is the outcome and B stands for a set that is a causal condition. 
Set A is smaller than set B and set B is thus a necessary condition for the outcome 
(set A).  
 
Figure 3: Venn diagram indicating that set B is a necessary condition for set A 
 
 
 
 
 
In the case of sufficient conditions, the subset-superset relations are exactly the 
opposite, as visualised in the following Venn diagram (Figure 4). Set A is still the 
outcome and set B is a condition. Now set A is bigger than set B and set B is thus a 
sufficient condition for set A.  
 
Figure 4: Venn diagram indicating that set B is a sufficient condition for set A 
 
 
 
 
If we assume, for example, that the set of voters of far-right parties is bigger than the 
set of inhabitants of rural areas, being an inhabitant of a rural area is a sufficient 
condition for being a voter of a far-right party. However, this condition does not 
 
Set A 
Set B 
Set B 
Set A 
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explain the entire outcome. Therefore, there must be other sufficient conditions for 
the same outcome.  
This central principle of QCA is called conjunctural causation. Conjunctural causation 
means “single conditions do not display their effect on their own, but only together 
with other conditions” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 6). Modelling causal relations 
as subset/superset-relations also means that the researcher has to recognise “the 
existence of equifinality, i.e., a scenario in which alternative factors can produce the 
same outcome” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 5). Equifinality is the second central 
principle in QCA, as the final solution formula normally consists of several different 
combinations of sufficient conditions or, in other words, different causal paths that 
all lead to the same outcome. Emmenegger has pointed out that this makes QCA a 
very valuable method for research projects in which the theoretical arguments are 
interlinked, that aim to test whether there are different paths that lead to the 
outcome, and those where arguments are causally related to each other (cf. 
Emmenegger 2011: 343). The third principle is the asymmetry of concepts and causal 
relations. This means that once we have determined the conditions that lead to the 
outcome, we cannot automatically assume that it is the non-occurrence of these 
conditions that lead to the non-occurrence of the outcome (cf. Schneider & 
Wagemann 2012: 6). If we have found, for example, that one causal term that leads 
to being a voter of a far-right party is to be male and to live in a rural area, we cannot 
automatically assume that not being a male and not living in a rural area (i.e., being a 
woman from an urban area) will lead to not voting for a far-right party.  
As a standard of good practice, “necessary and sufficient conditions should be 
analysed in separate analytical steps, with the analysis of necessary conditions going 
first“ (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 405). It is important – in QCA as in other 
methods – that the number of conditions included in the analysis, is kept at a 
moderate level. If the number of conditions tested is too high there will be a 
considerable number of combinations of conditions which are logically possible but 
for which there is no testable empirical data in the researchers’ cases (so called 
“logical remainders” that will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.4). Furthermore, 
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“with many conditions, QCA produces very complex results, making theoretically 
meaningful interpretations a daunting task” (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 402). 
 
5.3.1 Testing for necessary conditions 
In fsQCA necessary conditions can be assessed “by hand” with the help of an XY 
plot. For each condition, the researcher has to plot all the cases’ fuzzy set 
membership scores in the outcome (vertical axis) against the cases’ fuzzy set 
membership scores in the condition (horizontal axis). A condition is necessary if all 
cases’ set membership scores in the condition are larger than their set membership 
scores in the outcome or, in other words, if there are no cases located above the 
diagonal of the diagram. 
Necessary conditions can also be assessed with the help of the fsQCA 2.0 software, 
which will add the two main parameters of fit to the analysis (consistency and 
coverage, which will be explained in Chapter 5.6). The existence of necessary 
conditions is expressed as follows in Boolean algebra (X is the condition and Y is the 
outcome): X --> Y (read: X is necessary for Y).  
 
5.3.2 Testing for sufficient conditions: truth table minimisation 
Sufficient conditions are assessed via truth table minimisation. Table 4 is a fictional 
example for a truth table with three conditions of A, B and C. The truth table has 
eight rows because each condition may occur either in its presence or in its absence. 
The total number of theoretically possible truth table rows is therefore calculated by 
the expression 2k (with k being the number of conditions). It is important to note 
that when establishing the truth table the fuzzy set membership scores seem to 
disappear. 1 translates to cases having a set membership of 0.5 and higher and being 
members of the set (to a differing degree), 0 translates to cases having a set 
membership score lower than 0.5 and being not members of the set (again, to a 
differing degree). The fuzzy set membership scores will, however, not disappear 
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from the analysis and will be taken into consideration in the minimisation procedure 
by the computer software. 
 
Table 4: Fictional truth table example 
 Conditions    
Row A B C No. of cases Consistency Outcome 
1 1 1 1 1 0.677863478 ? 
2 1 1 0 2 0.976563242 ? 
3 1 0 0 1 0.834625371 ? 
4 0 0 0 1 0.238748991 ? 
5 0 0 1 0 0.000000000 ? 
6 0 1 1 0 0.000000000 ? 
7 1 0 1 1 0.7856437654 ? 
8 1 0 1 0 0.0000000000 ? 
 
Each row of the truth table is a statement about whether or not the combination of 
conditions represented by it is a sufficient condition for the outcome. Note that the 
decision whether every combination of conditions is a sufficient condition for the 
outcome has to be taken by the researcher (indicated by the question marks in the 
column for the outcome). When performing the truth table minimisation with the 
help of appropriate software such as fsQCA 2.0 (which is recommended due to the 
complexity of the analysis), the software will provide the researcher with the 
information he or she needs to make that decision. This information is the number 
of cases and the consistency value. First, the researcher should eliminate rows that do 
not contain cases. While the combinations of conditions represented by these rows 
theoretically exist, there are no cases in the data where these combinations of 
conditions can be found (this makes them so called “logical remainders”). Which 
other rows should be considered logical remainders and thus be excluded from the 
truth table minimisation depends on the total number of cases. When the database 
consists of only small to medium number of cases (approximately 10 to 100 cases), 
combinations of conditions that are only found in one case are usually considered 
relevant (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 153). When the study is based on a larger 
128 
 
number of cases the threshold should be set to two cases (or even more). The second 
criterion is consistency, a parameter of fit in set theoretic methods. What this 
parameter stands for and which threshold should be chosen for including cases in to 
the truth table minimisation are explained in further detail in Chapter 5.6. Those 
rows that make the researcher come to the conclusion – based on a satisfactory 
number of cases and a high enough consistency value – that the combination of 
conditions represented by it is a sufficient condition for the outcome are then 
included into the logical minimisation of the truth table.  
 
Table 5: Fictional truth table example 
 Conditions    
Row A B C No. of cases Consistency Outcome 
1 1 1 1 1 0.677863478 0 
2 1 1 0 2 0.976563242 1 
3 1 0 0 1 0.834625371 1 
4 0 0 0 1 0.238748991 0 
5 0 0 1 0 0.000000000 0 
6 0 1 1 0 0.000000000 0 
7 1 0 1 1 0.7856437654 1 
8 0 1 0 0 0.0000000000 0 
 
In our fictional example the researcher has decided, based on the number of cases 
and the consistency value, that rows 2, 3 and 7 contain the statement that this 
combination of conditions is sufficient for the outcome (see Table 5). In Boolean 
algebra, this results in the following expression:  
A*B*c + A*b*c + A*b*C <-- Y  
The expression is read as follows: The combination of condition A AND condition 
B AND the absence of condition C OR the combination of condition A AND the 
absence of condition B AND the absence of condition C OR the combination of 
condition A AND condition B AND the absence of condition C are sufficient 
conditions for the outcome Y. This expression is then minimised based on the rules 
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of Boolean addition and multiplication. As I pointed out earlier, this should be done 
with the help of appropriate computer software (fsQCA 2.0 uses the so-called 
Quine-McCluskey algorithm for logically minimising the sufficiency statements 
applying the rules of Boolean algebra). For a detailed description of this procedure 
please refer to Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 104ff). The result of the 
minimisation is the solution formula (cf. Chapter 5.3.5).  
 
5.4 Limited diversity and logical remainders  
In Tables 4 and 5, there were three logical remainders: the combinations a*b*C, 
a*B*C and a*B*c are not represented in the empirical database of the fictional 
research project (or, to be more precise, there are not enough cases that have a 
membership score higher than 0.5 in that combination of conditions). Thus, no 
statements on whether these conditions are or are not sufficient for the outcome can 
be made. This is referred to as the problem of limited diversity. The higher the 
amount of limited diversity, the higher the number of logically possible combinations 
of conditions that cannot be tested in the analysis.19 While researchers should keep 
limited diversity at a minimum level by including only a moderate number of 
conditions, a vast majority of truth tables will nevertheless contain logical 
remainders. Ragin (2008) suggests dealing with logical remainders by following the 
Standard Analysis. The Standard Analysis produces three solution terms. The first 
solution term is the conservative or complex solution and is produced by minimising the 
truth table without making any assumptions about the logical remainders. When 
producing the most parsimonious solution, the software allows the algorithm to include 
all assumptions about whether the missing combinations of conditions produce the 
outcome or not, under the only condition that they contribute to making the solution 
term more parsimonious, that is simpler. These assumptions are called “simplifying 
assumptions”. There are two kinds of simplifying assumptions: the so called easy and 
difficult counterfactuals. Easy counterfactuals are, first, in line with the empirical 
                                                 
19 Please note that limited diversity does not correspond to the concepts of degrees of freedom or 
missing values in correlational analysis. For a detailed discussion of limited diversity please refer to 
Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 152 ff). 
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evidence available. They are, second, also in line with existing theoretical knowledge 
that the researcher has on the effect of single conditions contained in the 
combination of conditions in the logical remainder on the outcome (for our fictional 
example, this would be the case when, for example, in all existing studies condition B 
has contributed to the outcome in its presence). The researcher’s assumptions based 
on theoretical knowledge are also called directional expectations. Difficult 
counterfactuals are in line with the empirical evidence in hand, but not with the 
directional expectations (as long as these exist). While the most parsimonious 
solution can draw on both easy and difficult counterfactuals when minimising the 
truth table, the intermediate solution uses only easy counterfactuals (or directional 
expectations). The specification of the counterfactuals is decided by the researcher.  
All three ways of dealing with limited diversity have advantages and disadvantages. 
The conservative solution often tends to be too complex to be interpreted in a 
theoretically meaningful or plausible manner. Depending on what the conditions 
included in the analysis are, the most parsimonious solution may rest on assumptions 
that contradict theoretical knowledge or common sense (think for example of 
untenable combinations of conditions like “pregnant” and “male”) (cf. Schneider & 
Wagemann 2012: 175). When the researcher is dealing with an under-researched 
topic or when there has to date only been contradictory evidence on the effect of 
single conditions, it may prove difficult to make directional expectations for the 
intermediate solution.  
While utilising QCA forces the researcher to deal with limited diversity in a very 
conscious manner (unlike other methods, cf. Schneider & Wagemann (2012: 157ff)) 
and to reflect on the different options to deal with it, limited diversity and logical 
remainders are neither specific problems of QCA as a method nor do they affect the 
empirical quality of the solution terms. As long as the researcher does not alter 
outcome values (from 1 to 0 or from 0 to 1) for the empirically observed truth table 
rows, “no solution term that is produced by changing assumptions on logical 
remainders can ever contradict the empirical evidence at hand” (Schneider & 
Wagemann 2012: 175). Different assumptions on different logical remainders will 
produce different solution formulas, but “any solution term will be a superset of the 
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truth table rows that contain empirical information and that are sufficient for the 
outcome of interest” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 161). Researchers should make 
transparent to the reader “whether or not logical remainders exist in the truth table 
and, if so, what type(s) of logically possible ‘cases’ are not observed empirically” 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 407). Researchers should also reveal “explicitly which 
of the different strategies were applied for dealing with logical remainders during the 
logical minimization process” (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 407) and which 
directional expectations were used for the intermediate solution. This information is 
indispensable for researchers who want to reproduce the analysis.  
 
5.5 The solution formulas 
All three solution formulas (most parsimonious, intermediate and conservative 
solution) should be presented to the reader in a formal Boolean notation. However, 
“when it comes to the theoretical and substantive interpretation of the results, a 
researcher is free to choose which formula(s) to put into the center of attention” 
(Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 408). Most researchers will not use all three solution 
formulas extensively for substantive interpretation.  
As I have mentioned before, the sufficient conditions for the non-occurrence of the 
outcome cannot be inferred automatically from the sufficient conditions for the 
occurrence of the outcome. If the researcher is interested in the conditions that lead 
to the non-occurrence of the outcome, a second analysis should be conducted for 
the negation of the outcome. 
 
5.6 Parameters of fit: consistency and coverage  
The crucial parameters of fit in QCA are consistency and coverage. Consistency is a 
measure of the degree to which the empirical data are in line with the subset relations 
the researcher specified. To be more precise, it “expresses the percentage of cases’ 
set-membership scores in two sets that is in line with the statement that one of the 
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two sets is a subset (or superset) of the other” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 324). 
Coverage is a measure of the relation between the size of a condition set and of the 
outcome set. For the assessment of sufficiency this means that coverage expresses 
how much of the outcome is explained (or “covered”) by the sufficient condition. In 
the case of necessary conditions, coverage expresses how relevant a necessary 
condition is for the outcome and also indicates whether a necessary condition is 
trivial.20 Consistency should always be calculated first since there is no meaningful 
interpretation of the coverage of an inconsistent condition. Consistency and coverage 
can be calculated by hand, or with the help of appropriate software (like fsQCA 2.0). 
For the calculation by hand please refer to Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 123ff).  
When performing QCA, consistency and coverage are important at several stages of 
the analysis. I already mentioned that when analysing necessary and sufficient 
conditions, the first step is to check whether there are necessary conditions for the 
outcome. When this is done with the help of fsQCA software, the programme will 
indicate consistency and coverage values for each condition tested. Only conditions 
that have a consistency value of 0.9 and preferably higher should be considered 
necessary conditions (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 278). If we think back to the 
Venn diagram for necessary conditions, the condition set is larger than the outcome 
set, or in other words, the outcome set is a perfect subset of the condition set. Thus, 
a consistency value of 1 indicates a perfect subset relation while values between 0.9 
and 1 indicate an almost perfect subset relation.21  
 
As I explained in Chapter 5.3, consistency is a crucial parameter when deciding 
which rows of the truth table are included in the minimisation and thereby contribute 
to the solution. When performing QCA with the help of the software fsQCA 2.0, a 
consistency value will be given for every truth table row. To reiterate, this value 
                                                 
20 If we take the example of extreme-right voters, a trivial necessary condition for voting for a far-right 
party is “having brown hair”. While the set of people that have brown hair is certainly a superset of 
people that vote for far-right parties (that would make it a necessary condition), the set of people that 
have brown hair is so much larger than that of the people that vote for far-right parties that it is a 
trivial necessary condition. This is indicated by low values for coverage. For a detailed discussion of 
trivialness please refer to Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 146ff; 233ff). 
21 For the possible implication of an almost but not fully perfect subset relation when assessing 
necessary conditions please refer to Schneider and Wagemann (2012: 143). 
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indicates how well the empirical reality matches the postulated subset relations, or, in 
other words, whether the empirical data confirm the assumption that the 
combination of conditions represented by the truth table row is a subset of the 
outcome (and thus a sufficient condition). While it can be assumed that consistency 
values between 0.0 and 0.75 indicate the existence of substantial inconsistency (cf. 
Ragin 2008: 136) and thus no consistency values lower than 0.75 should be accepted 
(cf. Ragin 2009: 118), there is no general rule as to where exactly the consistency 
threshold must be set. Researchers “cannot rely on commonly accepted thresholds 
that are applicable to any and all QCA” (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 406). Rather, 
the appropriate consistency level when deciding which cases go into the truth table 
minimisation and which do not is research-specific. It depends on the knowledge the 
researcher has about the cases, on the quality of the data gathered, on the specificity 
of theories and hypotheses in hand and on the research aims (cf. Schneider & 
Wagemann 2010: 406). For example, a cut-off level of 0.85 and higher is 
recommended for macrolevel data. Again, the researcher has to specify which 
threshold value he or she has chosen and why (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 
407). Empirically, consistency values across all truth table rows often display a gap 
between very high and very low values. If this is the case, it can often be an 
appropriate choice to set the threshold between the two values that are separated by 
this empirical gap (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 407).  
In contrast to the 0.75 minimum threshold for consistency there is no lower 
threshold for coverage (cf. Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 139). The lower the 
coverage value is, the less of the outcome is explained by the respective condition or 
the solution formula. However, researchers have to keep in mind that “the empirical 
importance expressed by coverage is not the same as the theoretical or substantive 
relevance” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 139) of a sufficient condition or a 
combination of conditions. Paths that achieve a low coverage value might 
nevertheless be theoretically or substantively meaningful and interesting.  
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5.7 Linking the solution formulas back to the cases 
As I proposed in Chapter 5.5, researchers should present the results of the truth table 
minimisation (parsimonious, intermediate and complex solution) in formal Boolean 
notation. This should, however, not be the finish point of the QCA. Rather, 
researchers have to link the solution formulas back to the cases by discussing 
“whether or not the results generated by the logical minimization make sense, both 
theoretically and empirically” (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 410). For this purpose, 
researchers must be transparent about which specific cases are covered (i.e., 
explained) by which of the paths in the solution formula. As Schneider and 
Wagemann have pointed out, “only if the results are useful for understanding the 
cases has the primary goal of QCA been achieved” (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 
410). What is more, “the solution formula alone should not be taken as 
demonstrating an underlying causal relationship between the conditions and an 
outcome” (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 412). The causal link or causal mechanism 
between the solution formula and the outcome should be explained and discussed 
with reference to the theoretical background of the analysis.  
It should be noted that the “results first and foremost hold for the cases that have 
actually been examined” (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 401). A generalisation of 
other cases is possible under the condition that the researcher clearly specifies scope 
conditions that have to be met by other cases if the causal relation examined is 
claimed to also hold for these cases. 
 
5.8 Robustness 
In QCA, solution terms can be deemed robust if they fulfil two conditions. First, 
necessary and sufficient conditions have to be similar across different model 
specifications. More specifically, this means that if “there is a clear subset relation 
between different solution terms, then results can be interpreted as robust, even if 
these solution terms look quite different on the surface” (Schneider & Wagemann 
2012: 286). Second, consistency and coverage have to be roughly the same across 
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different model specifications. They have to be “too marginal to provide the basis for 
meaningfully different substantive interpretations” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 
286).  
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Part III: Empirical Analysis  
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6. Professionalisation as a strategy of adaptation in the Swiss 
cantonal election campaigns 
As we remember from Chapter 2. I proposed to draw on sociological neo-
institutionalism as a theoretical foundation for the professionalisation of election 
campaigns. Hence, the professionalisation of election campaigns was defined as the 
process by which political parties adapt their campaigns to real or perceived changes 
in, and expectations from, the relevant environments for campaigning (constituted by 
the voters, the members, the media, and other parties) in order to ensure on-going 
support and legitimacy from these environments, and simultaneously, as the degree 
to which election campaigns are professionalised at a certain point in time. We also 
saw that the professionalisation of election campaigns can be considered a rational 
myth rather than being associated with efficiency or best practice, because it is, first, 
a manifestation of what parties consider an adequate adaptation to changes and 
institutional expectations in the most relevant environments, and it is, second, a way 
for parties to protect themselves against critique and the need for justification by 
complying with what they perceive to be state of the art campaigning. Several 
statements in the 37 semi-structured interviews that were conducted with the 
campaign managers of the 23 cantonal parties included in this study support that this 
theoretical conceptualisation of campaign professionalisation is reflected by the Swiss 
cantonal election campaigns.  
First, several statements reflect the purpose of designing the campaign in accordance 
with acknowledged rules as a protection against criticism – as long as a campaign was 
designed in accordance with how it is generally perceived that a campaign should be 
managed, the result cannot be considered the fault of the campaign managers. One 
interviewee (who was both campaign manager and candidate for the Christian 
Democrats in Aargau) pointed out that he did everything he could, that he knew how 
good campaigning had to be done and that he studied the Obama 2008 presidential 
campaign and copied it as well as he could – within the scope of his resources. 
Hence, his disappointing result (from his perspective) could only be attributed to the 
fact that he is not from the region and voters only vote for locals. Another 
interviewee (a local campaign manager for the Liberal Democrats in Aargau) was 
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puzzled by the discrepancy between the campaign, which he was convinced was 
“state of the art”, and the inexplicably poor result. Finally, a campaign manager and 
candidate from Bern (Christian Democrats) announced that he had invested all his 
accumulated campaign knowledge into the campaign, which nevertheless, brought a 
rather disappointing result. Hence, he declared that he had done all he could and that 
he would leave the campaign work to others who would obviously have to bring new 
ideas in order to succeed.  
Second, several statements underline that from the perspective of the interviewees, 
demands and expectations for election campaigns have changed and heightened 
during the last two decades. Interviewees referred, on the one hand, to technological 
innovations in graphics and word processing and stated that leaflets and brochures 
such as those that were handed out twenty years ago would not be of any help today 
because expectations were much higher now, (Christian Democrats, Bern), especially 
in regard to professional appearance, graphic art and corporate design (Social 
Democrats, Bern). On the other hand, interviewees referred to the general style of 
campaigning and implied that parties have to work harder to make their messages 
reach the voters. Several elements of campaign communication that have worked 
before are no longer deemed effective (“La grosse affiche où c’est mis ‘Tous ensemble, 
solidaire’, ça passe plus.” “The large poster saying ‘All together, solidly united’ doesn’t 
work anymore’” (Social Democrats, Neuchâtel). Hence, the knowledge of volunteer 
campaigners no longer suffices and professional tactics are needed (Social 
Democrats, Neuchâtel). Similarly, campaigns are perceived to have changed with 
regard to the interest of the voters, who no longer participate in panel discussions or 
other events organised by the parties and have become extremely hard to motivate 
and mobilise, a development that one interviewee (Liberal Democrats, Aargau) 
deplored.  
The issue of difficult mobilisation is frequently addressed by the interviewed 
campaign managers, both referring to the voters and their own members. 
Interviewees stated that even if potential voters are willing to go to the polls in 
principle, the large majority of them tend to forget to really go or have to be 
figuratively lured from their homes and pushed to the polls on Election Day (Swiss 
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People’s Party, Zürich; Christian Democrats, Zürich; Social Democrats, Bern). 
Interviewees also report that insistence is needed in order to make their own 
members go to the polls (Liberal Democrats, Bern; Green Party, Bern; Liberal 
Democrats, Aargau; Social Democrats, Aargau). Several times during the campaign, 
parties appeal to their members not to stay home on Election Day and point out 
how important their participation is (Christian Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, 
Zürich; Liberal Democrats, Bern). This can absorb up to 70 per cent of their 
campaign budget (Liberal Democrats, Aargau). Mobilisation is considered the key 
problem in Swiss election campaigns (Christian Democrats, Aargau) and a common 
conclusion is that mobilisation efforts have to be increased even more in the next 
campaign (Liberal Democrats, Aargau). Two interviewees pointed out that it is a 
general problem of society that people no longer dare to confess to being a supporter 
of a certain party (Green Party, Bern; Liberal Democrats, Aargau).  
Third, the interviews show that there is some uncertainty among the interviewees as 
to which communication channels are most effective for communicating with the 
voters. Interviewees stated, for example, that it is not known what is really effective 
and that opinions on this question differ considerably within the party (Social 
Democrats, Zürich; Christian Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich). Hence, 
communication efforts are dispersed through a large number of diverse channels, 
hoping to reach potential voters via one of them (Green Party, Bern). As a systematic 
evaluation after the campaign is costly and complicated, one interviewee compared 
the current situation as a “shot into the fog” (“So schiessen wir irgendwie im Nebel.”) and 
feared that the means of communication created are not of interest to the voters, and 
that communication channels are chosen which are not frequented by the voters 
(Liberal Democrats, Aargau). This uncertainty is not alleviated by media innovations 
as one interviewee pointed out by saying that she knew young people had to be 
addressed via the Internet, if she only knew how to do so (Christian Democrats, 
Zürich).  
Fourth, the interviews showed that different means or channels of campaign 
communication differ from each other with regard to their degree of taken-for-
granted-status and institutionalisation in the context of the cantonal election 
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campaigns included in this study. Several characteristics of campaign communication 
are institutionalised to a degree that they have a taken-for-granted-status, while some 
campaign managers cast doubts in their actual effectiveness for winning votes. This 
is the case for campaign posters and newspaper advertisements. As one campaign 
manager pointed out, a campaign clearly has to feature posters and newspaper 
advertisements and she would be astonished if a party decided to go without them. 
Personally, however, she doubts that voters would notice them (Green Party, 
Zürich). Rather, putting up posters is seen as a symbolic act to demonstrate that the 
party takes the campaign seriously (Green Party, Aargau). Another interviewee 
considered putting up campaign posters merely an act of duty (“passage obligé”, Liberal 
Democrats, Neuchâtel) that the party will not give up as long as other parties stick to 
it. Similar statements were also made by several interviewees in regard to campaign 
booths, whose major function is perceived to be marking the party’s presence. 
Nevertheless, the parties did not have the courage not to set up campaign booths, 
due to the long tradition and pervasiveness of this campaign activity (Liberal 
Democrats, Aargau; Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel). Leaflets, which are sent to all 
households in the constituency, were similarly referred to as an indispensable element 
(“élément incontournable”, Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel) that must be included in the 
campaign without knowing its impact. According to the interviewee, this logic is also 
applied to online campaigning (Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel).  
Similar statements about online campaigning, especially with regard to the necessity 
of having a campaign website and a profile on Facebook, were made by several 
campaign managers. They perceive parties to be obliged to engage in online 
campaigning, even if few votes will be won via these channels (Liberal Democrats, 
Bern; Social Democrats, Bern) as the Internet in general is too anonymous a medium 
for political communication (Swiss People’s Party, Zürich). The necessity of having a 
campaign website is taken for granted for several interviewees (Christian Democrats, 
Zürich; Social Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich, Green Party, Bern), as not 
even having a simple Web 1.0 website gives the party an image of being outdated 
(“Wenn man das nicht hat, ist man definitiv hinter dem Berg”, Liberal Democrats, Aargau). 
Having a profile on Facebook was also deemed to be necessary (Liberal Democrats, 
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Aargau). Hence, campaign managers typically announced that online campaigning 
would be enforced in the next campaign, regardless of the fact that the general effect 
on the voting result was evaluated sceptically (Christian Democrats, Aargau). At the 
same time campaign managers pointed to the quick evolution of online campaigning 
and questioned whether it made sense from an economic perspective to invest in 
Facebook or other new media. Blogs had been the campaign “hype” in the last 
elections but then lost importance, while the current hype is Facebook (Green Party, 
Zürich; Green Party, Aargau). The campaign manager of the Social Democrats in 
Bern pointed out that there are features of campaign communication (like online 
campaigning) that have to be included into the campaign, because without them the 
campaign will not be taken seriously by the public ("Sonst wird die Kampagne nicht für 
voll genommen.”). What is more, by leaving out certain indispensable campaign 
elements campaign managers fear that they will provoke critique from the party 
members and other important persons (Social Democrats, Bern) – even if, in the case 
of online campaigning, the balance of expense and gain is not in favour of the 
former.  
To sum up, the central parameters of the theoretical framework of this study are 
reflected in the interviews with the campaign managers, notably the conceptualisation 
of campaign professionalisation as a rational myth rather than a pure benefit-cost 
analysis, the general perception of changes in the environments for campaign 
professionalisation, and the perception of institutionalised expectations with regard 
to campaign communication and campaign organisation.  
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7. How professionalised are the Swiss cantonal election campaigns? 
Before turning to the analysis of the conditions that explain the professionalisation of 
Swiss cantonal election campaigns in Chapter 8, this chapter presents the descriptive 
results concerning campaign professionalisation in the 23 campaigns included in this 
study. Chapter 6 shows how campaign professionalisation is used as a strategy of 
adaptation to environmental challenges from the perspectives of the campaign 
managers in the cantonal election campaigns included in the present study. Chapter 7 
indicates to what degree campaigns are professionalised on an aggregate level 
(Chapter 7.1) and in relation to the four relevant electoral environments (Chapter 
7.2). The results are discussed from the perspective of both the indicators (in order 
to determine which characteristics of professionalised campaigning are most 
common in the 23 cantonal election campaigns included in this study) (Chapter 7.3) 
and that of the campaigns (comparing the index scores that the individual campaigns 
achieved with regard to professionalisation as an aggregated concept and with regard 
to each of the four environments) (Chapter 7.4). Following the same approach 
applied in Chapter 2.3.1, the results are then analysed to determine which 
environments the cantonal election campaigns have been professionalised towards 
most intensively (Chapter 7.5).  
 
7.1 Professionalisation as an aggregated concept 
We remember from Chapter 4.1 that the maximum score a campaign can achieve on 
this aggregated index is 13. The results show that there is considerable variance in the 
degree of professionalisation as an aggregated concept within the 23 campaigns 
included in this study. The campaign with the highest score on the aggregated 
professionalisation index is the campaign organised by the Social Democrats in 
Neuchâtel, which achieved a score of 12. It is followed by the campaign of the Social 
Democrats in Zürich with a score of 11 and the campaigns organised by the Social 
Democrats in Bern and by the Swiss People’s Party in Zürich each of which reached 
a score of 10. Two campaigns reach a score of 9, another two a score of 8. A group 
of five campaigns were assigned 7 index points, two campaigns were assigned 6 
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points. In the lower half of the rank are eight campaigns that feature less than half of 
the campaign characteristics that were defined as indicators for professionalised 
campaigning. The complete results are presented in Table 6.  
 
Table 6: Scores on the aggregated professionalisation index achieved by the 
campaigns 
Nr. Rank Campaign Score 
  Party Canton  
1 1 Social Democrats  Neuchâtel 12 
2 2 Social Democrats Zürich 11 
3 
3 
Social Democrats Bern 
10 
4 Swiss People’s Party Zürich 
5 
4 
Liberal Democrats Neuchâtel 
9 
6 Green Party  Zürich 
7 
5 
Liberal Democrats  Bern 
8 
8 Liberal Democrats Zürich 
9 
6 
Christian Democrats Aargau 
7 
10 Social Democrats Aargau 
11 Green Party Bern 
12 Green Party Neuchâtel 
13 Christian Democrats Zürich 
14 
7 
Green Party Aargau 
6 
15 Liberal Democrats Aargau 
16 
8 
Swiss People’s Party Bern 
5 17 Swiss People’s Party Neuchâtel 
18 Christian Democrats Neuchâtel 
19 
9 
Christian Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
4 
20 Christian Democrats Bern 
21 10 Social Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 3 
22 11 Liberal Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 2 
23 12 Green Party Appenzell Ausserrhoden 0 
 
Some patterns in regard to campaigns that took place in certain cantons and that 
were organised by certain parties seem to emerge from this picture. All campaigns 
that were organised in the small, rather rural and uncompetitive canton of Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden are found at the end of the ranking. All campaigns organised in the 
large, urban, and also rather uncompetitive canton of Zürich reached over half of the 
13 possible index points. In regard to the parties less obvious trends emerge. 
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However, three out of the four campaigns organised by the Christian Democrats – 
or, to be precise, by the cantonal branches in Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Bern und 
Neuchâtel – are found among the six least professionalised campaigns. These 
cantonal party branches are not represented in the cantonal parliament, have few 
seats and are located at the centre of the left-right ideological continuum. What is 
more, the fact that the first three ranks are occupied by campaigns organised by the 
Social Democrats casts some doubts on the hypothesis that being organised by a 
right-wing party is a causal condition for professionalised campaigning. We will see in 
Chapter 8 how these first trends fit into the larger pattern of causal conditions for 
campaign professionalisation. 
 
7.2 Professionalisation per environment 
7.2.1 Professionalisation with regard to the voters 
The campaign with the highest score on the index measuring professionalisation with 
regard to the voters is the campaign organised by the Social Democrats in Bern, 
achieving a score of 9 out of 11 possible index points. Table 7 presents the results for 
the remaining campaigns.  
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Table 7: Scores on the voters’ index achieved by the campaigns 
Nr. Rank Campaign Score 
  Party Canton  
1 1 Social Democrats Bern 9 
2 
2 
Social Democrats Neuchâtel 
7 
3 Swiss People’s Party Zürich 
4 3 Social Democrats Zürich 6 
5 
4 
Green Party Bern 
5 
6 Liberal Democrats Bern 
7 Christian Democrats Neuchâtel 
8 Liberal Democrats Neuchâtel 
9 Green Party Zürich 
10 
5 
Christian Democrats Aargau 
4 
11 Green Party Aargau 
12 Green Party Neuchâtel 
13 Christian Democrats Zürich 
14 Liberal Democrats Zürich 
15 
6 
Christian Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
3 
16 Liberal Democrats Aargau 
17 Social Democrats Aargau 
18 Christian Democrats Bern 
19 Swiss People’s Party Bern 
20 7 Swiss People’s Party Neuchâtel 2 
21 
8 
Liberal Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
1 
22 Social Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
23 9 Green Party Appenzell Ausserrhoden 0 
 
7.2.2 Professionalisation with regard to the members 
The campaign with the highest score on the index measuring professionalisation with 
regard to the members is the same campaign that scored highest in the voters’ index. 
On this index the campaign organised by the Social Democrats in Bern achieved a 
score of 9 out of 10 possible index points. Table 8 presents the complete results for 
the individual campaigns. Some trends that had already emerged from the results of 
the aggregate professionalisation index recur here, with campaigns organised by the 
Social Democrats occupying the first three ranks and campaigns organised in 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden being placed at the end of the ranking.  
 
146 
 
Table 8: Scores on the members’ index achieved by the campaigns 
Nr. Rank Campaign Score 
  Party Canton  
1 1 Social Democrats Bern 9 
2 
2 
Social Democrats Neuchâtel 
7 
3 Social Democrats Zürich 
4 
3 
Liberal Democrats Bern 
6 5 Green Party Zürich 
6 Swiss People’s Party Zürich 
7 
4 
Social Democrats Aargau 
5 
8 Christian Democrats Neuchâtel 
9 Liberal Democrats Neuchâtel 
10 Liberal Democrats Zürich 
11 
5 
Christian Democrats Aargau 
4 
12 Green Party Aargau 
13 Green Party Bern 
14 Swiss People’s Party Bern 
15 Christian Democrats Zürich 
16 
6 
Christian Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
3 
17 Liberal Democrats Aargau 
18 Green Party Neuchâtel 
19 Swiss People’s Party Neuchâtel 
20 
7 
Social Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
2 
21 Christian Democrats Bern 
22 8 Liberal Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 1 
23 9 Green Party Appenzell Ausserrhoden 0 
 
7.2.3 Professionalisation with regard to the media 
The results for campaign professionalisation with regard to the media differ more 
considerably from the previous results. A group of five campaigns reaches the 
maximum score of 2 by both mandating professionals for tasks related to the 
appearance of the campaign in the media and by offering training for candidates or 
volunteers that aims at ameliorating their performance in the media. Eleven 
campaigns featured one of these activities, while in seven campaigns no activities 
aimed at professionalising the campaign with regard to the media were included. 
Table 9 presents the complete results for every campaign. 
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Table 9: Scores on the media index achieved by the campaigns 
Nr. Rank Campaign Score 
  Party Canton 
2 
1 
1 
Liberal Democrats Bern 
2 Liberal Democrats Neuchâtel 
3 Social Democrats Neuchâtel 
4 Green Party Zürich 
5 Swiss People’s Party Zürich 
6 
2 
Green Party Aargau 
1 
7 Liberal Democrats Aargau 
8 Social Democrats Aargau 
9 Christian Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
10 Christian Democrats Bern 
11 Social Democrats Bern 
12 Swiss People’s Party Bern 
13 Green Party Neuchâtel 
14 Swiss People’s Party Neuchâtel 
15 Liberal Democrats Zürich 
16 Social Democrats Zürich 
17 
3 
Christian Democrats Aargau 
0 
18 Green Party Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
19 Liberal Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
20 Social Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
21 Green Party Bern 
22 Christian Democrats Neuchâtel 
23 Christian Democrats Zürich 
 
7.2.4 Professionalisation with regard to the other parties 
The results for professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by 
other parties indicate that in 15 out of 23 cantonal election campaigns, monitoring of 
the other parties’ campaign activities did not take place at all. Six campaigns (among 
them are four of the five campaigns that were organised in Zürich) engaged in 
monitoring other parties’ campaign activities. The campaigns organised by the 
Liberal Democrats and  the Social Democrats in Neuchâtel are the only ones that 
achieve the highest score of 2, because they not only monitored other campaigns but 
also reacted to their insights in a proactive way by adapting their own campaign 
activities. Table 10 presents the complete results for every campaign. A challenge for 
the subsequent analysis of the causal conditions for this outcome with fsQCA may 
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be that the outcome set is small with only two campaigns achieving the maximum 
index score of 2 and another six campaigns achieving an index score of 1. Hence, the 
empirical basis that can be drawn on in the truth table minimisation is very small.  
 
Table 10: Scores on the other parties’ index achieved by the campaigns 
Nr. Rank Campaign Score 
  Party Canton  
1 
1 
Liberal Democrats Neuchâtel 
2 
2 Social Democrats Neuchâtel 
3 
2 
Christian Democrats Aargau 
1 
4 Green Party Neuchâtel 
5 Green Party Zürich 
6 Liberal Democrats Zürich 
7 Social Democrats Zürich 
8 Swiss People’s Party Zürich 
9 
3 
Green Party Aargau 
0 
10 Liberal Democrats Aargau 
11 Social Democrats Aargau 
12 Christian Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
13 Green Party Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
14 Liberal Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
15 Social Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
16 Christian Democrats Bern 
17 Green Party Bern 
18 Liberal Democrats Bern 
19 Social Democrats Bern 
20 Swiss People’s Party Bern 
21 Christian Democrats Neuchâtel 
22 Swiss People’s Party Neuchâtel 
23 Christian Democrats Zürich 
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7.3 Which characteristics of professionalised campaigning are most common in 
cantonal election campaigns? 
Considering these descriptive results from the perspective of the indicators and 
analysing which characteristics of professionalised campaigning are most common in 
cantonal election campaigns it becomes obvious that mandating at least one 
professional in order to provide technical support seems to have been a “must have” 
in the cantonal election campaigns included in this study – this was the case in all but 
two campaigns. Also, sending direct e-mails as a means of so-called direct 
communication or narrow-casting to potential voters and/or members was very 
common (20 out of 23 campaigns).  
Direct mail was sent in 17 out of 23 campaigns. The large gap between direct mail 
sent to voters and members can be explained by the fact that for sending direct mail 
postal addresses are required. While most party offices hold this information about 
their party members, parties would still have to purchase postal addresses from 
providers who offer these for commercial purposes or to go about collecting postal 
addresses of non-party members themselves (for example via sweep stakes). The 
latter seems to be a very common practice in order to gain personal e-mail addresses, 
but very uncommon with regard to accessing mail addresses. All campaigns that 
featured direct e-mails to the members also featured direct e-mails to other potential 
voters. Also, in three out of five cases in which text messages where sent, these were 
directed at potential voters. Direct mail, however, was very rarely sent to potential 
voters (three out of 17 campaigns).  
The installation of a campaign headquarters, the setting up of a designated campaign 
team (17 campaigns) and the central elaboration and implementation of a basic joint 
campaign (16 campaigns) were relatively widely-used organisational features. While 
using social networks as a means of online communication remained a characteristic 
of 12 campaigns, the remaining campaign characteristics can be found only in a 
moderate to small number of campaigns (see Table 11).  
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Table 11: Frequency of characteristics of professionalised campaigning 
Campaign Characteristic  No. of 
campaigns 
If specified: 
reference to 
environment 
No. of 
campaigns 
Mandating professional for technical support 21 
 Media 7 
 Voters and members 4 
Mandating professional for 
strategic/conceptual/ideological support 
6 
Provide training for candidates and/or party 
members 
16 
 Media 14 
 Voters 5 
 Members 1 
Central elaboration and implementation of a 
basic joint campaign 
16 
Installation of campaign headquarters or a 
designated campaign team 
17 
Continuous campaigning 2 
Direct communication: Direct mail 17 
 Voters 3 
 Members 17 
Direct communication: Text message 5 
 Voters 3 
 Members 4 
Direct communication: Direct e-mail 20 
 Voters 20 
 Members 20 
Online communication: Social networks 12 
Online communication: Participative web 
content  
6 
Online communication: Video clip/video 
channel 
6 
Monitoring of other parties’ campaigns 8 
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7.4 Comparing the campaigns’ performances on the indices 
Switching the analytical perspective to the campaigns and comparing the 
performance of the campaigns on the differentiated professionalisation indices, the 
results show that the degrees of professionalisation of the single campaigns with 
regard to the different environments are similar in some campaigns, but are quite 
different in others. In general, some campaigns perform very poorly on all 
dimensions of professionalisation, notably those organised by the Social Democrats, 
the Liberal Democrats and the Green Party in Appenzell Ausserrhoden (see Table 
12). In the majority of the cases, however, the degrees of professionalisation with 
regard to the different environments seem to be unrelated. The campaign organised 
by the Social Democrats in Bern, for example, that has the highest scores among all 
campaigns with regard to the environments constituted by the voters and by the 
members, is not professionalised at all with regard to the environment constituted by 
other parties and achieves only a medium score with regard to the environment 
constituted by the media. On the contrary, the campaign organised by the Liberal 
Democrats in Neuchâtel achieves the maximum score with regard to the media and 
to other parties, but has only a medium degree of professionalisation with regard to 
the members and to the voters.  
The same conclusion applies if we analyse the campaigns with regard to their 
performance on the aggregated professionalisation index and on the environment 
related indices. While there are some campaigns which perform either very well 
(notably the campaigns organised by the Social Democrats in Neuchâtel) or very 
poorly (again, these are the campaigns organised by the Social Democrats, the Liberal 
Democrats and the Green Party in Appenzell Ausserrhoden) from an aggregate and 
from a differentiated perspective, the degrees of professionalisation are more mixed 
in the majority of the campaigns. Taking the campaign organised by the Liberal 
Democrats as an example, this campaign achieves at least a medium degree of 
professionalisation as an aggregated concept, but performs quite poorly with regard 
to the environment related professionalisation indices.  
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To sum up, the fact that the professionalisation profiles (i.e., the degree of 
professionalisation as an aggregate concept and with regard to the different 
environments) are relatively differentiated for the majority of the cases can be 
interpreted as first evidence that an environmentally differentiated perspective on 
campaign professionalisation is a fruitful research approach. 
 
Table 12: Comparison of index scores per campaign 
Campaign Aggregate Media Members Voters Other 
parties  
Social Democrats, Neuchâtel 12 4 7 7 4 
Social Democrats, Zürich 11 2 7 6 2 
Social Democrats, Bern 10 2 9 9 0 
Swiss People’s Party, Zürich 10 4 6 7 2 
Green Party, Zürich 9 4 6 5 2 
Liberal Democrats, 
Neuchâtel 
9 4 5 5 4 
Liberal Democrats, Bern 8 4 6 5 0 
Liberal Democrats, Zürich 8 2 5 4 2 
Social Democrats, Aargau 7 2 5 3 0 
Christian Democrats, Zürich 7 0 4 4 0 
Green Party, Bern 7 0 4 5 0 
Christian Democrats, Aargau 7 0 4 4 2 
Green Party, Neuchâtel 7 2 3 4 2 
Green Party, Aargau 6 2 4 4 0 
Liberal Democrats, Aargau 6 2 3 3 0 
Christian Democrats, 
Neuchâtel 
5 0 5 5 0 
Swiss People’s Party, Bern 5 2 4 3 0 
Swiss People’s Party, 
Neuchâtel 
5 2 3 2 0 
Christian Democrats, 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
4 2 3 3 0 
Christian Democrats, Bern 4 2 2 3 0 
Social Democrats, Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 
3 0 2 1 0 
Liberal Democrats, 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
2 0 1 1 0 
Green Party, Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 
0 0 0 0 0 
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7.5 With regard to which environment are the cantonal election campaigns 
most professionalised? 
After having analysed how professionalised the 23 cantonal election campaigns are in 
general and with regard to the four relevant electoral environments, the results are 
analysed in order to discover which environments the cantonal election campaigns 
have been professionalised towards most intensively. This is achieved by following 
the same approach as that used in Chapter 2.3.1 in relation to existing studies of 
campaign professionalisation. With regard to the environment of the voters, all 23 
campaigns together reach a score of 93, representing 37 per cent of the maximum 
score of 253. With regard to the environment constituted by the members, this 
percentage rises to 43 per cent (total score of 98 out of a maximum score of 230). 
The environment that the cantonal election campaigns included in this study have 
been professionalised most intensively towards is the environment formed by the 
media (46 per cent or 21 out of 46 index points). The election campaigns are least 
professionalised with regard to the electoral environment constituted by the other 
parties (22 per cent or 10 out of 46 index points). However, this comparison is not 
entirely reliable as the number of indicators measuring campaign professionalisation 
is different for each environment. 
If we compare these results to the overall result from existing studies on campaign 
professionalisation focusing on cases from Germany, Sweden and Portugal (see 
Chapter 2.3.1), the 23 cantonal election campaigns included in the present study were 
most professionalised with regard to the environment of the media, while campaigns 
in existing studies were least adapted to the environment of the media in comparison 
to the other three environments. The campaigns in existing studies were most 
professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members, which 
is the environment that the cantonal election campaigns were adapted to second 
most intensively. Under the premise that the results from the present study and from 
existing studies are comparable – despite methodological differences – at least with 
regard to these rough tendencies, a logical yet speculative explanation for the 
discrepancy relative to the environment of the media could be the following: The 
indicators measure whether professionals were mandated for tasks related to the 
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appearance of the campaign in the media and whether training for candidates or 
volunteers that aims at ameliorating their performance in the media was offered. 
Therefore, the result might suggest that the environment of the media has gained 
importance in Swiss cantonal election campaigns only more recently than in the 
national campaigns analysed in existing studies. In this case, the cantonal party 
branches would require more activities that aim at adapting their campaigns to the 
changes and institutional expectations inherent in the environment of the media than 
would parties in an environment where the medialisation process has started earlier 
and where parties adapted their campaigns to this development earlier, hence already 
being used to the centrality of medialised campaigning. This interpretation seems 
more plausible than to assume that the media play a more important role in the 
cantonal election campaigns than in the national campaigns of Germany, Sweden and 
Portugal.   
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8. Explaining campaign professionalisation in Swiss cantonal 
election campaigns 
In this chapter I will begin by explaining how the principles and method of fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) are applied in order to extract causal 
paths that lead to professionalised campaigning in the 23 cantonal election campaigns 
of this study (Chapter 8.1). Chapter 8.1.1 provides the conceptual basis of the 
research design by outlining how the professionalisation of election campaigns and 
the conditions influencing it can be modelled as subset/superset relations. The 
subsequent chapters focus on the calibration of the outcome (8.1.2) and of the causal 
conditions (8.1.3). These chapters are included at this point of the study because, as 
the reader will see, the application of the method is so closely linked to the results of 
the analysis that both can be comprehended much easier when presented in direct 
sequence. Chapter 8.2 provides the results of the fsQCA analysis for campaign 
professionalisation as an aggregated concept, both reporting necessary (8.2.1) and 
sufficient conditions (8.2.2). Chapter 8.3 does the same for the four differentiated 
outcomes: necessary and sufficient conditions are reported for professionalisation 
with regard to the electoral environments constituted by the voters (8.3.1), by the 
members (8.3.2.), by the media (8.3.3) and by other parties (8.3.4). An overview over 
the results is given in Chapter 8.4 and the results are discussed in Chapter 8.5. 
 
8.1 Applying fsQCA to explain campaign professionalisation 
8.1.1 Campaign professionalisation in set-theoretic terms 
As I outlined in Chapter 5.1, a key principle in QCA as a set theoretic method is that 
the relations between the causal conditions and the outcome can be described as 
subset/superset relations. The rationale underlying this study is that this principle is 
valid for the professionalisation of election campaigns. More concretely, I assume 
that the relation between each of the five outcomes of my analysis (campaign 
professionalisation as an aggregated concept and professionalisation with regard to 
each of the four relevant electoral environments) and the five causal conditions that 
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are assumed to produce professionalised campaigning can all be modelled as 
subset/superset relations. The empirical analysis will show which subset/superset 
relations can be confirmed by the empirical data from the 23 cantonal election 
campaigns (see also Chapter 3.4 for the role of the hypotheses in QCA analyses). 
Logically, the following subset/superset relations can be postulated:  
• The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a subset 
of the set of campaigns that were organised in large cantons.  
• The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a subset 
of the set of campaigns that were organised in urbanised cantons.  
• The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a subset 
of the set of campaigns that were organised in cantons with close 
competition in the cantonal parliament. 
• The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a subset 
of the set of campaigns that were organised by right-wing parties.  
• The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a subset 
of the set of campaigns that were organised by catch-all parties.  
The subset/superset relation postulated in the first statement translates to: Being 
organised in a large canton is a necessary condition for professionalised campaigning. 
The second statement means that being organised in an urbanised canton is a 
necessary condition for professionalised campaigning, and so forth.  
The same statements can be made for professionalisation with regard to each of the 
four relevant environments. For example, it could be assumed that the set of 
campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment of the members 
is a subset of the set of campaigns that were organised in a canton with a close 
competition in the cantonal parliament. This translates to: Being organised in a 
canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament is a necessary condition 
for a campaign that is professionalised with regard to the members. Thinking back to 
Chapter 5.3, this latter subset/superset relation can be graphically illustrated as seen 
in Figure 5, with set A being the set of professionalised campaigns and B being the 
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set of campaigns organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal 
parliament. 
 
Figure 5: Venn diagram indicating that set B is a necessary condition for set A 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on existing research, I hypothesised that there are no necessary conditions for 
campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and no necessary conditions 
for campaign professionalisation with regard to any of the four relevant 
environments. Hence, the subset/superset relations postulated above are logically 
possible and they prove that it makes sense to model the relation between each of 
the outcomes of my analysis and the five causal conditions as subset/superset 
relations. QCA is thus a useful approach for the research interest of this study. 
However, these subset/superset relations would most likely not be found in the 
empirical reality of the 23 cantonal election campaigns. 
In addition to the subset/superset relations postulated above, the following are also 
logically possible:  
• The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a superset 
of the set of campaigns that were organised in large cantons.  
• The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a superset 
of the set of campaigns that were organised in urbanised cantons.  
• The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a superset 
of the set of campaigns that were organised in cantons with a close 
competition in the cantonal parliament. 
B 
A 
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• The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a superset 
of the set of campaigns that were organised by right-wing parties.  
• The set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated concept) is a superset 
of the set of campaigns that were organised by catch-all parties.  
The subset/superset relation postulated in the first statement now means that being 
organised in a large canton is a sufficient condition for professionalised campaigning. 
The second statement means that being organised in an urbanised canton is a sufficient 
condition for professionalised campaigning, and so forth.  
Again, the same statements can be made for professionalisation with regard to each 
of the four relevant environments. For example, it could be assumed that the set of 
campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment of the members 
is a superset of the set of campaigns that were organised in a canton with close 
competition in the cantonal parliament. This translates to: Being organised in a 
canton with close competition in the cantonal parliament is a sufficient condition for a 
campaign that is professionalised with regard to the members. This is depicted in 
Figure 6, with set A now being the set of campaigns organised in a canton with close 
competition in the cantonal parliament and B being the set of professionalised 
campaigns. 
 
Figure 6: Venn diagram indicating that set A is a sufficient condition for set B 
 
 
 
 
 
As we can see in Figure 6 and as we remember from Chapter 5.3, set A does not 
cover set B entirely, or in other words, condition A (being organised in a canton with 
B 
A 
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close competition in the cantonal parliament) does not explain all of outcome B (a 
professionalised campaign). Hence, only the combination of several sufficient 
conditions, including condition A, would produce outcome B (as I outlined in 
Chapter 5.3, the phenomenon that single conditions do not display their effect on 
their own, but only together with other conditions is called conjunctural causation). 
For example, when formulating the hypothesis in Chapter 3.4 it was assumed that 
being organised in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament, not 
being organised by a right-wing party, and being organised by a catch-all party are all 
sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the 
environment constituted by the members. Translated back to set-theoretic terms, this 
means that the set of campaigns organised in a canton with close competition in the 
cantonal parliament, the set of campaigns that were not organised by a right-wing 
party, and the set of campaigns that were organised by a catch-all party are subsets of 
the set of campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment 
constituted by the members. This can be illustrated as depicted in Figure 7. The 
green circle represents the set of campaigns that are professionalised with regard to 
the environment constituted by the members, the red, orange and blue circles 
represent the set of campaigns organised in a canton with close competition in the 
cantonal parliament, the set of campaigns that were not organised by a right-wing 
party, and the set of campaigns that were organised by a catch-all party respectively. 
The section were the three latter sets overlap represents those campaigns that are 
professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members that can 
be explained by the combination of the three conditions being organised in a canton 
with close competition in the cantonal parliament, not being organised by a right-
wing party, and being organised by a catch-all party. 
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Figure 7: Venn diagram illustrating an outcome that is explained by the combination of three 
conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While the empirical analysis will show whether or not these and the other 
subset/superset relations implicated in the hypotheses can be verified with regard to 
the 23 election campaigns, they show that the relation between each of the outcomes 
and the five causal conditions can be modelled as subset/superset relations. 
Based on this set-theoretic framework, two kinds of analyses will be conducted. On 
the one hand the outcome is the set of professionalised cantonal election campaigns 
(to be precise, with professionalisation being conceptualised – as it has been done in 
existing research – as an aggregated concept measured with one single 
professionalisation index). On the other hand, I perform the analyses with the help 
of fsQCA with four different outcomes. These are:  
• the set of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to 
the voters, 
• the set of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to 
the members, 
• the set of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to 
the media, and 
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• the set of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to 
other parties. 
As I have noted, the purpose of these analyses is to identify the causal paths that lead 
to professionalised cantonal campaigns in general, and those causal paths that lead to 
the professionalisation of the cantonal campaigns with regard to each of the four 
electoral environments constituted by the voters, members, media and other parties. 
The underlying theoretical framework is as follows: The general changes in the most 
relevant electoral environments for campaigning (the voters, members and media 
from the macro-sociological perspective of neo-institutionalism and other parties 
from the organisational perspective of neo-institutionalism) that were described in 
Chapter 2.2.3 equally affect all cantonal election campaigns included in this study (the 
fact that this assumption is valid for my sample campaigns was corroborated by 
statements from the interviews with the campaign managers (see Chapter 4.). Hence, 
the organising parties professionalise (i.e., adapt) their campaigns in order to find 
ways to cope with these environmental changes and to fulfil institutional 
expectations resulting from the changes (for example in adapting to changes in the 
environment of the media by initialising campaigning via Facebook or in adapting to 
changes in the environment constituted by the voters by including means of so-called 
direct communication or by ensuring that a voter recognises the same candidates and 
topics on all campaign posters he or she sees on the way to work). Parties do this 
with measures that they deem express the appropriate way to act (acquiring the 
necessary knowledge through their own reasoning, such as the standards set by 
professionals or from the examples of other parties) in order to ensure on-going 
support and legitimacy from the environments. For example, by sending so-called 
direct mail in order to address as many voters as possible as there is generally more 
to win and more to lose facing a more volatile and indifferent electorate. Due to 
confrontations with the same environmental changes and institutional expectations, 
as well as with the mutual monitoring and copying (resulting from uncertainty as to 
how to best react to changes), all campaigns should be professionalised in the same 
way, that is, with regard to the same environments and to the same degree. However, 
I assume, in line with sociological neo-institutionalism and based on existing 
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professionalisation research, first, that the influence that general environmental 
changes and resulting institutional expectations have on the campaigns differs 
according to on factors that are located at the party level and at the systemic level. 
We can assume, for example, that a catch-all party, which is more dependent on the 
media for addressing its large group of potential voters and its members, is affected 
more strongly by changes and pressures to adapt in the environment constituted by 
the media and will therefore professionalise its campaigns more strongly with regard 
to the media than a niche party. Similarly, a campaign that is organised in a canton 
with close competition in the cantonal parliament is under greater pressure to feature 
the monitoring of other parties campaigns and will thus be more professionalised 
with regard to this environment than other campaigns. As I proposed in Chapters 3.2 
to 3.4, the five causal conditions included in this study can be assumed to have a 
different weight and impact in regard to the four environments. Therefore, the causal 
conditions leading to campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept can be 
assumed to be different from those leading to campaign professionalisation with 
regard to the different environments, which for their part can be assumed to differ 
from each other. What is more, election campaigns are not necessarily 
professionalised to the same degree with regard to each of the four environments, as 
their organising parties can be expected to exercise a certain strategic choice in 
adapting to their institutional environments and to decide how intensively to adapt, 
depending on which adaptation is deemed to be most important. The latter 
estimation differs again, influenced by the five causal conditions at the party level and 
at the systemic level. As both the profile (i.e., with regard to which environment the 
campaign is professionalised) and the degree (i.e., how professionalised a campaign 
is) can be expected to differ from campaign to campaign, the causal paths leading to 
campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and in regard to the relevant 
environments should be analysed separately and can be expected to differ from one 
another. 
I also mentioned that the hypothesised relations between the conditions and the 
outcome, as well as the actual results of the analysis, are valid first and foremost 
under the scope conditions defined by the research design and the data underlying 
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the analysis. For the study in hand, this means that the formulated subset/superset 
relations are valid with regard to the campaigns that were included in the database of 
this study. As we can recall, these are the election campaigns organised by the 
respective cantonal branches of the Green Party, the Social Democrats, the Christian 
Democrats, the Liberal Democrats and the Swiss People’s Party for the occasion of 
the elections to the cantonal parliaments in the cantons of Aargau and Neuchâtel in 
2009, in the canton of Bern in 2010 and in the cantons of Zürich and Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden in 2011 (see Chapter 8.5 for a discussion of the validity of the results 
beyond these scope conditions). 
 
8.1.2 Calibrating the outcome  
A challenge in calibrating the outcome sets of this analysis is that the data we have at 
hand, in order to assign calibrated membership scores to each of the 23 election 
campaigns, consists of the scores that the campaigns reached on the aggregated 
professionalisation index and on each of the differentiated professionalisation 
indices. As we recall, both the aggregated index and the differentiated indices consist 
of indicators that reflect qualitative characteristics of professionalised campaigning (1 
characteristic = 1 point on the index) (see chapter 5.2). Two aspects make calibrating 
membership scores in these sets challenging: First, these are not “real world” data in 
the sense that there is no common sense concept or general understanding of what 
constitutes a professionalised campaign, or which characteristics a professionalised 
campaign at least needs to feature in order to be regarded as professionalised (in 
contrast to, say, calibrating the set of poor students, where I could draw on existing 
approaches to, or definitions of, what constitutes a “poor” person). I cannot rely on 
existing research either, neither by drawing on examples of how professionalisation 
has been calibrated in other studies based on fsQCA nor by referring to a minimal 
consensus or understanding of professionalisation used by researchers in qualitative 
or correlational analyses. Second, a theoretical argumentation is also difficult with 
this kind of data. The general approach will thus be the following: Incorporating a 
particular amount of professionalisation characteristics is considered a substantial 
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effort for the campaigns and their organising parties and it is assumed to be sufficient 
to be treated as an effort to adapt (i.e., to professionalise) the campaign to 
environmental changes and institutional expectations inherent in the environments. 
This particular amount is represented by the index score indicating the cross-over 
point. For example, it is argued for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated 
concept that incorporating seven or more professionalisation characteristics (or, in 
other words, indicators of professionalised campaigning) out of 13 possible 
indicators from the aggregated professionalisation index into the campaign is a 
sufficient effort to consider the campaign a professionalised campaign (i.e., having a 
set membership score in the set of professionalised campaigns (as an aggregated 
concept) that is larger than 0.5). Following the same reasoning, it may be assumed 
that incorporating five or more professionalisation characteristics out of 11 possible 
indicators from the index measuring campaign professionalisation, with regard to the 
voters in the campaign, is a sufficient effort to consider the campaign 
professionalised with regard to the voters, and so forth.  
In order to further substantiate the calibration based on this principle, I will rely on 
empirical gaps in the raw data, where these exist (see Chapter 5.2.3). In accordance 
with the standards of good practice in QCA, it will also be made transparent how the 
sets were calibrated and the raw data is provided in Appendix C), so that researchers 
can come up with alternative calibration propositions. Finally, the robustness of the 
results will be checked against an alternative, slightly different calibration.  
Before I turn to the actual calibration procedure a second general remark on the 
qualitative anchors that will be presented for calibrating the outcome sets is in order. 
Readers may notice that the definition of the membership in the outcome sets may 
seem rather generous, for example, by declaring all cases that have a score of 10 and 
more out of 13 on the aggregated professionalisation index full members of the set 
of professionalised campaigns, by setting the qualitative anchor for full non-
membership at 3 characteristics and the cross-over point reflecting the maximum 
ambiguity at 6. However, I argue that opting for a rather inclusive set definition can 
be backed up theoretically and methodically. As we remember from Chapter 5.1, 
QCA requires that sets be defined in line with the research interest. As we have seen, 
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the empirical research interest of this study is, first, to capture the professionalisation 
of the Swiss cantonal election campaigns as adequately and as comprehensively as 
possible (descriptive results), and, second, to find out which causal paths lead to 
different profiles of professionalisation (explanatory results). If the outcome sets (i.e., 
professionalised campaigns in general and per environment) are defined very rigidly, 
there will be only a small number of cases (or, in my concrete case, of campaigns) in 
the outcome sets. The database on which it may be calculated via fsQCA which 
causal paths lead to the outcome may then not suffice to produce meaningful results. 
As we will see in Chapter 8.3.2, for example, only four campaigns achieve at least half 
of the 11 possible points on the index measuring campaign professionalisation with 
regard to the voters, with the number of campaigns rising to nine if we also count 
the campaigns that achieved five points. Hence, a rather generous and inclusive 
calibration of the outcome sets best serves the research interest of this dissertation. 
As is the case for every research project of this kind, we have to keep in mind how 
the outcome was operationalised and how set membership was defined when 
interpreting the results of the analysis – and especially when comparing them to 
results from other studies.  
 
8.1.2.1 Calibrating the set of professionalised cantonal election campaigns 
As I have shown, the maximum score a campaign can achieve on the index reflecting 
professionalisation as an aggregated concept is 13. As I outlined in Chapter 5.2.1, 
three qualitative anchors have to be defined in order to calibrate the set of 
professionalised cantonal election campaigns via the direct method of calibration for 
full membership in the outcome set, for full non-membership in the outcome set, 
and for the cross-over point. All cases that have a score of 10 and over are 
considered full members of the set of professionalised campaigns. The qualitative 
anchor for full non-membership is set at 3 characteristics and the cross-over point 
reflecting the maximum ambiguity is set at 6. This results in the set membership 
scores, which are displayed in Table 13. 
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As a test of robustness the analysis is performed with a different calibration, 
following the strategy applied by Emmenegger (2011) (see Chapter 5.2.3), who 
directly assigns fuzzy set membership scores to the cases based on empirical 
information (which means, for our cases, based on the information of which 
characteristics of professionalised campaigning were included in the campaigns, or in 
other words, the index scores achieved by the campaigns). I opt for a six value fuzzy 
scale, in which a set membership score of 0 stands for full non-membership in the 
set of professionalised cantonal election campaigns. All cases that achieve index 
scores between 0 and 3 are assigned this set membership score. A set membership 
score of 0.2 means that the campaign is mostly but not fully a non-member of the set 
of professionalised cantonal election campaigns and is assigned to cases with an 
index score of 4. The set membership score of 0.4 is assigned to cases that have an 
index score of 5 and are thus more out of the set than in. 0.5 marks, as usual, the 
point of maximum ambiguity, where it is least clear whether the cases do or do not 
form part of the set, which is the case for campaigns with an index score of 6. A set 
membership score of 0.6 is assigned to cases with an index score of 7, suggesting that 
they are considered more in than out of the set. A set membership score of 0.8 is 
assigned to campaigns with an index score of 8, indicating that the case is mostly but 
not fully a member of the target set. The value of 1 represents full membership in the 
set of professionalised campaigns and is assigned to cases with index scores between 
13 and 9.  
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Table 13: Set of professionalised campaigns: Raw data and set membership scores 
Campaign 
Index 
score 
Result of direct calibration 
via fsQCA software 
Alternative 
calibration 
Party Canton    
Social Democrats  Neuchâtel 12 0.99 
1 
Social Democrats Zürich 11 0.98 
Social Democrats Bern 
10 0.95 
Swiss People’s Party Zürich 
Liberal Democrats Neuchâtel 
9 0.9 
Green Party  Zürich 
Liberal Democrats  Bern 
8 0.82 0.8 
Liberal Democrats Zürich 
Christian Democrats Aargau 
7 0.68 0.6 
Social Democrats Aargau 
Green Party Bern 
Green Party Neuchâtel 
Christian Democrats Zürich 
Green Party Aargau 
6 0.5 0.5 
Liberal Democrats Aargau 
Swiss People’s Party Bern 
5 0.27 0.4 Swiss People’s Party Neuchâtel 
Christian Democrats Neuchâtel 
Christian Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
4 0.12 0.2 
Christian Democrats Bern 
Social Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 3 0.05 
0 Liberal Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 2 0.02 
Green Party Appenzell Ausserrhoden 0 0 
 
8.1.2.2 Calibrating the sets of cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised 
with regard to the four environments 
In order to define and calibrate the sets of cantonal election campaigns that are 
professionalised with regard to the four environments constituted by the voters, the 
members, the media and other parties I draw on the differentiated professionalisation 
indices.  
As we remember from Chapter 5.2, the degree of professionalisation that a campaign 
achieved with regard to the voters is measured on an index with a maximum score of 
11. In order to calibrate the set via the direct method of calibration, all cases that 
have an index score of 7 and more are considered full members of the set of 
cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment 
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constituted by the voters. The qualitative anchor for full non-membership is set at an 
index score of 2 and the cross-over point reflecting the maximum ambiguity is set at 
an index score of 4. This results in the set membership scores displayed in Table 14. 
Again, the analysis is performed with a slightly different calibration as a test of 
robustness. This time I opt for directly assigning set membership scores from a four 
value fuzzy scale to the campaigns as the raw data reveals less variance than was the 
case for professionalisation as an aggregated concept (where a six value scheme was 
chosen). The set membership score of 0 indicates full non-membership in the set of 
campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment of the voters and is 
assigned to cases with index scores between 0 and 2. The set membership score of 
0.33 marks cases that are considered more out than in the set of campaigns 
professionalised with regard to the environment of the voters. It is assigned to cases 
with an index score of 3. 0.5 marks the point of maximum ambiguity, where it is least 
clear whether the cases do or do not form part of the set, which is the case for 
campaigns with an index score of 4. The set membership score of 0.67 is assigned to 
cases with index scores of 5 and 6 and indicates that these cases are more in than out 
of the outcome set. All cases that achieve index scores between 7 and 11 are 
considered full members of the outcome set, which translates to a set membership 
score of 1. 
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Table 14: Set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment 
constituted by the voters: Raw data and set membership scores 
Campaign 
Index 
score 
Result of direct calibration 
via fsQCA software 
Alternative 
calibration 
Party Canton    
Social Democrats Bern 9 0.99 
1 Social Democrats Neuchâtel 
7 0.95 
Swiss People’s Party Zürich 
Social Democrats Zürich 6 0.88 
0.67 
Green Party Bern 
5 0.73 
Liberal Democrats Bern 
Christian Democrats Neuchâtel 
Liberal Democrats Neuchâtel 
Green Party Zürich 
Christian Democrats Aargau 
4 0.5 0.5 
Green Party Aargau 
Green Party Neuchâtel 
Christian Democrats Zürich 
Liberal Democrats Zürich 
Christian Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
3 0.18 0.33 
Liberal Democrats Aargau 
Social Democrats Aargau 
Christian Democrats Bern 
Swiss People’s Party Bern 
Swiss People’s Party Neuchâtel 2 0.05 
0 
Liberal Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
1 0.01 
Social Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
Green Party Appenzell Ausserrhoden 0 0 
 
The degree of professionalisation that a campaign achieved with regard to the 
members is measured on an index with a maximum score of 9. Applying again the 
direct method of calibration, all cases that have an index score of 6 and more are 
considered full members of the set of cantonal election campaigns that are 
professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members. The 
qualitative anchor for full non-membership is set at an index score of 2 and the 
cross-over point reflecting the maximum ambiguity is set at an index score of 4. The 
resulting set membership scores are displayed in Table 15. 
Once again, I run the analysis with a slightly different calibration as a test of 
robustness. I opt for a similar scheme that was used for the alternative calibration of 
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the set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the voters. The set membership 
score of 0 indicates full non-membership in the set of campaigns professionalised 
with regard to the environment of the members and is assigned to cases with index 
scores between 0 and 2. The set membership score of 0.33 marks campaigns that are 
considered more out than in the set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the 
environment of the members. It is assigned to cases with an index score of 3. 0.5 
marks the point of maximum ambiguity and is assigned to campaigns with an index 
score of 4. The set membership score of 0.67 is assigned to cases with an index score 
of 5 and indicates that these cases are more in than out of the outcome set. All cases 
that achieve index scores between 6 and 9 are considered full members of the 
outcome set, which translates to a set membership score of 1. 
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Table 15: Set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment 
constituted by the members: Raw data and set membership scores 
Campaign 
Index 
score 
Result of direct calibration 
via fsQCA software 
Alternative 
calibration 
Party Canton    
Social Democrats Bern 9 1 
1 
Social Democrats Neuchâtel 
7 0.99 
Social Democrats Zürich 
Liberal Democrats Bern 
6 0.95 Green Party Zürich 
Swiss People’s Party Zürich 
Social Democrats Aargau 
5 0.82 0.67 
Christian Democrats Neuchâtel 
Liberal Democrats Neuchâtel 
Liberal Democrats Zürich 
Christian Democrats Aargau 
4 0.5 0.5 
Green Party Aargau 
Green Party Bern 
Swiss People’s Party Bern 
Christian Democrats Zürich 
Christian Democrats Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 
3 0.18 0.33 
Liberal Democrats Aargau 
Green Party Neuchâtel 
Swiss People’s Party Neuchâtel 
Social Democrats Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 2 0.05 
0 
Christian Democrats Bern 
Liberal Democrats Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 
1 0.01 
Green Party Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 
0 
0 
 
The degree of professionalisation that a campaign achieved with regard to the media 
is measured on an index with a maximum score of 2. This poses a theoretical and 
methodological challenge to my analysis based on fsQCA. Theoretically, I argue that 
campaigns that feature one out of two activities meant to professionalise the 
campaign with regard to the media can be considered members of the set of 
campaigns professionalised with regard to the media rather than non-members of 
this set. They should thus have a membership score larger than 0.5. However, if we 
want to calibrate set membership scores via the direct method of calibration with the 
help of the fsQCA-software, the software only allows for whole numbers when 
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inserting the three qualitative anchors (for example, it is technically not possibly to 
set the cross-over point at 0.7). With a maximum index score of 2 the software 
would only allow the following qualitative anchors: 2 marking full membership in the 
set, 1 as the cross-over point and 0 marking full non-membership in the set. Hence, 
all campaigns with an index score of 1 would be located at the cross-over point, 
meaning that they are neither members nor non-members of the set. This contradicts 
my theoretical reasoning. For the purpose of the calibration procedure, the scores on 
the index are therefore doubled: Campaigns that achieve an index score of 2 are 
recoded to an index score of 4, campaigns with an index score of 1 are recoded to an 
index score of 2, and campaigns with an index score of 0 are left with the original 
score. The threshold for full membership is set at an index score of 4, declaring all 
campaigns full members (set membership score of 1) of the set of cantonal election 
campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by 
the media that would also be full members in the original data. With the help of this 
procedure, the qualitative anchor for the cross-over point can now be set at an index 
score of 1. The qualitative anchor for full non-membership is set at an index score of 
0. The resulting set membership scores are displayed in Table 16. 
As a test of robustness the analysis is replicated with a different calibration, in which 
all cases with an index score of 2 are considered full members of the set of 
campaigns professionalised with regard to the media. Campaigns with an index score 
of 1 are assigned a set membership score of 0.67, indicating that they are more in 
than out of the outcome set. Campaigns with an index score of 0 are considered full 
non-members of the outcome set and are assigned a set membership score that is 
also 0.  
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Table 16: Set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment 
constituted by the media: Raw data and set membership scores 
Campaign 
Index 
score 
Adapted 
index score 
Result of direct 
calibration via 
fsQCA software 
Alternative 
calibration 
Party Canton     
Liberal Democrats Bern 
2 4 0.95 1 
Liberal Democrats Neuchâtel 
Social Democrats Neuchâtel 
Green Party Zürich 
Swiss People’s Party Zürich 
Green Party Aargau 
1 2 0.73 0.67 
Liberal Democrats Aargau 
Social Democrats Aargau 
Christian Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
Christian Democrats Bern 
Social Democrats Bern 
Swiss People’s Party Bern 
Green Party Neuchâtel 
Swiss People’s Party Neuchâtel 
Liberal Democrats Zürich 
Social Democrats Zürich 
Christian Democrats Aargau 
0 0 0.05 0 
Green Party Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
Liberal Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
Social Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
Green Party Bern 
Christian Democrats Neuchâtel 
Christian Democrats Zürich 
 
An alternative procedure would have been to increase the number of indicators 
measuring professionalisation with regard to the media. However, this turned out to 
be impossible based on the data in hand. The same applies to the indicators 
measuring professionalisation with regard to other parties. Therefore, the same 
procedure is followed here: The degree of professionalisation that a campaign 
achieved with regard to other parties is measured on an index with a maximum score 
of 2. Campaigns that achieve an index score of 2 are recoded to an index score of 4, 
campaigns with an index score of 1 are recoded to an index score of 2, and 
campaigns with an index score of 0 are left with the original score. In conformity 
with the calibration procedure applied to the set of cantonal election campaigns that 
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are professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the media, all 
cases that have an index score of 4 are considered full members of the set of 
cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment 
constituted by other parties. The qualitative anchor for full non-membership is set at 
an index score of 0 and the cross-over point reflecting the maximum ambiguity is set 
at an index score of 1. This results in the set membership scores displayed in Table 
17. 
Again, as a test of robustness, the analysis is replicated with a different calibration, in 
which all cases with an index score of 2 are considered full members of the set of 
campaign professionalised with regard to other parties. Campaigns with an index 
score of 1 are assigned a set membership score of 0.67, indicating that they are more 
in than out of the outcome set. Campaigns with an index score of 0 are considered 
full non-members of the outcome set and are assigned a set membership score that is 
also 0.  
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Table 17: Set of campaigns professionalised with regard to the environment 
constituted by other parties: Raw data and set membership scores 
Campaign 
Index 
score 
Adapted 
index score 
Result of direct 
calibration via 
fsQCA software 
Alternative 
calibration 
Party Canton     
Liberal Democrats Neuchâtel 
2 4 0.95 1 
Social Democrats Neuchâtel 
Christian Democrats Aargau 
1 2 0.73 0.67 
Green Party Neuchâtel 
Green Party Zürich 
Liberal Democrats Zürich 
Social Democrats Zürich 
Swiss People’s Party Zürich 
Green Party Aargau 
0 0 0.05 0 
Liberal Democrats Aargau 
Social Democrats Aargau 
Christian Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
Green Party Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
Liberal Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
Social Democrats Appenzell Ausserrhoden 
Christian Democrats Bern 
Green Party Bern 
Liberal Democrats Bern 
Social Democrats Bern 
Swiss People’s Party Bern 
Christian Democrats Neuchâtel 
Swiss People’s Party Neuchâtel 
Christian Democrats Zürich 
 
8.1.3 Calibrating the causal conditions  
8.1.3.1 Calibrating the set of election campaigns that were organised in large cantons 
As I proposed in Chapter 3.2, the theoretical argument behind this causal condition 
is that if the target group of the campaign is large and regionally scattered a large 
group of candidates have to be handled, a greater effort to organise a recognisable 
campaign in a large number of constituencies has to be taken and measures to 
centrally control the campaign are needed in a large canton. These circumstances lead 
parties to incorporate elements of professionalised campaigning in their campaigns in 
order to react to a changing environment for campaigning. While there is no existing 
research linking professionalised campaigning to a certain size of the audience of 
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campaign communication, I argue that there is a qualitative difference between 
Zürich, Bern and Aargau on the one hand, all figuring among the four largest 
cantons in terms of population, and Neuchâtel and Appenzell Ausserhoden on the 
other hand, while Appenzell Ausserrhoden has considerably fewer inhabitants than 
Neuchâtel. The crossover point must thus be located between Aargau und 
Neuchâtel. I set the three qualitative anchors as follows: The threshold for full 
membership in the set of campaigns organised in a large cantons is set at the 
population size of 900,000 inhabitants, based on the gap between Bern and Aargau. 
The threshold for full non-membership is set at 60,000, reflecting the gap between 
Neuchâtel and Appenzell Ausserrhoden. The cross-over point is set at 500,000. 
These qualitative anchors result in the set membership scores displayed in Table 18. 
As all campaigns that were organised in the same canton logically are assigned the 
same set membership score in the set of large cantons, Table 18 shows only the five 
different membership scores for reasons of clarity.  
Table 18: Set of campaigns organised in large cantons: Raw data and set membership score 
Canton Population 
Result of direct calibration 
via fsQCA software 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 53,000 0.1 
Aargau 611,500 0.7 
Bern 979,800 0.97 
Neuchâtel 172,100 0.05 
Zürich 1,373,100 1 
 
8.1.3.2 Calibrating the set of election campaigns that were organised in urbanised 
cantons 
I assumed in Chapter 3.2 that there are more incentives for parties to incorporate 
elements of professionalised campaigning in their campaigns in an urban 
environment where they are confronted with a higher acceptance of online 
campaigning and with a more heterogeneous, less party affiliated or potentially more 
volatile electorate. What has been said for the size of the cantons also holds true for 
the degree of their urbanisation. While it can, theoretically, be argued that 
professionalised campaigning is of greater importance to the parties in a more 
urbanised environment where the recipients have a greater habit of relying on online 
communication for political information and participation and where the amount of 
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volatility in the electorate is potentially higher, there is no existing research on the 
degree of urbanisation as a causal condition for professionalised campaigning. I thus 
base the calibration on general external knowledge on the urbanisation of cantons in 
Switzerland. According to Ladner (2004: 407), Zürich, Bern and Neuchâtel can be 
considered urbanised cantons, while the cantons of Aargau and Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden are rather rural. Following Ladner’s reasoning the cross-over point 
would be located between Bern and Appenzell Ausserrhoden. This can also be 
confirmed by the distribution of cases in the raw data by a considerable gap between 
the degree of urbanisation between the two cantons (40 per cent and 29 per cent 
respectively). I set the three qualitative anchors as follows: The threshold for full 
membership in the set of campaigns organised in an urbanised canton is set at a 
percentage of urbanisation of 50 per cent. The threshold for full non-membership is 
set at 20 per cent. The cross-over point is set at 35 per cent. These qualitative 
anchors result in the set membership scores displayed in   
Table 19. Again,   
Table 19 shows only the five different membership scores for reasons of clarity.  
Table 19: Set of campaigns organised in urbanised cantons: Raw data and set membership 
score 
Canton Degree of urbanisation 
Result of direct calibration 
via fsQCA software 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 29% 0.23 
Aargau 19% 0.04 
Bern 40% 0.73 
Neuchâtel 53% 0.97 
Zürich 66% 1 
 
8.1.3.3 Calibrating the set of election campaigns that were organised in competitive 
cantons 
To reiterate, I assume that a competitive situation between parties in the cantonal 
parliament (operationalised by the difference in seats claimed by the strongest and 
second strongest party in the legislative periods before the cantonal elections 
analysed in this paper) is a causal condition for campaign professionalisation, because 
the higher the degree of competition the more is at stake for the parties and the more 
important it is to win as many votes as possible. Similarly, the more is at stake for the 
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parties, the greater the feeling of uncertainty and the more important it becomes to 
monitor the campaign activities of other parties. In order to assess what can be 
considered a competitive situation, I draw on the results of the last two elections to 
the cantonal parliament and analyse the maximum changes in the voter shares of the 
parties. Since the maximum change in a voter share among the parties included in 
this study was 8.8 per cent in these elections, with the median being 4.4 per cent, I 
exclude the campaigns that took place in Aargau (difference between percentage of 
seats claimed by the strongest party and by the second strongest party: 11.34 per 
cent), Appenzell Ausserrhoden (29 per cent) and Zürich (11.1 per cent) from the set 
of campaigns that were organised in competitive cantons. The campaigns that took 
place in Neuchâtel (0.87 per cent) and Bern (3.13 per cent) can be considered 
members of the set. I therefore set the threshold for full membership in the set of 
campaigns organised in competitive cantons at a 5 per cent difference in seats 
claimed by the strongest and second strongest party, the threshold for full non-
membership at 11 per cent and the cross-over point at 9 per cent. These qualitative 
anchors result in the set membership scores displayed in Table 20. 
Table 20: Set of campaigns organised in competitive cantons: Raw data and set membership 
score 
Canton 
Difference in seats 
claimed by strongest and 
second strongest party 
Result of direct calibration 
via fsQCA software 
Appenzell Ausserrhoden 28% 0 
Aargau 11.43% 0.03 
Bern 3.13% 0.99 
Neuchâtel 0.87% 1 
Zürich 11.1% 0.04 
 
8.1.3.4. Calibrating the set of election campaigns that were organised by right-wing 
parties 
As I proposed in Chapter 3.3, I incorporate Gibson and Römmele’s (2001) argument 
that campaigns organised by parties with a right-wing ideology exhibit higher levels 
of campaign professionalisation than campaigns organised by left-wing parties. We 
have seen in Chapter 4 that the positions of the cantonal party branches on the left-
right ideological continuum were measured on a scale where 0 stands for the extreme 
left and 10 for the extreme right. In order to calibrate the campaigns’ membership in 
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the set of campaigns that were organised by right-wing parties, I set the threshold for 
full membership at a score of 7 on the left-right-scale, based on the reasoning that 
the Swiss People’s Party can be considered a right-wing party while the Liberal 
Democrats are generally deemed a centre-right, but not fully right-wing party. The 
threshold for full non-membership is set at a score of 3 on the left-right-scale, 
backed by the widely accepted fact that the Social Democrats, whose highest score is 
2.5, can definitively be excluded from the set of right-wing parties. The cross-over 
point is set at the numerical centre of the 0-10 scale (5), which is empirically 
supported by the fact that the score of 5 is occupied by a cantonal party branch of 
the Christian Democrats, who are generally considered a centre party. These 
qualitative anchors result in the set membership scores displayed in Table 21. While 
the reader has been advised not to pay too much attention to nuances in the raw data 
(because a 0.1 difference on the left-right-scale between two parties might rather 
reflect a random measurement artefact than a real ideological difference), the fine 
grained differences in the resulting set membership scores are of no calculative 
relevance to the analysis (see Chapter 5.8) and will therefore not have an influence on 
the results.  
Table 21: Set of campaigns organised by right-wing parties: Raw data and set membership 
score 
Canton 
Party Political position 
0 (left) – 10 (right) 
Result of direct calibration 
via fsQCA software 
Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 
Christian Democrats 
5 
0.5 
 Green Party 1.85 0.01 
 Liberal Democrats 6.42 0.89 
 Social Democrats 2.5 0.02 
Aargau Christian Democrats 5.28 0.6 
 Green Party 1.88 0.01 
 Liberal Democrats 6.795 0.94 
 Social Democrats 2.15 0.01 
Bern Christian Democrats 5.26 0.6 
 Green Party 2.06 0.01 
 Liberal Democrats 6.31 0.88 
 Social Democrats 2.455 0.02 
 Swiss People’s Party 7.055 0.96 
Neuchâtel Christian Democrats 4.64 0.37 
 Green Party 1.69 0.01 
 Liberal Democrats 6.305 0.88 
 Social Democrats 2.04 0.01 
 Swiss People’s Party 7.36 0.97 
Zürich Christian Democrats 4.955 0.48 
 Green Party 1.775 0.01 
 Liberal Democrats 6.87 0.94 
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 Social Democrats 1.835 0.01 
 Swiss People’s Party 7.4 0.97 
8.1.3.5 Calibrating the set of election campaigns that were organised by catch-all 
parties 
As I outlined in Chapter 3.3, the theoretical argument behind this causal condition is 
that catch-all parties are encouraged to use as many media channels as possible in 
order to get in touch with their voters and that they benefit from their size with 
regard to financial resources. Hence, they have both more incentives and more 
possibilities for professionalised campaigning.  
The definition of the set of catch-all parties has to be suitable for the cantonal 
political systems that are characterised by the presence of multiple parties. For the 
case of Sweden whose number of parties in the national parliament is similar to that 
of the cantonal parliaments included in this study, Strömbäck proposes “the status of 
being a catch-all party [to be] defined as 2 = 35 per cent or more, 1 = more than 20 
but less than 35 per cent and 0 = less than 20 per cent“ (Strömbäck 2009: 99). 
Applying this definition to the calibration of membership scores in the set of 
campaigns that were organised by catch-all parties, I set the threshold for full 
membership at a 35 per cent share of the electorate. The cross-over point is located 
at 20 per cent and the threshold for full non-membership at 19 per cent. This results 
in the set membership scores displayed in Table 22. 
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Table 22: Set of campaigns organised by catch-all parties: Raw data and set membership 
scores 
Canton 
Party Percentage of 
seats 
Result of direct calibration 
via fsQCA software 
Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden 
Christian Democrats 
5 
0 
 Green Party 0 0 
 Liberal Democrats 40 0.98 
 Social Democrats 6 0 
Aargau Christian Democrats 19 0.05 
 Green Party 5 0 
 Liberal Democrats 17 0 
 Social Democrats 21 0.55 
Bern Christian Democrats 1 0 
 Green Party 12 0 
 Liberal Democrats 16 0 
 Social Democrats 26 0.77 
 Swiss People’s Party 29 0.86 
Neuchâtel Christian Democrats 0 0 
 Green Party 9 0 
 Liberal Democrats 35 0.95 
 Social Democrats 36 0.96 
 Swiss People’s Party 15 0 
Zürich Christian Democrats 7 0 
 Green Party 11 0 
 Liberal Democrats 16 0 
 Social Democrats 20 0.5 
 Swiss People’s Party 31 0.9 
 
8.2 Results: Professionalisation as an aggregated concept 
8.2.1 Necessary conditions 
We remember from Chapter 5.3 that the first step in determining causal conditions is 
to test whether necessary conditions exist for the outcome set. As hypothesised (see 
Chapter 3.4.1), there are no necessary conditions for campaign professionalisation as 
an aggregated concept. This means that among the five causal conditions that have 
been included in this analysis none produces the outcome by itself.  
8.2.2 Sufficient conditions 
Turning to the analysis of the sufficient conditions, standards of good practice 
demand that the reader is provided, first, with the minimum number of cases that a 
combination of conditions had to be represented by, in order to be included in the 
truth table minimisation process. In accordance with standard practices all 
combinations of conditions that were represented by a minimum of one campaign 
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were included (see Chapter 5.3). Second, the consistency cut-off that was chosen to 
decide whether a combination of conditions is sufficient for the outcome was set at 
0.758794 in accordance with the minimum lower value for consistency and with the 
raw data. Third, there was – as is usually the case in fsQCA – a considerable amount 
of limited diversity in my data: 16 out of 32 possible combinations of causal 
conditions were represented in the data, while 16 were not. In order to consult the 
truth table for more detailed information, please refer to Appendix D), section 1.  
Finally, standards of good practice demand that all three solution formulas (complex, 
most parsimonious and intermediate; please refer to Chapter 5.5 to reiterate their 
characterisation) that were produced are presented in Boolean algebra. However, as I 
outlined in Chapter 5.5, “when it comes to the theoretical and substantive 
interpretation of the results, a researcher is free to choose which formula(s) to put 
into the center of attention” (Schneider & Wagemann 2010: 408). Therefore, all three 
solution formulas can be consulted in Appendix E), section 1. I chose to present and 
interpret the intermediate solution here as a valuable middle ground between the 
conservative solution, which tends to be too complex to be interpreted in a 
theoretically meaningful or plausible manner, and the parsimonious solution, which 
bears the risk of resting on assumptions about the logical remainders that contradict 
the theoretical reasoning underlying the analysis. When minimising the truth table, 
the intermediate solution relies exclusively on assumptions about the logical 
remainders that were specified by the researcher (i.e., the so called directional 
expectations; readers who might want to re-read these principles please refer to 
Chapter 5.4). Please note again that there is no difference between the three solution 
formulas in how they minimise the data that are at hand. All three solutions minimise 
the causal conditions represented in the empirical data set in exactly the same way. 
The only difference lies in the inclusion of the combinations of conditions that are 
not represented in the data (i.e., the logical remainders).  
The directional expectations that contributed to the intermediate solution were 
specified in line with the theoretical reasoning underlying the causal conditions (see 
Chapter 3.2 and 3.3). The causal conditions being organised in a large canton, in an 
urbanised canton, in a canton with close competition in the cantonal parliament, and 
183 
 
by a catch-all party are expected to contribute to the outcome when they are present. 
As existing findings on the influence of being organised by a right-wing party do not 
show a clear tendency, no specification on this condition was made (i.e., it could 
contribute to minimising the logical remainders either in its presence or in its 
absence).  
In the following, the intermediate solution is presented in Boolean algebra. For 
reasons of clarity, the conditions are presented in a shortened wording: the condition 
“being organised in a large canton” is shortened to “large canton”, and so forth. The 
tilde sign (~) translates to “not”: “~catch-all party” means “not being organised by a 
catch-all party”. To recall, “*” is the Boolean expression for “and”, “+” is the 
Boolean expression for “or”. “*” links single conditions together to a combination of 
conditions, “+” separates the solution terms that all equally produce the outcome. 
The two parameters of fit, the consistency value and the coverage value, are also 
indicated. The value for solution consistency is acceptable22 (see chapter 5.6). As we 
remember from Chapter 5.6, in contrast to the 0.75 minimum threshold for 
consistency there is no lower threshold for coverage. Lower coverage values simply 
indicate that less of the outcome is explained by the respective condition or the 
solution formula. 
~competitive canton*large canton + 
~right-wing party*large canton + 
~catch-all party*large canton + 
catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton 
(solution coverage: 0.905690, solution consistency: 0.825871) 
This solution formula was the same for the direct calibration via the fsQCA software 
and for the alternative calibration of the outcome set. Hence, the results are robust 
against slight changes in set membership scores (the same applies to the 
parsimonious and the complex solution formulas). 
The following overview shows which cases are explained by which solution term: 
                                                 
22 Please note that it is differentiated between acceptable and not acceptable consistency values. 
Hence, acceptable is not to be understood as a relativisation of “good”.  
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• Campaigns that were organised in a large canton without a competitive 
situation in the cantonal parliament: all campaigns organised in the cantons 
of Zürich and Aargau 
• Campaigns that were organised in a large canton by a non-right-wing party: 
Social Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich; Christian Democrats, Zürich; 
Social Democrats, Bern; Green Party, Bern; Social Democrats, Aargau; 
Green Party, Aargau 
• Campaigns that were organised in a large canton by a non-catch-all party: 
Liberal Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich; Christian Democrats, 
Zürich; Liberal Democrats, Bern; Green Party, Bern; Liberal Democrats, 
Aargau; Green Party, Aargau; Christian Democrats, Aargau 
• Campaigns that were organised in an urban and competitive but not large 
canton by a catch-all party: Social Democrats, Neuchâtel; Liberal Democrats, 
Neuchâtel 
When we analyse which campaign was covered by which solution term, it becomes 
obvious that several of the campaigns are covered by more than one solution term 
and that there are overlaps especially between the first three solution terms (i.e., 
those involving the presence of a large canton). The campaigns organised by the 
Green Party and the Christian Democrats in Zürich and by the Green Party in 
Aargau, for example, are covered by all three solution terms, while several other 
campaigns are covered by two terms. Hence, these campaigns cannot exclusively be 
explained by one solution term. Only the campaigns organised by the Liberal 
Democrats in Bern (~catch-all party*large canton) as well as those organised by the 
Social Democrats and by the Liberal Democrats in Neuchâtel (catch-all 
party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton) are explained by one term 
only.  
The only case that is not explained is the campaign organised by the Green Party in 
Neuchâtel, which achieved a score of 7 on the aggregated professionalisation index 
(set membership scores of 0.68 and 0.6 respectively) but which is covered by none of 
the solution formula (hence, the coverage value is lower than 1).  
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To recall, extracting the causal conditions that lead to campaign professionalisation 
does not tell us which conditions lead to the absence of campaign professionalisation – 
it could be, but is not necessarily explained by, the absence of conditions that lead to 
campaign professionalisation. In order to explain why the 2009, 2010 and 2011 
cantonal election campaigns organised by the Swiss People’s Party and the Christian 
Democrats in Bern, the Swiss People’s Party and the Christian Democrats in 
Neuchâtel, and by all included parties from Appenzell Ausserrhoden were not 
professionalised, a separate analysis would have to be performed. In the framework 
of this dissertation, however, this has to be left open to future analyses as the focus 
and research aim here is on explaining the presence, not the absence of campaign 
professionalisation. 
As I outlined in Chapter 5.7, presenting the solution formula is not the finish point 
of an analysis performed with fsQCA. Rather, researchers should explain the results 
based on in-depth knowledge about the cases and on the theoretical assumptions 
underlying the analysis. The presentation of the results should consider both the 
“case- and the condition oriented aspects of QCA” (Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 
280). I will account for both aspects by interpreting the solution formula obtained 
for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept both from the perspective 
of the cases and by interpreting the solution formula from the perspective of the 
underlying assumptions and hypotheses. I will proceed in the same manner when 
presenting the solution formulas leading to campaign professionalisation with regard 
to the four electoral environments in subsequent chapters.  
I hypothesised in Chapter 3.4.1 that being organised in a large canton, in an 
urbanised canton, in a canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament, by 
a right-wing party or by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for professionalised 
campaigning. If we analyse the solution formula from the perspective of these 
hypotheses, it becomes obvious that although it is not a necessary condition for 
campaign professionalisation, being organised in a large canton is a very dominant 
sufficient condition, as it is present in three of the four solution terms. Against the 
background of my theoretical assumptions the first three solution terms might be 
interpreted as follows. Being organised in a large canton is such a strong incentive for 
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leading a professionalised campaign that campaigns organised in large cantons 
became professionalised although they were organised in a non-competitive situation 
in the cantonal parliament by a non-right-wing or non-catch-all party.  
An alternative interpretation would suggest that the theoretical assumptions 
underlying the hypotheses were wrong in the first place: a competitive situation, 
being organised by a right-wing party and being organised by a catch-all party do not 
contribute to campaign professionalisation in their presence but in their absence. 
This interpretation seems plausible for the condition of being organised by a right-
wing party as existing findings – especially those by Strömbäck (2009) and Gibson 
and Römmele (2009) (although they interpreted the leading position of the Social 
Democrats differently) – have already cast doubt on the positive influence of being 
organised by a right-wing party on campaign professionalisation (see Chapter 3.1). 
The absence of being organised by a catch-all party could suggest that campaign 
professionalisation is a strategy for mid-sized and small parties to compensate for 
their smaller size, smaller budget and/or smaller degree of popularity. This 
interpretation is, however, less self-evident, as the campaign activities included in the 
aggregated professionalisation index as indicators for campaign professionalisation 
(mandate professionals, provide training, perform a continuous campaigning, employ 
means of direct and online communication, monitor other parties) do require a 
certain amount of resources, be it financial or human resources. Also, existing 
findings (especially those by Gibson and Römmele (2009) and Tenscher (2007, 
2011)) point to large resources being an advantage for organising professionalised 
campaigns rather than to professionalisation being a compensation strategy for small 
parties. However, it cannot be excluded that small parties can afford 
professionalisation activities relying on very active members and volunteers. While 
there might thus be viable explanations why being organised by a right-wing party or 
catch-all party contribute to campaign professionalisation in large cantons in their 
absence, the author cannot think of an interpretation as to why the absence of a 
competitive situation in large cantons should contribute to campaign 
professionalisation against the background of existing findings and empirical 
assumptions.  
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The fourth solution term covers the campaigns organised by the party branches of 
the Social Democrats and the Liberal Democrats that are catch-all parties in the 
urban and competitive environment of the small canton of Neuchâtel. The important 
role of close competition is confirmed by the interview statements of the campaigns 
managers of both parties, who frequently referred to the campaign activities of the 
other party in their interviews and brought up the close race between the equally 
strong left and right political camps. Also, the positive influence of an urbanised 
environment that is open to online and non-standard campaigning can be indirectly 
confirmed by the interviews. The campaigns of the Social Democrats and the Liberal 
Democrats featured some kind of online campaign competition between the two 
parties, centring on what might be called a video clip Ping-Pong between the two 
parties. Both parties were publishing video clips in which they responded to and/or 
mocked the other party’s clips.  
To conclude, the following substantive conclusions are drawn from the solution 
formula for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept. First, large 
cantons confront the campaigns that are organised in them with a large and 
geographically scattered campaign target group, large numbers of candidates and a 
generally larger effort to centrally organise and control the campaign communication 
and campaign activities, for example in order to create a campaign that is 
recognisable and memorable even for potential voters and members that live and 
work in different constituencies. These challenging conditions enhance the (real or 
perceived) pressures on parties to adapt their campaigns to changes in the 
environments for campaigning by including elements of professionalised 
campaigning. Campaigns in large cantons become professionalised even when the 
elections do not take place in a competitive environment, that is, when there is no 
competitive majority situation in the cantonal parliament. Campaign 
professionalisation is not reserved to catch-all parties, particularly, as we remember 
from Chapter 8.1.2, if we define campaign professionalisation rather inclusively and 
argue that campaigns with a score of 7 and more on a scale of 13 index points are (to 
a differing degree) members of the set of professionalised campaigns. Mid-sized 
parties (concretely, several parties with a percentages of seats in the cantonal 
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parliament between 11 per cent and 19 per cent) and small parties (percentage of 
seats in the cantonal parliament 7 per cent (Christian Democrats, Zürich) and 5 per 
cent (Green Party, Aargau)) organise professionalised campaigns when the campaign 
is organised in a large canton. Also, left-wing and centre parties seem to be more 
inclined to organise professionalised campaigns than right-wing parties – again, 
however, the condition not being organised by a right-wing party does not produce 
the outcome on its own, but in combination with the condition being organised in a 
large canton.  
Despite the importance of the large size of the organising canton for campaign 
professionalisation it is not the only path leading to campaign professionalisation as 
an aggregated concept. Even when this condition is absent professionalised 
campaigns are organised as an adaptation to a changing environment for 
campaigning when a combination of other systemic incentives (urbanised and 
competitive environment) and incentives at the party level (being organised by a catch-all party) 
reinforce the pressures to adapt to these changes: when the organising party has to 
reach a large group of potential voters and members via as many media channels as 
possible in order to get in touch with them or when the party faces a competitive 
election in an urban environment where the electorate is potentially more volatile and 
more is at stake. 
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8.3 Results: Professionalisation per environment 
8.3.1 Professionalisation with regard to the voters  
8.3.1.1 Necessary conditions 
As hypothesised (see Chapter 3.4.2), there are no necessary conditions for campaign 
professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by the voters. None 
of the five causal conditions that have been included in this analysis produces the 
outcome by itself. 
 
8.3.1.2 Sufficient conditions 
When presenting the results for the sufficient conditions for campaign 
professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by the voters, I 
proceed in the same manner as in the previous chapter. All combinations of 
conditions that were represented by a minimum of one campaign were included in 
the truth table minimisation. The consistency cut-off was set at 0.763819. 16 out of 
32 possible combinations of causal conditions were represented in the data, while 16 
were not (in order to consult the truth table for more detailed information, please 
refer to Appendix D), section 2. All three solution formulas can be consulted in 
Appendix E), section 2. Following the reasoning that was presented in the previous 
chapter, I chose the intermediate solution for detailed presentation and substantive 
interpretation.  
The directional expectations that contributed to the intermediate solution were 
specified in line with the theoretical reasoning underlying the causal conditions (see 
Chapter 3.2 and 3.3). The causal conditions of being organised in a large canton, 
being organised in an urbanised canton, being organised in a canton with a close 
competition in the cantonal parliament and being organised by a catch-all party are 
expected to contribute to the outcome when they are present.  
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In the following, the intermediate solution is presented in Boolean algebra. The value 
for solution consistency is acceptable. 
~right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton + 
~right-wing party*urban canton*large canton + 
catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton + 
catch-all party*~competitive canton*urban canton*large canton + 
~catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*large canton + 
(solution coverage: 0.796143, solution consistency: 0.829665) 
This solution formula was the same for the direct calibration via the fsQCA software 
and for the alternative calibration of the outcome set. Hence, the results are robust 
against slight changes in set membership scores (the same applies to the 
parsimonious and the complex solution formulas). 
In the following, an overview is provided on which campaigns are explained by 
which solution term: 
• Campaigns that were organised in an urban canton with a competitive 
situation in the cantonal parliament by a non-right-wing party: Social 
Democrats, Neuchâtel; Green Party, Neuchâtel; Social Democrats, Bern; 
Green Party, Bern; Christian Democrats, Neuchâtel 
• Campaigns that were organised in an urban and large canton by a non-right-
wing party: Social Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich; Social 
Democrats, Bern; Green Party, Bern; Christian Democrats, Zürich 
• Campaigns that were organised in an urban but not large canton with a 
competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a catch-all party: Social 
Democrats, Neuchâtel; Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel 
• Campaigns that were organised in an urban and large canton without a 
competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a catch-all party: Swiss 
People’s Party, Zürich 
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• Campaigns that were organised in an urban and large canton with a 
competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a non-catch-all party: 
Liberal Democrats, Bern; Green Party, Bern 
We can identify some overlap in the solution terms: The campaign organised by the 
Green Party in Bern is covered by three of the solution terms. The campaigns 
organised by the Social Democrats in Bern and Neuchâtel are explained by two 
solution terms. The remaining campaigns are exclusively covered by one solution 
term.  
Four out of 14 campaigns are not covered by these five solution terms. These are the 
campaigns organised by the Social Democrats in Zürich, the Christian Democrats 
and the Green Party in Aargau and the Liberal Democrats in Zürich. Hence, it 
cannot be explained with these solution terms why these campaigns are 
professionalised with regard to the environment of the voters. 
Turning to the case- and variable-oriented interpretation of the results, I 
hypothesised that being organised in a large canton, in an urbanised canton, in a 
canton with a close competition in the cantonal parliament and by a catch-all party 
are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the 
environment constituted by the voters. These conditions do indeed contribute to 
campaign professionalisation with regard to the voters – the explanative pattern is, 
however, more complex than this. Catch-all parties in urban cantons did organise 
campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the voters either when the canton 
was also large and had no competitive situation in the parliament (Zürich) or when 
the canton was not large but had a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament 
(Neuchâtel). Hence, the large size and the competitive situation in the canton may be 
interpreted as being complementary: One of the two had to be present in order to 
produce campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the voters in addition to 
the conditions of catch-all party and urban canton. Non-catch-all parties organised 
campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the voters in the large, urban, and 
competitive canton of Bern. The condition of being organised by a right-wing party 
contributed to campaign professionalisation with regard to the voters in its absence. 
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Non-right-wing parties organised campaigns that are professionalised with regard to 
the voters either in urban and large cantons (Bern; Zürich) or in urban and 
competitive cantons (Zürich; Neuchâtel).  
To conclude, campaigns become professionalised with regard to the voters in several 
different circumstances. What emerges from the solution terms is that being 
organised in an urban canton always contributes to the outcome in its presence. I 
infer from this that professionalisation with regard to the voters is more important 
when the campaign faces a potentially more heterogeneous and more volatile 
electorate. Hence, an urban environment can be assumed to be a factor that 
enhances the urgency and the incentives to professionalise the campaigns with regard 
to the environment of the voters or in other words, to adapt the campaign activities 
to general trends of rising numbers of swing voters and late deciders, weaker party 
affiliations and a larger window of opportunity in this very important environment 
for campaigning. The incentives for professionalised campaigning are also stronger 
when campaigns are organised in a competitive canton and in a large canton, as 
reacting to changes in the environment of the voters becomes more urgent when 
every single vote counts in a close race and when a larger target group has to be 
addressed. These conditions, however, seem to complement each other, at least 
when the organising party is a catch-all party or a non-right-wing party.  
At the party level there is a stronger incentive for catch-all parties to professionalise 
their campaigns with regard to the voters, as they have to address a large and diverse 
target audience, preferably via as many media channels as possible. Catch-all parties 
organised campaigns that were professionalised with regard to the voters in an urban 
environment and either when the canton was large and had no competitive situation 
in the parliament or when the canton was not large but had a competitive situation in 
the cantonal parliament. Non-catch-all parties seem to require stronger incentives to 
professionalise their campaigns with regard to the voters as all conditions at the 
systemic level have to be present: the campaign has to be organised in a large, urban, 
and competitive canton. Non-right-wing parties are rather inclined to professionalise 
their campaigns with regard to the voters than right-wing parties. Non-right-wing 
parties organised campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the voters in an 
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urban environment either in a large canton or a canton with a competitive situation 
in the parliament. 
 
8.3.2. Professionalisation with regard to the members 
8.3.2.1 Necessary conditions 
As hypothesised (see Chapter 3.4.2), there are no necessary conditions for campaign 
professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by the members. 
 
8.3.2.2 Sufficient conditions 
All combinations of conditions that were represented by a minimum of one 
campaign were included in the truth table minimisation. The consistency cut-off was 
set at 0.757895. 16 out of 32 possible combinations of causal conditions were 
represented in the data, while 16 were not (in order to consult the truth table for 
more detailed information please refer to Appendix D), section 3). All three solution 
formulas can be consulted in Appendix E), section 3. For the same reasons as in the 
previous analyses, I chose the intermediate solution for detailed presentation and 
substantive interpretation.  
The directional expectations that contributed to the intermediate solution were 
specified in line with the theoretical reasoning underlying the causal conditions (see 
Chapter 3.2 and 3.3): The causal conditions of being organised in a canton with a 
close competition in the cantonal parliament and of being organised by a catch-all 
party are expected to contribute to the outcome when they are present. Being 
organised by a right-wing party is assumed to contribute to professionalisation with 
regard to the environment of the members in its absence.  
In the following, the intermediate solution is presented in Boolean algebra. The 
parameters of fit are acceptable.  
~right-wing party*~urban canton*large canton + 
~competitive canton*urban canton*large canton + 
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catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton 
(solution coverage: 0.762862, solution consistency: 0.864299) 
This solution formula was the same for the direct calibration via the fsQCA software 
and for the alternative calibration of the outcome set. Hence, the results are robust 
against slight changes in set membership scores. The same applies to the 
parsimonious and the complex solution formulas. 
In the following, an overview is provided on which campaigns are explained by 
which solution term: 
• Campaigns that were organised in a large but not urban canton by a non-
right-wing party: Social Democrats, Aargau; Green Party, Aargau 
• Campaigns that were organised in a large and urban canton without a 
competitive situation in the cantonal parliament: all campaigns that were 
organised in the canton of Zürich 
• Campaigns that were organised in an urban and competitive canton by a 
catch-all party: Social Democrats, Neuchâtel; Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel; 
Social Democrats, Bern; Swiss People’s Party, Bern 
It stands out from the solution that there are no overlaps between the three solution 
terms: every campaign is exclusively explained by one solution term.  
Four out of 15 campaigns are not covered (i.e., explained) by these three solution 
terms. These are the campaigns organised by the Liberal Democrats and the Green 
Party in Bern, the Christian Democrats in Neuchâtel and the Christian Democrats in 
Aargau. 
In Chapter 3.2, I assumed that being organised in a canton with a close competition 
in the cantonal parliament, not being organised by a right-wing party, and being 
organised by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are 
professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the members. These 
assumptions are partly mirrored in the solution formula. However, the solution is 
more complex than these three assumptions. Being organised by a catch-all party in a 
competitive canton indeed contributed to campaign professionalisation with regard 
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to the members, but only if the canton was also an urban one (Bern; Neuchâtel). 
Also, even if the situation in the cantonal parliament was not competitive, campaigns 
became professionalised with regard to the members when they were organised in a 
large and urban canton (Zürich). Non-right-wing parties did indeed professionalise 
their campaigns with regard to the members when the campaigns took place in a 
large but not urban canton (Aargau). 
The following substantive conclusions are drawn from these results: First, adapting 
the campaigns to the changes in the environment constituted by the members (which 
are similar to those concerning the voters and include declining numbers of party 
members and more difficult mobilisation) is more important for non-right-wing 
parties than for right-wing parties. Left-wing and centre parties might have a stronger 
orientation towards the inside of the party than right-wing parties and be more 
dedicated with regard to internal communication and organisation, especially in a 
relatively rural environment and when they have to handle a large and geographically 
dispersed group of members. Second, for catch-all parties with a large group of 
members but who also have to target a broad general electorate, the members 
become a more important asset and adaptations aimed at gaining on-going support 
and legitimacy by the members are more urgent when the campaign is organised in a 
competitive and urban environment. In general, campaigns become professionalised 
with regard to the members when the canton in which the election takes place is not 
only urban but also large, that is when a large and geographically dispersed group of 
members has to be mobilised and animated to go to the polls and when the 
campaign has to convince a potentially more heterogeneous and volatile group of 
potential voters (in which the members are included), even when there was not a 
competitive situation.  
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8.3.3 Professionalisation with regard to the media 
8.3.3.1 Necessary conditions 
As hypothesised (see Chapter 3.4.2), there are no necessary conditions for campaign 
professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by the media. 
 
8.3.3.2 Sufficient conditions 
All combinations of conditions that were represented by a minimum of one 
campaign were included in the truth table minimisation. The consistency cut-off was 
set at 0.804082. 16 out of 32 possible combinations of causal conditions were 
represented in the data, while 16 were not (in order to consult the truth table for 
more detailed information, please refer to Appendix D), section 4). All three solution 
formulas can be consulted in Appendix E), section 4. Again, the detailed presentation 
and substantive interpretation are provided for the intermediate solution.  
The directional expectations that contributed to the intermediate solution were 
specified in line with the theoretical reasoning underlying the causal conditions (see 
Chapters 3.2 and 3.3): The causal conditions of being organised in a large canton, 
being organised in an urban canton and being organised by a catch-all party are 
expected to contribute to campaign professionalisation with regard to the media 
when they are present.  
The intermediate solution in Boolean algebra reads as follows. The parameters of fit 
are acceptable.  
~right-wing party*~competitive canton*large canton + 
catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton + 
catch-all party*urban canton*large canton + 
right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton*large canton 
(solution coverage: 0.705255, solution consistency: 0.892100) 
The results can be considered robust. When performing the analysis with the set 
membership scores resulting from the alternative calibration strategy (see Chapter 
8.1.2), the last three solution terms depicted above are exactly the same. The first 
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solution term differs inasmuch as the solution term reads ~right-wing party*~not 
competitive canton*large canton*catch-all party for the alternative calibration. 
However, as this is a superset of the term ~right-wing party*~not competitive 
canton*large canton resulting from the data obtained with the direct method of 
calibration, this is not a breach of robustness (see Schneider & Wagemann 2012: 
286). 
The following campaigns are explained by the respective solution terms: 
• Campaigns that were organised in a large canton without a competitive 
situation in the cantonal parliament by non-right-wing parties: Social 
Democrats, Zürich; Green Party, Zürich; Social Democrats, Aargau; Green 
Party, Aargau 
• Campaigns that were organised in an urban canton with a competitive 
situation in the cantonal parliament by a catch-all party: Social Democrats, 
Neuchâtel; Liberal Democrats, Neuchâtel; Swiss People’s Party, Bern; Social 
Democrats, Bern 
• Campaigns that were organised in a large and urban canton by a catch-all 
party: Swiss People’s Party, Zürich; Swiss People’s Party, Bern; Social 
Democrats, Bern 
• Campaigns that were organised in a large and urban canton with a 
competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a right-wing party: Swiss 
People’s Party, Bern; Liberal Democrats, Bern; Christian Democrats, Bern 
The campaigns organised in Bern by the Swiss People’s Party and the Social 
Democrats can both be explained by two of the solution terms. All other campaigns 
are exclusively explained by one solution term.  
Five out of 16 campaigns are not covered by these four solution terms. These are the 
campaigns organised by the Liberal Democrats in Aargau, the Christian Democrats 
in Appenzell Ausserrhoden, the Green Party in Neuchâtel, the Swiss People’s Party 
in Neuchâtel and the Liberal Democrats in Zürich. Hence, it cannot be explained 
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with these solution terms why these campaigns were professionalised with regard to 
the environment of the media. 
I assumed in the hypotheses that being organised in a large canton, an urbanised 
canton, and by a catch-all party are sufficient conditions for campaigns that are 
professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the media. The 
combination of these conditions is indeed one of the solution terms (to be precise, 
the second term enlisted above). However, the complete solution formula is more 
complex. Catch-all parties also adapted their campaign to the media when the 
campaign took place in an urban and competitive environment (Neuchâtel; Bern). 
Right-wing parties professionalised their campaigns with regard to the media in the 
competitive, urban and large canton of Bern. Non-right-wing parties, on the other 
hand, professionalised their campaign with regard to the media in large cantons 
without a competitive situation (Zürich; Aargau). 
I conclude from these results that, first, catch-all parties adapt to changes in the 
environment constituted by the media and institutional expectations resulting from 
these changes (broadly speaking, giving the media a central role in campaign 
communication, adapting to the logic of the media and incorporating new forms of 
mediated communication via the so-called new and social media) rather than non-
catch-all parties. This might be the case because their prospects of getting media 
attention and coverage are higher than those of the smaller parties and because they 
are more dependent on mediated campaign communication in order to address a 
broad range of potential voters and a large group of members. This is especially the 
case when the campaign is organised in an urban context (where so-called new media 
are more widely accepted and used as a means of political communication than in 
rural areas) and either when the campaign is organised in a large canton, that is when 
the media have a key role for reaching an audience that is geographically more 
dispersed and many voters have to be addressed, or in a competitive environment, 
that is when every viewer or reader that is convinced by mediated campaign 
communication counts.  
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Second, non-right-wing parties in large cantons professionalise their campaign with 
regard to the media when the canton where the campaign takes place is large and, 
hence, a large and dispersed audience has to be addressed, even if there is no 
competitive situation in the cantonal parliament. Right-wing parties, on the other 
hand, seem to require more environmental incentives in order to professionalise their 
campaigns with regard to the media. They have to be faced with a competitive 
situation in an urban environment, targeting a large audience in a large canton.  
 
8.3.4 Professionalisation with regard to other parties 
8.3.4.1 Necessary conditions 
As hypothesised (see Chapter 3.4.2), there are no necessary conditions for campaign 
professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by the other parties. 
 
8.3.4.2 Sufficient conditions 
As it has been the case in the previous analyses, all combinations of conditions that 
were represented by a minimum of one campaign were included in the truth table 
minimisation. The consistency cut-off was set at 0.938596 due to a large gap between 
the second highest (0.938596) and third highest (0.775956) consistency value (see 
Appendix D), section 5.2). 16 out of 32 possible combinations of causal conditions 
were represented in the data, while 16 were not (in order to consult the truth table 
for more detailed information, please refer to Appendix D), section 5). All three 
solution formulas are presented in Appendix E), section 5. In analogy with the 
procedure in the previous chapters, the detailed presentation and substantive 
interpretation are provided for the intermediate solution.  
Again, the directional expectations that contributed to the intermediate solution were 
specified in line with the theoretical reasoning underlying the causal conditions (see 
Chapter 3.2 and 3.3). The causal condition being organised in a canton with a close 
competition in the cantonal parliament is expected to contribute to campaign 
professionalisation with regard to the environment constituted by other parties when 
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it is present. The causal condition of being organised by a catch-all party is expected 
to contribute to the outcome when it is absent. 
The intermediate solution in Boolean algebra reads as follows. The solution 
consistency value is acceptable.  
catch-all party*~right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton + 
catch-all party*right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton*large canton 
(solution coverage: 0. 258890, solution consistency: 0.962963) 
The following campaigns are explained by the respective solution terms: 
• Campaigns that were organised in an urban but not large canton with a 
competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a catch-all party: Social 
Democrats, Neuchâtel 
• Campaigns that were organised in a large and urban canton without a 
competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a right-wing party: Swiss 
People’s Party, Zürich 
As I briefly addressed in Chapter 7.2.4, a particular challenge for the analysis of the 
sufficient conditions for this outcome lies in the fact that the outcome set is small 
(with only two campaigns achieving the maximum index score of 2 and another six 
campaigns achieving an index score of 1). Hence, the empirical basis that the truth 
table minimisation can draw on is very small. This is reflected in the results of the 
minimisation procedure: Only two out of eight campaigns are covered by the two 
solution terms provided by the analysis (hence, the low value for solution coverage).  
My hypothesis had been that being organised in a canton with a close competition in 
the cantonal parliament and not being organised by a catch-all party are sufficient 
conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment 
constituted by other parties. However, the obtained solution terms show (limited as 
their coverage may be) that even catch-all parties are not “immune” against 
competition and hence professionalise their campaign with regard to other parties 
when the campaign takes place in a competitive and urban environment. This is the 
case in large cantons, as the case of the Swiss People’s Party in Zürich shows, but 
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also in small cantons. The case of the Social Democrats in Neuchâtel also confirms 
the statements from the interviews which were already alluded to in Chapter 4.: The 
campaign managers of both the Social Democrats and the Liberal Democrats 
frequently referred to the campaign activities of the other party in their interviews 
and brought up the close race between the equally strong left and right political 
camps. Also, a kind of online campaign competition developed between the two 
parties. Admittedly, the causal conditions tested in this analysis do not provide an 
explanation as to why the Liberal Democrats professionalised their campaign with 
regard to other parties. While the competition with the Social Democrats probably 
had an influence on their campaign, this condition alone did not produce campaign 
professionalisation with regard to other parties by itself or in combination with the 
other conditions tested in this analysis, but probably in combination with other 
conditions that have not been included in the present analysis.  
To sum up, the results obtained for professionalisation with regard to other parties 
solve only a small piece of the puzzle. For the remaining campaigns, no explanation 
as to which conditions contribute to campaign professionalisation with regard to 
other parties can be provided based on my fsQCA analysis. As a methodological 
conclusion, I propose to note that when the outcome set that the research project 
aims to explain is small, the truth table minimisation reaches the limits of its 
performance range due to fsQCA’s version of the too many variables too few cases 
problem – in this concrete case, the relation was eight cases to five conditions (this 
aspect is discussed in further detail in the conclusion). 
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8.4 Overview of the results 
Cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised on an aggregate level are 
organised  
• in large non-competitive cantons, 
•  by left-wing or centre parties in large cantons, 
• by small or mid-sized parties in large cantons, 
• or by catch-all parties in competitive, urban and not large cantons. 
 
Figure 8: Explaining campaign professionalisation in cantonal election campaigns on an 
aggregate level 
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Cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the 
environment constituted by the voters are organised  
• by left-wing or centre parties in competitive and urban cantons,  
• by left-wing or centre parties in urban and large cantons, 
• by catch-all parties in competitive, urban and small or mid-sized cantons,  
• by catch-all parties in non-competitive, urban and large cantons,  
• or by small or mid-sized parties in competitive, urban and large cantons. 
 
Figure 9: Explaining campaign professionalisation in cantonal election campaigns with 
regard to the environment constituted by the voters 
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Cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the 
environment constituted by the members are organised  
• by left-wing or centre parties in large and non-urbanised cantons, 
• in urban and large cantons without a competitive situation in the cantonal 
parliament, 
• or by catch-all parties in urban cantons with a competitive situation in the 
cantonal parliament.  
 
Figure 10: Explaining campaign professionalisation in cantonal election campaigns with 
regard to the environment constituted by the members 
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Cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the 
environment constituted by the media are organised 
• by left-wing or centre parties in large cantons without a competitive situation 
in the cantonal parliament,  
• by catch-all parties in urban cantons with a competitive situation in the 
cantonal parliament,  
• by catch-all parties in urban and large cantons,  
• or by right-wing parties in urban and large cantons with a competitive 
situation in the cantonal parliament. 
 
Figure 11: Explaining campaign professionalisation in cantonal election campaigns with 
regard to the environment constituted by the media 
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Cantonal election campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the 
environment constituted by other parties are organised 
• by left-wing or centre catch-all parties in small or mid-sized urban cantons 
with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament  
• by right-wing catch-all parties in large and urban cantons with a competitive 
situation in the cantonal parliament 
 
Figure 12: Explaining campaign professionalisation in cantonal election campaigns with 
regard to the environment constituted by other parties 
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8.5 Discussion of the results 
Are there different causal paths leading to the different outcomes? 
As we have seen in the previous chapters the causal paths that lead to the aggregated 
and to the four differentiated outcomes are indeed quite different from each other. 
The results confirm the assumption that there are substantively different paths that 
produce the five different outcomes that were included in the fsQCA analysis. 
Referring back to sociological neo-institutionalism, the results underline that 
conceptualising campaign professionalisation as an adaptation to changing electoral 
environments for campaign communication and organisation is a logical and valuable 
theoretical conceptualisation of the so far under theorised campaign 
professionalisation research. However, the results confirm convincingly that while 
campaigns and their organising parties are generally under pressure to adapt (i.e., to 
professionalise) their campaigns to the changes and to the institutional expectations 
resulting from them, there are different conditions that reinforce these pressures with 
regard to the different environments. Therefore, professionalisation as an aggregated 
concept and professionalisation with regard to each of the four electoral 
environments are explained by different patterns of conditions. Campaign 
professionalisation as a strategy to ensure on-going support and legitimacy from the 
relevant electoral environments is shaped by different factors in the different 
environments. 
Comparing the results of the empirical analysis with the hypotheses I formulated in 
Chapter 3.4, it becomes obvious that the general assumptions that were made on the 
impact of the five causal conditions on the different outcomes are mostly correct. 
What is more, the theoretical arguments used to formulate the hypotheses (Chapter 
3.2 and 3.3) proved to be very useful in order to discuss whether or not the results 
generated by the fsQCA make sense, both theoretically and empirically, and to find 
that indeed the results can be interpreted in a theoretically and empirically useful way. 
However, the empirical reality is more complex than may be assumed. Most of the 
conditions contribute to the outcomes in the hypothesised way but they interact 
more often with other conditions than has been hypothesised.   
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Open questions and constraints 
Apart from the generally positive evaluation of the theoretical assumptions 
underlying this analysis and of the empirical results of the analysis with the help of 
fsQCA, there are some open questions and constraints that crystallise from the 
results. First, it became obvious that for all of the outcomes except campaign 
professionalisation with regard to the members, there was a certain amount of 
overlap between the solution terms. This means that for certain cases or campaigns it 
is not possible to name just one combination of conditions that produced its 
professionalisation profile – rather, all solution terms are valid explanations for the 
professionalisation of the campaign. If we take, for example, the case of the 
campaign organised by the Social Democrats in Neuchâtel, the fact that this 
campaign was professionalised with regard to the voters might be either due to this 
campaign being organised in an urban canton with a competitive situation in the 
cantonal parliament by a non-right-wing party or to being organised in an urban canton 
with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament by a catch-all party. Both 
explanations are valid and we cannot point just to one of them. A possible further 
step of research, which has to be left open to future research in the framework of 
this dissertation, might be to conduct further interviews with the campaign managers 
which focus on the circumstances and conditions (both at the level of the canton and 
on the level of the party) in which the party was organised, in order to gain insight on 
whether one of the solution terms is more plausible for the specific case.  
Second, I have shown that the reported solution formulas explain the vast majority 
of cases of professionalised cantonal election campaigns, but do not account for all 
campaigns. There are two possible explanations for and conclusions that may be 
drawn from this. First, other causal conditions at the systemic and party level that I 
have not taken into account here might contribute to campaign professionalisation. 
Hence, more causal conditions should be identified based on theoretical reasoning 
and existing empirical insights may then be systematically tested. The second 
explanation is that the identified causal conditions are exhaustive and that the 
unexplained cases are influenced by conditions, which are specific to the single 
campaigns making them diverge from the explanative pattern. For example, there 
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could be contingent circumstances like a specific internal event, a windfall profit for 
the party, or an unusually independent campaign manager, etc. (see Hasse & Krücken 
2005: 200 who describe this possibility for organisations in general and who cite 
specific factors like age and history, micropolitical interests, convictions and opinions 
of the involved persons, functional requirements and routines). The methodological 
consequence of this explanation would be to identify what we could call the deviant 
cases, analyse these cases in further detail and probably conduct further interviews in 
order to identify factors and explanations specific to the single cases. In the 
framework of this dissertation, it has to be left open to future research to balance 
and to validate the two explanations and to undertake further research steps.  
 
Scope conditions 
As we remember from Chapter 5.7, the results of an analysis based on QCA “first 
and foremost hold for the cases that have actually been examined” (Schneider & 
Wagemann 2010: 401), i.e., for the election campaigns organised by the respective 
cantonal branches of the Green Party, the Social Democrats, the Christian 
Democrats, the Liberal Democrats and the Swiss People’s Party for the occasion of 
the elections to the cantonal parliaments in the cantons of Aargau and Neuchâtel in 
2009, in the canton of Bern in 2010 and in the cantons of Zürich and Appenzell 
Ausserrhoden in 2011. However, applying a generalisation to other cases is possible 
under the condition that the researcher clearly specifies scope conditions that have to 
be met by other cases if the causal relation examined is claimed to also hold for these 
cases. Based on these principles I argue, first, that the solution formula obtained 
based on the 23 campaigns included in this analysis can be transferred to other Swiss 
cantonal election campaigns. While there may be considerable differences between 
the 26 Swiss cantons with regard to their political systems, socio-economic structures 
and political legacies, they are all part of the same political, socioeconomic and 
cultural national framework of Switzerland. More importantly, the cantons that were 
included in this analysis do not differ systematically from the remaining cantons, nor 
do they represent deviant or particular cases among the Swiss cantons. I therefore 
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argue that the results can also claim validity for the campaigns of the party branches 
of the five parties that were included in this analysis in the remaining Swiss cantons. 
What is more, I argue that the results are also transferrable to campaigns organised 
by cantonal party branches of other parties, under the condition that they are 
comparable in size, voter share, and political position on the left-right political 
spectrum to the party branches that were analysed here.  
In general, the reported results were obtained under the following scope conditions. I 
analysed elections to the parliaments of the administrative entity below the national 
level in a federal state. These sub-national entities are small (ranging from 15,700 to 
1,408,200 inhabitants) but have a large range of political sovereignty. The political 
system is democratic and a multi-party system. Amateurism and volunteering are 
important elements of the political culture; political expertise is – as in other 
European countries – sought inside the party rather than outside. Paid political 
advertising on television and on the radio is forbidden; the parties do not receive 
direct funding from the state. As we have seen in Chapter 2.3.3, these conditions can 
be assumed to affect campaign professionalisation in Switzerland in general and in 
the Swiss cantons in particular. Therefore, I argue that the more international cases 
conform to these scope conditions, the more these results can claim validity for these 
cases. However, it remains an open issue for future research to definitely review and 
possibly revise this conclusion. 
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Conclusion 
Key findings and their theoretical and practical implications 
The “bigger picture” behind campaign professionalisation: Professionalisation as an 
adaptation to a changing environment for campaigning 
I have shown in the present study based on sociological neo-institutionalism that the 
professionalisation of election campaigns is the process by which political parties 
adapt their campaigns to real or perceived changes in, and expectations from, the 
most relevant environments for election campaigning in order to ensure on-going 
support and legitimacy from these environments. Parties professionalise (i.e., adapt) 
their campaigns in order to find ways to cope with real and perceived changes that 
are going on in the environments constituted by the voters, by the members, by the 
media and by other parties and to fulfil institutional expectations resulting from the 
changes.  
Campaign professionalisation is a “rational myth” and should be measured differently in different 
contexts 
Parties professionalise their campaigns by taking those measures that they consider 
the appropriate way to act, acquiring the necessary knowledge from own reasoning, 
from the standards set by professionals or from the examples of other parties, in 
order to fulfil environmental expectations. Campaign professionalisation is a 
“rational myth”, a survival strategy that parties turn to in order to cope with 
environmental changes and expectations. It is thus not a pre-existing phenomenon, 
but rather a subjective construct that is created at the interface of campaigning 
parties and their environments. As such, it depends on the perceptions and decisions 
by the parties and their leading actors, which are for their part influenced by the 
structural circumstances that the campaign takes place in and by the characteristics 
and interests of the party that organises the campaign. Campaign professionalisation 
as an object of research is therefore insufficiently captured by asking which campaign 
is “most professional” and by determining the degree of professionalisation from a 
score on a universally applicable professionalisation index. What is “professional” in 
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the sense of what is an adequate means to strive for success at the polls and for 
creating support from relevant environments cannot be determined without taking 
the context of the campaign into consideration.  
Hence, in order to understand campaign professionalisation, its origin and its 
variations, analysing campaign professionalisation has to go beyond counting 
campaign characteristics and concluding that the campaign which achieves the largest 
score is most professional. The analysis of campaign professionalisation should take 
the context in which a campaign was organised into consideration, both when 
establishing the measurement instrument and when interpreting the results. Coming 
back to the questions brought up by Tenscher, stating that “theoretically and 
empirically, it is unclear if an additive index adequately reflects degrees of 
professional campaigning” (Tenscher et al. 2012: 165) and putting up for question 
whether single components of professionalisation indices may “have to be weighted 
accordingly – or perhaps intentional withdrawing of components may sometimes be 
a better indicator for professional campaigning than adding up the elements” 
(Tenscher et al. 2012: 165), the theoretical and empirical results of the present 
dissertation clearly indicate that the answer to the latter question is yes: Researchers 
should opt for an emic measurement that is adapted to the context in which the 
campaign takes place and which leaves out indicators that are not adequate (if we 
think for example of television advertisement which is forbidden for parties in some 
countries).  
This does not mean, however, that campaign professionalisation as it is 
conceptualised in the framework of this study has no value to comparative research. 
Comparing the degree of professionalisation between campaigns from different 
regions or countries is still possible when a similar context allows for using the same 
measurement instrument.  
The degree of professionalisation differs between environments and should therefore be measured 
separately 
The results of the present study show that the degree of professionalisation is not 
homogenous throughout the environments constituted by the voters, by the 
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members, by the media and by other parties in the majority of the campaigns. In 
other words, a campaign can achieve very high degrees of professionalisation with 
regard to certain electoral environments but score very low with regard to others, or 
achieve at least a medium score on the aggregated professionalisation index but score 
rather lowly on the differentiated indices. Therefore, measuring campaign 
professionalisation exclusively with an aggregated index obscures how the amount of 
professionalisation is distributed between the different environments and thus gives 
as inaccurate impression of the campaign’s degree of campaign professionalisation. 
The empirical results suggest that campaign professionalisation should be considered 
a differentiated concept and hence be measured with differentiated indices.  
Parties cannot escape the pressure to adapt, but they can chose how and how intensively to adapt – a 
blessing or a curse for internal party democracy? 
Parties are confronted with challenges resulting from changes in their relevant 
environments, for example with the rise of new media and with a general tendency of 
declining membership rates and with a (perceived) difficulty to mobilise the 
remaining members. Based on the sociological neo-institutionalism, the present 
dissertation has argued that while parties cannot escape the pressure to adapt to 
environmental expectations (for example resulting from the above mentioned 
changes) in order to ensure on-going support for a longer time, their response to the 
challenges is not predetermined: Parties exercise a certain strategic choice in adapting 
to their institutional environments and as to how intensively to adapt, depending on 
which adaptation they deem to be most important. This is particularly relevant for 
parties confronted with a tight budget.  
The present dissertation allowed for the possibility that parties place greater emphasis 
on a specific environment due to their specific situation and their campaign interests. 
However, no general emphasis was placed on a specific environment. It was assumed 
that in principle and overall, all four environments for campaigning (the voters, the 
members, the media, other parties) can have the same importance and that there is 
not one environment that has to be weighted higher than the others for all the 
campaigns. From a theoretical-democratic perspective and adding to the recurrent 
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discussion on the role of the members in modern parties, it could be asked, however, 
whether the members should not be the most important point of reference for a 
party. What implications does it have for the internal democracy of a party when 
professionalising the campaign with regard to the media or the general public is 
considered more important than putting all efforts in maintaining the support by the 
own members? On the other hand, is it really reasonable to assume that the other 
environments have the same importance than the environment constituted by the 
voters when – in the long run – every party strives for success at the polls? These 
considerations have to be left open in the present study, but should be given more 
thought in similar research in the future.  
The strategies of adaptation differ between parties: Left-wing and centre parties are more prone to 
professionalise their campaigns 
Parties of different political couleurs and different sizes have different strategies to 
cope with challenges induced by their environments. The present study has 
corroborated existing doubts on the assumption by Gibson and Römmele (2009) that 
right-wing parties organise more professionalised campaigns than left-wing parties. 
The empirical results add to evidence that right-wing parties are not more inclined to 
organise professionalised campaigns than left-wing or centre parties – on the 
contrary, left-wing and centre parties seem to organise professionalised campaigns 
more than right-wing parties – both with regard to campaign professionalisation as 
an aggregated concept and also with regard to the environments constituted by the 
voters, members and media (in the described combinations with other variables). 
Where this difference between right-wing and non-right-wing parties stems from can 
only be speculated about at this point – it might be the case that the members of 
certain non-right-wing parties (especially the Green Party) are on average still 
significantly younger than those of right-wing parties (for the case of the Swiss 
cantonal parties cf. Knocks & Fraefel 2013: 27) and more open to mediated 
campaign communication in general or at least to online campaign communication. 
Non-right-wing parties might also feel a stronger need to ensure that their campaign 
communication represents the party in such a way as gives them a modern image, 
which might not be so important to conservative parties. 
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Each environment for campaigning provokes a different way of adaptation  
The results of the present study show that although campaigns and their organising 
parties are generally under pressure to adapt (i.e., to professionalise) their campaigns 
to the changes and to the institutional expectations resulting from them, there are 
different conditions that reinforce these pressures with regard to the different 
environments. As each environment presents different incentives and expectations 
for a campaign, each provokes a different way of adaptation. Therefore, the causal 
conditions that lead to campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept and to 
campaign professionalisation with regard to each of the different environments are 
not the same but differ from each other. Hence, not only the measurement 
instrument for campaign professionalisation should differentiate between 
environments, so should the analysis of the reasons behind it.  
Large size of the organising canton comes close to a “one size fits all”-explanation, but there is more 
than one explanation for professionalised campaigning 
From a methodological point of view all reported solution formula, that is the one 
for the aggregated concept of professionalisation and those resulting from the 
differentiated concept, are correct. Their substantive interpretation and evaluation 
depend, however, on the specific research interest. If we are interested in a “one size 
fits all” encompassing explanation for campaign professionalisation in the Swiss 
cantons, drawing on the solution formula for campaign professionalisation as an 
aggregated concept makes most sense, suggesting that the general changes in the 
relevant environments in campaigning affect those campaigns most severely that are 
organised in large cantons (by non-right-wing parties, by non-catch-all parties or in a 
non-competitive environment) and that when the condition of a large canton is 
absent, professionalised campaigns are organised by catch-all parties facing a 
competitive election in an urban environment. The large size of the organising 
canton came close to being a necessary condition, but did not fulfil the required 
threshold value for necessary conditions. It is therefore not the only factor explaining 
campaign professionalisation overall, but clearly shows that the environmental 
pressures towards adapting and professionalising the campaign are intensified when a 
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large and geographically scattered electorate has to be targeted and campaign 
communication has to make use of mediated communication to reach a maximum 
number of voters, when a large group of candidates has to be handled and the 
campaign has to be recognisable in a large number of constituencies.  
The explanation for campaign professionalisation as an aggregated concept does, 
however, not tell the whole story behind the phenomenon of campaign 
professionalisation. 
Professionalisation with regard to the voters is especially important in urban environments 
An urban environment is a key incentive at the systemic level for organising a 
campaign that is professionalised with regard to the environment constituted by the 
voters. Adapting the campaign in order to ensure the support of the general 
electorate is a survival strategy that campaigns turn to when the campaign faces a 
potentially volatile and diverse electorate that is concentrated in a rather confined 
regional area and that can thus be reached rather conveniently. On the party level, 
left-wing or centre parties, who in general tend to professionalise their campaigns 
rather than right-wing parties, also professionalise their campaigns with regard to the 
environments constituted by the voters. Assumptions that right-wing parties might 
be more electorate-oriented and left-wing or centre parties more oriented towards 
members are thus not confirmed. Catch-all parties and small or mid-sized parties 
equally professionalise their campaigns with regard to the voters, indicating that the 
general electorate is thus not exclusively important to catch-all parties.  
The environment of the members is especially important when there is a close competition and when 
targeting the general electorate is little promising 
Professionalising the campaign with regard to the environment of the members is a 
strategy that parties turn to, first, when the circumstances that the campaign takes 
place in are rather competitive (urbanised canton, close competition in the cantonal 
parliament) and the members are thus a more important asset. Second, parties 
professionalise their campaigns with regard to the members when they are not likely 
to achieve gains at the polls by targeting new voters in the general electorate. This 
was the case, taking the example of the campaigns included in the sample of the 
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present dissertation, for left-wing or centre parties in rural cantons where right-wing 
parties predominate, and in urban, large and non-competitive cantons where it is 
sufficient for the dominant party to mobilise its members and it is little promising for 
the other parties to target new voters. 
Pressures to adapt to the environment of the media are higher when campaigns target large and 
scattered or urban electorates  
The environmental pressures to professionalise the campaign with regard to the 
media are particularly strong when a large and geographically scattered electorate has 
to be reached and successful campaigning via the media is more important. Also, 
campaigns are professionalised with regard to the media in urban settings where 
expectations for a campaign to have a modern appearance might be higher, while 
traditional campaigning elements like posters or gatherings in pubs and restaurants 
might still be accepted and effective in rural environments. Also, the plurality of 
media can be expected to be higher in urban settings and to call for a more 
elaborated strategy facing diverse channels and technologies.  
Professionalising the campaign with regard to the media is a strategy that is rather 
applied by catch-all parties that have to reach a larger group of members and 
supporters and that might hope on larger chances to be invited in and reported in the 
traditional media. Unfortunately, the measurement instrument applied in the present 
study does not differentiate between the type of media (so-called traditional or new 
media) that the campaign was adapted to. From a democratic-participatory point of 
view, it would make sense to assume that mid-sized or small parties adapt their 
campaigns more strongly to online media in order to reach their members and the 
electorate because these do not pose the same barriers of entry than traditional 
media. This assumption cannot be confirmed based on the present study. Besides the 
lack of differentiation between traditional and online media this might, however, be 
due to the fact that the database this study is from 2009 to 2011 and online media in 
general were not yet very popular in the cantonal election campaigns, as the 
interviews suggested (see chapter 6.; cf. also Knocks & Fraefel 2013). The results 
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might be different if the study was replicated with newer data that differentiated 
between online and traditional media.  
Few parties have professionalised their campaigns with regard to other parties - Catch-all parties are 
not immune against competition from other parties 
The analysis of the cantonal election campaigns in the present study has shown that 
only few parties engaged in actively observing other parties and even fewer adapted 
their own campaigns as a result of their findings. It cannot be excluded that this 
result is at least partly influenced by a certain social desirability effect, as parties 
might be reluctant to reveal that they engaged in opposition monitoring. The causal 
conditions for professionalising the campaign with regard to other parties could 
hence only be determined for very few cases and should be treated with caution. 
Nevertheless, it became clear that catch-all parties are not immune against 
competition from other parties, given that other circumstances are present that 
enhance the pressure to professionalise the campaign.  
Campaign professionalisation can only be explained by the interaction of systemic and party features 
The results strikingly confirm the assumption from existing research that causal 
conditions (or, in more general terms, influence factors for campaign 
professionalisation) at the party level and at the systemic level are interlinked and 
interact with each other. Campaign professionalisation, neither as an aggregated 
concept nor with regard to different environments, can be explained by the systemic 
environment that a campaign takes place in or by the features of the party that 
organises the campaign alone. This empirical result confirms the theoretical 
conclusion that campaign professionalisation is produced at the interface of parties’ 
considerations and actions and environmental changes and expectations.  
Adapting the “selling process” of election campaigns to environmental expectations – good, enough, 
too much?  
The present dissertation has shown that campaign professionalisation is a process by 
which parties try to keep up with changes and challenges in their relevant 
environments and ensure their ongoing support. Parties do this by adapting the way 
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they try to sell their products (their manifesto, their agenda for the time after the 
election, their visions and aims), that is by adapting their campaign organisation and 
their campaign communication. Adapting the selling process, to stick with this 
metaphor for a moment, is, on the one hand, a legitimate and justifiable aim. It is a 
logical consequence of parties’ interest to getting voted for and, in the long run, to 
take on political responsibility as well as to maintain their bonds with the electorate 
and with their members. It is in the parties’ interest that the society and the voters 
perceive them as fit and adapted to stand up to modern societies’ tasks and 
challenges, as acceptable and worth to be voted for, as important. The concept of 
professionalisation as it was developed in the present dissertation thus relies on a 
purpose-rational perspective on parties and their environments. However, this 
perspective is not sufficient in order to analyse and evaluate the parties’ roles and 
actions in the society and vis-à-vis their relevant environments. It does not reveal 
how parties perform in absorbing and processing needs and ideas from the society 
and in creating and shaping societal processes and changes in contrast to merely 
responding to them. A desideratum for future research lies thus in elaborating on 
other theoretical and analytical dimensions that complement the perspective of 
professionalisation as an adaptation and optimisation with regard to relevant 
environments and that embrace political parties’ roles as initiators and organisers of 
political and social processes.  
 
Methodological conclusions: FsQCA as a method for analysing causal conditions for campaign 
professionalisation 
The assumed strengths and advantages of fsQCA as a tool for data analysis did 
indeed prove to be very useful for analysing causal conditions for campaign 
professionalisation. First, the method did allow me to test five potential causal 
conditions from two different levels (party level, systemic level) together in one 
research model. It is striking how the obtained solution formulas show how these 
factors are strongly intertwined and how they interact in producing the different 
profiles of campaign professionalisation. Second, the calibration of the set 
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membership scores of the 23 cases in the outcomes and in the causal conditions 
allowed us to capture the empirical reality of the data in hand more precisely than a 
dichotomous measurement that only differentiates between “professionalised” and 
“not professionalised” campaigns. What is more, the reader should be aware that the 
notion of “causal conditions” may indeed be accepted at face value: fsQCA allows 
for establishing causal relations between the outcome and the conditions. We can be 
absolutely sure that the obtained solution caused the outcome and the influence of 
other conditions can be excluded (this has a flipside as we will see below). 
On the other hand, there are some features that may be considered to be the 
disadvantages or inconveniences of the method. First, the method is not immune to 
the so-called too many variables, too few cases problem, or, in other words, it is stretched 
to its methodological and mathematical limits when the outcome set is small. This is, 
strictly speaking, not a disadvantage of the method but rather a fact that researchers 
should be aware of. I was confronted with this feature when analysing the causal 
conditions for campaigns that are professionalised with regard to the environment 
constituted by other parties, where the outcome set turned out to be small with only 
two campaigns achieving the maximum index score of 2 and another six campaigns 
achieving an index score of 1, representing a relation of eight cases to five conditions. 
This resulted in a solution formula with a low coverage value that did not perform 
well in the robustness test. While it is at least questionable whether a similar situation 
can be avoided in the research process in the first place, researchers should pay 
special attention when planning their endeavour.  
A second characteristic of fsQCA as a method of data analysis is that the results are 
valid first and foremost for the cases that were included in the analysis, that is in the 
case of the present dissertation for the 23 election campaigns studied here. This is 
the flipside of fsQCA’s potential to demonstrate causal relations between the 
outcome and the conditions: we gain causality but we lose a direct applicability of the 
results to other contexts and cases. There are, however, ways to assess and eventually 
claim that the results are valid also for other cases and contexts (see next paragraph).  
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To sum up, fsQCA, like any other method for data analysis, offers many advantages 
– having said that, every advantage brings possible pitfalls. Whether fsQCA is a valid 
method or not depends – again, this is the case for every method – on the specific 
research interest in hand. If the researcher is willing to cope with the inconveniences 
that were described above or if she or he decides that these are not relevant for his or 
her specific research interest, fsQCA is a very fruitful approach for studying and 
analysing campaign professionalisation, mostly for its potential of testing logically 
intertwined combinations of conditions and revealing complex causal paths, but also 
due to its potential to calibrate the set membership scores in the outcome and in the 
causal conditions. For the research interest of this dissertation, fsQCA has therefore 
proven to be a very valuable method of data analysis.  
As a subjective methodological conclusion I may add, first, from the experience of 
the present dissertation, 23 election campaigns and 37 semi-structured interviews 
with campaign managers are at the upper end of the number of cases that a research 
project similar to the present dissertation can handle when the researcher wants to 
gain in-depth knowledge on each case, as is in line with standards of good practice in 
QCA. Second, it became obvious during the research process that when a campaign 
manager reflected on the campaign and the circumstances by which it was organised 
in the interviews, these interviews were a useful source for additional in-depth 
information on the campaigns (as readers might have noticed, this was especially the 
case for the campaign managers of the Social and Liberal Democrats in Neuchâtel). 
On the contrary, the amount of additional in-depth knowledge that could be gained 
from the interviews was rather small when campaign managers did not take the time 
to reflect but merely reported campaign activities. Researchers who might want to 
opt for similar research designs and questions should thus find ways to encourage 
interviewees to provide additional in-depth information on the subject of the 
interview (e.g. by making sure that there is enough time for in-depth and context-
related questions).  
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Limitations of this study 
First, the theoretical and empirical reasoning of the present dissertation is certainly 
not sufficient to consider the question of whether campaign professionalisation has 
to be considered a differentiated concept and measured with different indices a 
closed case. Further empirical analyses from different contexts and based on other 
methods will have to show whether this result can be substantiated or has to be 
revised. 
Second, an aspect that could potentially pose a challenge for future studies that adopt 
the differentiation between the four environments is the fact that the differentiation 
between the environments constituted by the voters and by the members might be 
difficult for certain campaigns, especially for those organised by very small parties or 
with a very low budget. During the coding process of the present dissertation it 
became obvious that some of the communication activities launched by the cantonal 
party branches in this study were directed both at the voters and at the members and 
that the parties did not always differentiate between the two target groups – mostly 
for economic reasons. While the data analysis, with the help of fuzzy set Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis, revealed that there are different paths that lead to campaign 
professionalisation with regard to the members and to the voters and therefore 
underlined that the two environments are indeed differentiable, future studies might 
have to check whether there is an overlap between the communication strategies 
directed at the two environments, evaluate if this could have an influence on the 
research strategy and on the results, and find solutions for this challenge (for 
example, as has been done in the present case, by adding more variables that 
contribute to differentiating the environments).  
Furthermore, other links to, or advancements of, existing findings on the factors 
influencing campaign professionalisation are unfortunately rather difficult to make 
from the perspective of the present dissertation. This is due, first, to the fact that the 
results gained with fsQCA are rather complex, second, to the fact that the present 
study analyses causal conditions for campaign professionalisation in a differentiated 
manner and finally introduces new explanatory variables that have not yet explicitly 
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been tested in existing studies. These research features allowed the gaining of new 
perspectives and insights on the phenomenon of campaign professionalisation yet at 
the same time they act as an obstacle to linking them to existing findings. 
Finally, as in all comparative research and especially with regard to a rather “fuzzy” 
social science concept like campaign professionalisation the comparability of 
empirical results on this concept depends heavily on its operationalisation. 
Researchers are always advised to carefully check how the object of research was 
operationalised before directly comparing and linking the empirical results from 
different studies. This advice most definitely applies also to the present dissertation, 
especially because I opted – for the reasons described in Chapter 2.3.2 – for an emic 
measurement and because – as was explained in Chapter 8.2.1 – campaign 
professionalisation was defined in a somewhat encompassing and permissive manner 
in order to adequately gather all facets of campaign professionalisation in the 
cantonal election campaigns included in this study. 
 
Future research perspectives 
On the one hand, there are several research desiderata that directly emerge from 
what has to be left open in the framework of this dissertation due to the constraints 
of time and space. First, it was not possible for certain campaigns to name just one 
combination of conditions that produced its professionalisation profile due to a 
certain amount of overlap between the solution terms. Rather, several solution terms 
can be assumed to have led to campaign professionalisation in certain cases. This 
overlapping is inherent to all solution formulas except for the outcome campaign 
professionalisation with regard to the members. In the concerned campaigns, all 
solution terms are valid as explanations for the professionalisation of the campaign 
and we cannot point just to one of them. A possible further step of research might 
be to conduct further interviews with the campaign managers which focus on the 
circumstances and conditions (both on the level of the canton and on the level of the 
party) in order to gain insight on whether one of the solution terms is more plausible 
for the specific case.  
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Second, we have seen that the reported solution formula explain the vast majority of 
cases of professionalised cantonal election campaigns, but they do not account for all 
campaigns. There are two possible explanations for, and conclusions from, this. First, 
other causal conditions at the systemic and at the party level that I have not taken 
into account here might contribute to campaign professionalisation. Hence, more 
causal conditions should be identified based on theoretical reasoning and existing 
empirical insights and be systematically tested. The second explanation is that the 
identified causal conditions are exhaustive and that the unexplained cases are 
influenced by conditions, which are specific to the single campaigns so that they 
diverge from the explanative pattern. These could, for example, be contingent 
circumstances like a specific internal event, a windfall profit for the party, or an 
unusually independent campaign manager, etc. The methodological consequence 
from this explanation would be to identify what we could call deviant cases, analyse 
these cases in further detail and probably conduct further interviews in order to 
identify factors and explanations specific to the single cases.  
On the other hand, there are two more general perspectives that are of future interest 
and importance. The first concerns campaign professionalisation as a rational myth. 
The theoretical foundation suggests that parties perceive professionalised 
campaigning to be the best and most adequate way to adapt to changing 
circumstances for election campaigning. The empirical results of this dissertation 
confirm that campaign professionalisation, in its different profiles (i.e., with regard to 
the different electoral environments) is indeed a strategy that parties turn to in order 
to master the challenges that they are confronted with by their most relevant 
electoral environments. From the perspective of neo-institutionalism, the parties 
perceive it to be most rational to choose these forms of adaptations – influenced and 
inspired by other parties, professionals and the perceived expectations of the 
environments rational myth. But are these strategies really promising in order to 
adapt to changes and challenges in the relevant environments? Coming back to the 
apprehensions I already addressed in the introduction, impersonal or indirect 
communication (e.g. so-called direct mail, direct email, telephone banks), which is 
part of nearly all existing operationalisations of professionalised campaigns and 
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which is also relied on in the Swiss cantonal election campaigns studied in this 
dissertation might actually be one of the reasons for many of today’s campaigns’ 
problems rather than being their cure. As empirical results addressed by Green and 
Smith (2003: 332) indicate, “it remains to be seen whether future investigations turn 
up similar effects, but the tentative conclusion seems to be that the staple of modern 
campaigning, direct mail, is considerably less efficient than more personal campaign 
tactics”. While being referred to as means of “direct” communication (direct mail, 
direct e-mail) or narrow-casting, communication tactics which aim at addressing a 
large electorate with minimum financial resources and as quickly as possible are in 
fact indirect and impersonal means of communication, compared to so called “pre-
modern” campaign tactics like personal chats when distributing party flyers. Rather 
than being a promising strategy when dealing with a more volatile electorate and with 
the resulting pressure to address more potential voters, impersonal “direct” 
communication hence might not be the cure for a more difficult mobilisation of 
potential voters but might rather be the cause, or at least reinforce, the alienation of 
the electorate from the parties. A slightly different concern is expressed by Maarek, 
who argues that “direct marketing by mail, telephone and other ways of reaching the 
voter at home often leads to the paradoxical result that, having given a credit card 
number by phone to donate for a politician’s campaign or for a party, the individual 
will feel that he has done enough” (Maarek 2004: 220). He assumes that this is a 
significant cause of the decrease in voting turnouts, as “over-informed through the 
excessive efficiency of professionalized political communication, the citizen will not 
go to the polling station on election day” (Maarek 2004: 220). To sum up, from both 
an organisational perspective focusing on the parties and their need to mobilise 
voters as well as from a democratic or participative perspective focusing on the 
citizens, it is crucial that the different elements of professionalised campaigning are 
not uncritically welcomed as the long desired cure for mobilisation problems, but 
have to be critically examined with regard to their effectiveness for political 
mobilisation and voting turnout. 
Finally, an important challenge both from the perspective of the parties as well as 
from the perspective of campaign and professionalisation research is the fact that 
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campaign strategies and choices of communication channels for political 
communication have developing degrees of institutionalisation. Zucker’s cornerstone 
article made it clear that an institutional status is not simply present or absent, but 
that there are different degrees of institutionalisation and that the efficacy of 
institutionalised rules can differ throughout time (cf. Zucker 1977). Applying her 
results to the use of communication channels in election campaigns, this means that 
channels or means of communication which are taken for granted now may become 
dispensable and insignificant over time, others may have the status of a “nice to 
have” now and may become a “must have” in a few years. This dynamic applies, first 
and most obviously, to the means of online campaigning. While Facebook was still 
considered a trend that may have passed quickly and that was thought of as not 
worth investing in by some of the campaign managers that were interviewed for this 
dissertation, the degree of institutionalisation of Facebook as a campaign tool may 
have risen by now, bringing a perceived pressure to integrate this “must have” into 
the cantonal election campaigns. Other interviewees referred to blogs, which were 
perceived to have been a “must have” in the previous election but which were – in 
the perception of the campaign managers – becoming more of a “nice to have” in 
the campaign studied in this dissertation as the main trend of having a blog was 
already over. Second, changing degrees of institutionalisation affect also more 
traditional channels or means of campaign communication. As several interviewees 
stated, the efficiency of campaign posters for mobilising voters is more and more 
questioned – yet, they are institutionalised to a degree that no campaign manager 
would dare to organise a campaign without posters. However, his might change in a 
few years and the institutional status of campaign posters may change from 
indispensable to dispensable. Also, if trends of low turnout rates and high degrees of 
volatility in voters’ behaviour continue and scientific evidence for the low efficiency 
of campaign communication via direct mail and e-mail is substantiated, campaign 
professionals may start to recommend, or innovative parties may start to use, more 
personal means of campaign communication. To sum up, the professionalisation of 
election campaigns, either if researchers are interested in following its development 
over time or determine its degree at a single point in time, as has been done in the 
present dissertation, is a dynamic and evolving phenomenon. As the environmental 
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challenges and expectations for campaigns change and as the degree of 
institutionalisation of the means of campaign communication changes, parties find 
ways to adapt their campaigns to these developments, depending on their systemic 
environment and their profile. Both, for the sake of political communication research 
and for democratic and participatory interests, the challenge for professionalisation 
research will thus be to comprehend, track and measure a moving target: the dynamic 
and ever evolving phenomenon of campaign professionalisation.  
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A) Meta-analysis of existing studies 
Gibson, R. K., & Römmele, A. (2009). Measuring the Professionalization of Political 
Campaigning. Party Politics, 15(3), 265–293. 
 
Voters 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Use of telemarketing for contracting own members and outside 
target groups 
12 8 
Use of direct mail to own members and outside target groups 12 9 
E-mail sign up or subscription list for regular news updates 12 10 
Continuous campaigning 12 6 
Use of computerized databases 12 9 
Use of opinion polling 12 11 
Use of outside public relations/media consultants 12 7 
Total score 84 60 
Percentage  71% 
 
Members 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Use of telemarketing for contracting own members and outside 
target groups 
12 8 
Presence of an internal Internet communication system 12 9 
Use of direct mail to own members and outside target groups 12 9 
E-mail sign up or subscription list for regular news updates 12 10 
Use of outside public relations/media consultants 12 7 
Total score 60 43 
Percentage  72% 
 
Media 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Use of outside public relations/media consultants 12 7 
Percentage  58% 
 
Other parties 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Conducting opposition research 12 10 
Use of outside public relations/media consultants 12 7 
Total score 24 17 
Percentage  71% 
 
  
236 
 
Strömbäck, J. (2009). Selective Professionalisation of Political Campaigning: A Test 
of the Party-Centred Theory of Professionalised Campaigning in the Context of the 
2006 Swedish Election. Political Studies, 57, 95–116. 
 
Voters 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Use of telemarketing 21 3 
Use of direct mail 21 18 
E-mail sign-up or electronic newsletters 21 11 
Continuous campaigning 21 11 
Use of computerised databases 21 6 
Use of opinion polling 21 11 
Use of external public relations/media consultants 21 5 
Use of focus groups 21 7 
Research of one’s own party or campaign 21 0 
Total score 189 72 
Percentage  38% 
 
Members 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
E-mail sign-up or electronic newsletters 21 11 
Use of telemarketing 21 3 
Use of direct mail 21 18 
Use of external public relations/media consultants 21 5 
Research of one’s own party or campaign 21 0 
Total score 105 37 
Percentage  35% 
 
Media 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Use of external public relations/media consultants 21 5 
Research of one’s own party or campaign 21 0 
Total score 42 5 
Percentage  12% 
 
Other parties 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Opposition research 21 7 
Use of external public relations/media consultants 21 5 
Total score 42 12 
Percentage  29% 
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Tenscher, J. (2007). Professionalisierung nach Wahl: Ein Vergleich der 
Parteikampagnen im Rahmen der jüngsten Bundestags- und Europawahlkämpfe in 
Deutschland. In F. Brettschneider, O. Niedermayer, & B. Weβels (Eds.), Die 
Bundestagswahl 2005. Analysen des Wahlkampfs und der Wahlergebnisse (pp. 65–
95). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
 
Voters 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Campaign duration 18 0 
Degree of centralisation of campaign organization 12 12 
Degree of externalization 18 12 
Nature and degree of feedback 12 9 
Degree of targeting 18 10 
Degree of narrowcasting activities 24 19 
Total score 102 62 
Percentage  61% 
 
Members 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Differentiation of internal communication structures 18 15 
Degree of centralisation of campaign organization 12 12 
Degree of externalization 18 12 
Nature and degree of feedback 12 9 
Degree of targeting 18 10 
Degree of narrowcasting activities 24 19 
Total score 102 77 
Percentage  75% 
 
Media 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Relevance of paid media 30 24 
Relevance of free media 36 31 
Relevance of talk shows 12 9 
Degree of event and news management 12 9 
Degree of personalization 12 8 
Degree of privatization 12 1 
Negative campaigning 12 4 
Degree of externalization 18 12 
Total score 144 98 
Percentage  68% 
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Other parties 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Degree of opposition research 6 4 
Degree of externalization 18 12 
Total score 24 16 
Percentage  67% 
 
 
Tenscher, J. (2011). Defizitär - und trotzdem professionell? Die Parteikampagnen im 
Vergleich. In J. Tenscher (Ed.), Superwahljahr 2009. Vergleichende Analysen aus 
Anlass der Wahlen zum Deutschen Bundestag und zum Europäischen Parlament 
(pp. 65–95). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
 
Voters 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Campaign duration 18 8 
Degree of centralisation of campaign organization 12 9 
Degree of externalization 18 12 
Nature and degree of feedback 12 12 
Degree of targeting 18 13 
Degree of narrowcasting activities 36 20 
Total score 114 74 
Percentage  65% 
 
Members 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Differentiation of internal communication structures 30 25 
Degree of centralisation of campaign organization 12 12 
Degree of externalization 18 12 
Nature and degree of feedback 12 9 
Degree of targeting 18 10 
Degree of narrowcasting activities 36 19 
Total score 126 87 
Percentage  69% 
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Media 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Relevance of paid media 30 18 
Relevance of free media 36 30 
Relevance of talk shows 12 8 
Degree of event and news management 12 11 
Degree of personalization 12 6 
Degree of privatization 12 1 
Negative campaigning 12 1 
Degree of externalization 18 12 
Total score 144 87 
Percentage  60% 
 
Other parties 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Degree of opposition research 6 6 
Degree of externalization 18 12 
Total score 24 18 
Percentage  75% 
 
 
Lisi, M. (2011). The professionalisation of Portuguese campaigns: parties and 
candidates in the 2009 general elections. Journal of Social and Political Sciences, (2), 
105–122. 
 
Voters 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Use of telemarketing 15 4 
Use of direct mail 15 7 
E-mail sign-up or electronic newsletters 15 13 
Continuous campaigning 15 11 
Use of computerised databases 15 6 
Use of opinion polling 15 1 
Use of external public relations/media consultants 15 5 
Use of focus groups 15 3 
Total score 120 50 
Percentage  42% 
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Members 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
E-mail sign-up or electronic newsletters 15 13 
Use of telemarketing 15 4 
Use of direct mail 15 7 
Use of external public relations/media consultants 15 5 
Total score 60 29 
Percentage  48% 
 
Media 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Use of external public relations/media consultants 15 5 
Percentage  33% 
 
Other parties 
Indicator Max. score Score achieved 
Negative campaign (= opposition research, cf. 
Chapter 2.2.4) 
15 0 
Use of external public relations/media consultants 15 5 
Total score 30 5 
Percentage  17% 
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B) Questions from the Semi-Structured Interviews23 
Role of the interviewee in the election campaign 
• Which role did you have and which tasks were you responsible for in the 
latest election campaign? 
• Why did you have this role and these responsibilities? 
 
The party during the election campaign: structures, processes and persons 
• Please describe the internal organisation of and the distribution of 
competences in your party during the latest election campaign. Who 
elaborated central campaign elements like the slogan, the corporate design, 
etc.? 
• Did you employ professionals (e.g. PR agents, website specialists, etc.) in 
your campaign? If yes, which tasks did they have? 
• (How) did you prepare candidates and volunteers for their tasks during the 
campaign? 
 
Campaign communication  
• Which channels, which means of communication did you use in order to 
communicate with your electorate (including “traditional” means of 
communication, online communication, so-called direct communication or 
narrow-casting (if not understood: e.g. direct mail, direct e-mail and text 
messages) 
• Which channels, which means of communication did you use in order to 
communicate with your members? 
• Why (based on which information, based on which reasoning) did you 
choose these channels or means of communication? 
• Which channels or means of communication did prove to be effective from 
your point of view? Which did not? 
• Which are the main differences between campaign communication and your 
internal and external communication outside election campaigns? 
                                                 
23 Selection of questions that are relevant for the aspects discussed in the present dissertation. 
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C) Raw data 
Party 
 
Right-
wing24 
Size25 Urbanisation26 Competition27 Strength28 Professionalisation 
index 
Media 
index 
Members 
index 
Voters 
index 
Other 
parties 
index 
Social Democrats, Bern 2,455 979800 40 3,13 26 10 2 9 9 0 
Social Democrats, Zürich 1,835 1373100 66 11,10 20 11 2 7 6 2 
Social Democrats, Neuchâtel 2,04 172100 53 0,87 36 12 4 7 7 4 
Liberal Democrats, Bern 6,31 979800 40 3,13 16 8 4 6 5 0 
Green Party, Zürich 1,775 1373100 66 11,10 11 9 4 6 5 2 
Swiss People’s Party, Zürich 7,4 1373100 66 11,10 31 10 4 6 7 2 
Liberal Democrats, Zürich 6,87 1373100 66 11,10 16 8 2 5 4 2 
Christian Democrats, Neuchâtel 4,64 172100 53 0,87 0 5 0 5 5 0 
Social Democrats, Aargau 2,15 611500 19 11,43 21 7 2 5 3 0 
Liberal Democrats,  Neuchâtel 6,305 172100 53 0,87 35 9 4 5 5 4 
Christian Democrats, Zürich 4,955 1373100 66 11,10 7 7 0 4 4 0 
Green Party, Bern 2,06 979800 40 3,13 12 7 0 4 5 0 
Green Party, Aargau 1,88 611500 19 11,43 5 6 2 4 4 0 
Christian Democrats, Aargau 5,28 611500 19 11,43 19 7 0 4 4 2 
Swiss People’s Party, Bern 7,055 979800 40 3,13 29 5 2 4 3 0 
Swiss People’s Party, Neuchâtel 7,36 172100 53 0,87 15 5 2 3 2 0 
Liberal Democrats,  Aargau 6,795 611500 19 11,43 17 6 2 3 3 0 
Christian Democrats, Appenzell A. 5 53000 29 28,00 5 4 2 3 3 0 
                                                 
24 Arithmetic mean between the modified values from Ladner et al. (2008) and Geser et al. (2003) 
25 Number of inhabitants 
26 Percentage of the population living in cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants 
27 Difference in the percentage of seats claimed by the strongest and the second strongest party in the cantonal parliament 
28 Percentage of seats in the cantonal parliament held by the cantonal party branch in the legislative period before the elections studied in this dissertation 
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Green Party, Neuchâtel 1,69 172100 53 0,87 9 7 2 3 4 2 
Christian Democrats, Bern 5,26 979800 40 3,13 1 4 2 2 3 0 
Social Democrats, Appenzell A. 2,5 53000 29 28,00 6 3 0 2 1 0 
Liberal Democrats, Appenzell A. 6,42 53000 29 28,00 40 2 0 1 1 0 
Green Party, Appenzell A. 1,85 53000 29 28,00 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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D) Truth tables 
1. Professionalised campaigning as an aggregated concept 
1.1 Truth table – raw version 
 
fssize129 fsurban130 fscomp131 fsright132 fscatch133 number fsprof1 raw consist. PRI consist. SYM consist 
0 0 0 0 0 2  0.390879 0 0.5 
0 1 1 0 0 2  0.697917 0.402062 0.585153 
1 0 0 1 0 2  0.857143 0.571429 0.5625 
1 1 0 0 0 2  0.955102 0.930818 0.73125 
1 1 1 1 0 2  0.758794 0.533981 0.611336 
0 0 0 1 1 1  0.117647 0 0.5 
0 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.832117 
0 1 1 1 0 1  0.525974 0 0.5 
0 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 0.830508 
1 0 0 0 0 1  0.863388 0.456522 0.535593 
1 0 0 0 1 1  0.955224 0.884615 0.609524 
1 1 0 1 0 1  0.927374 0.867347 0.672065 
1 1 0 1 1 1  0.970874 0.965909 0.869565 
1 1 1 0 0 1  0.846512 0.641304 0.596721 
                                                 
29 Short variable name used for the calibrated set membership in the condition “being organised in a large canton”. 
30 Short variable name used for the calibrated set membership in the condition “being organised in an urbanised canton”. 
31 Short variable name used for the calibrated set membership in the condition “being organised in a canton with a competitive situation in the cantonal parliament”. 
32 Short variable name used for the calibrated set membership in the condition “being organised by a right-wing party”. 
33 Short variable name used for the calibrated set membership in the condition “being organised by a catch-all party”. 
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1 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.780142 
1 1 1 1 1 1  0.515789 0 0.5 
0 0 0 0 1 0  0.8125 0 0.5 
0 0 0 1 0 0  0.680328 0 0.5 
0 0 1 0 0 0  1 1 0.512195 
0 0 1 0 1 0  1 1 0.529412 
0 0 1 1 0 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
0 0 1 1 1 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
0 1 0 0 0 0  0.434783 0 0.5 
0 1 0 0 1 0  0.571428 0 0.5 
0 1 0 1 0 0  0.72093 0 0.5 
0 1 0 1 1 0  0.3 0 0.5 
1 0 0 1 1 0  0.769231 0 0.5 
1 0 1 0 0 0  0.875 0.571428 0.552632 
1 0 1 0 1 0  1 1 0.693548 
1 0 1 1 0 0  0.833333 0.375 0.531915 
1 0 1 1 1 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
1 1 0 0 1 0  0.955882 0.941176 0.792683 
 
1.2 Truth table – edited version 
 
fssize1 fsurban1 fscomp1 fsright1 fscatch1 number fsprof1 raw consist. PRI consist. SYM consist 
1 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.780142 
0 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 0.830508 
0 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.832117 
1 1 0 1 1 1  0.970874 0.965909 0.869565 
1 0 0 0 1 1  0.955224 0.884615 0.609524 
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1 1 0 0 0 2  0.955102 0.930818 0.73125 
1 1 0 1 0 1  0.927374 0.867347 0.672065 
1 0 0 0 0 1  0.863388 0.456522 0.535593 
1 0 0 1 0 2  0.857143 0.571429 0.5625 
1 1 1 0 0 1  0.846512 0.641304 0.596721 
1 1 1 1 0 2  0.758794 0.533981 0.611336 
0 1 1 0 0 2  0.697917 0.402062 0.585153 
0 1 1 1 0 1  0.525974 0 0.5 
1 1 1 1 1 1  0.515789 0 0.5 
0 0 0 0 0 2  0.390879 0 0.5 
0 0 0 1 1 1  0.117647 0 0.5 
 
2. Professionalisation with regard to the voters 
2.1 Truth table – raw version 
 
fssize1 fsurban1 fscomp1 fsright1 fscatch1 number fsvoters1 raw consist PRI consist SYM consist 
0 0 0 0 0 2  0.355049 0 0.5 
0 1 1 0 0 2  0.791667 0.487179 0.571429 
1 0 0 1 0 2  0.557823 0 0.5 
1 1 0 0 0 2  0.857143 0.705882 0.625 
1 1 1 1 0 2  0.763819 0.5 0.59144 
0 0 0 1 1 1  0.105882 0 0.5 
0 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.808511 
0 1 1 1 0 1  0.448052 0.114583 0.543307 
0 1 1 1 1 1  0.846939 0.758065 0.697479 
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1 0 0 0 0 1  0.688525 0 0.5 
1 0 0 0 1 1  0.38806 0 0.5 
1 1 0 1 0 1  0.73743 0.096154 0.509653 
1 1 0 1 1 1  0.961165 0.955056 0.876106 
1 1 1 0 0 1  0.897674 0.755556 0.606918 
1 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.769231 
1 1 1 1 1 1  0.421053 0.017857 0.506329 
0 0 0 0 1 0  0.541667 0 0.5 
0 0 0 1 0 0  0.614754 0 0.5 
0 0 1 0 0 0  1 1 0.512195 
0 0 1 0 1 0  1 1 0.529412 
0 0 1 1 0 0  1 1 0.508197 
0 0 1 1 1 0  1 1 0.52 
0 1 0 0 0 0  0.445652 0 0.5 
0 1 0 0 1 0  0.523809 0 0.5 
0 1 0 1 0 0  0.813954 0 0.5 
0 1 0 1 1 0  0.266667 0 0.5 
1 0 0 1 1 0  0.692308 0 0.5 
1 0 1 0 0 0  0.925 0.709677 0.555 
1 0 1 0 1 0  1 1 0.716667 
1 0 1 1 0 0  0.9 0.100001 0.503106 
1 0 1 1 1 0  0.756757 0.1 0.509091 
1 1 0 0 1 0  0.941176 0.904762 0.711111 
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2.2 Truth table – edited version 
 
fssize1 fsurban1 fscomp1 fsright1 fscatch1 number fsvoters1 raw consist. PRI consist. SYM consist 
1 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.769231 
0 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.808511 
1 1 0 1 1 1  0.961165 0.955056 0.876106 
1 1 1 0 0 1  0.897674 0.755556 0.606918 
1 1 0 0 0 2  0.857143 0.705882 0.625 
0 1 1 1 1 1  0.846939 0.758065 0.697479 
0 1 1 0 0 2  0.791667 0.487179 0.571429 
1 1 1 1 0 2  0.763819 0.5 0.59144 
1 1 0 1 0 1  0.73743 0.096154 0.509653 
1 0 0 0 0 1  0.688525 0 0.5 
1 0 0 1 0 2  0.557823 0 0.5 
0 1 1 1 0 1  0.448052 0.114583 0.543307 
1 1 1 1 1 1  0.421053 0.017857 0.506329 
1 0 0 0 1 1  0.38806 0 0.5 
0 0 0 0 0 2  0.355049 0 0.5 
0 0 0 1 1 1  0.105882 0 0.5 
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3. Professionalisation with regard to the members 
3.1 Truth table – raw version 
 
fssize1 fsurban1 fscomp1 fsright1 fscatch1 number fsmembers1 raw consist. PRI consist. SYM consist 
0 0 0 0 0 2  0.407166 0.066667 0.527426 
0 1 1 0 0 2  0.625 0.414634 0.634921 
1 0 0 1 0 2  0.564626 0.015385 0.50303 
1 1 0 0 0 2  0.963265 0.939597 0.710843 
1 1 1 1 0 2  0.723618 0.56 0.66055 
0 0 0 1 1 1  0.105882 0.012987 0.529412 
0 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.838235 
0 1 1 1 0 1  0.532467 0.225806 0.573427 
0 1 1 1 1 1  0.938775 0.916667 0.779661 
1 0 0 0 0 1  0.857924 0.518519 0.548951 
1 0 0 0 1 1  0.940298 0.904762 0.715909 
1 1 0 1 0 1  0.921788 0.833333 0.634615 
1 1 0 1 1 1  0.961165 0.955556 0.883929 
1 1 1 0 0 1  0.730233 0.382979 0.564748 
1 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.814815 
1 1 1 1 1 1  0.757895 0.08 0.507042 
0 0 0 0 1 0  0.791667 0.565217 0.603175 
0 0 0 1 0 0  0.622951 0.021277 0.503311 
0 0 1 0 0 0  1 1 0.531646 
0 0 1 0 1 0  1 1 0.580645 
0 0 1 1 0 0  1 1 0.516667 
0 0 1 1 1 0  1 1 0.541667 
250 
 
0 1 0 0 0 0  0.48913 0.020833 0.505618 
0 1 0 0 1 0  0.523809 0.090909 0.52381 
0 1 0 1 0 0  0.837209 0.125 0.507042 
0 1 0 1 1 0  0.266667 0.043478 0.533333 
1 0 0 1 1 0  0.692308 0.2 0.529412 
1 0 1 0 0 0  0.816667 0.592592 0.597561 
1 0 1 0 1 0  1 1 0.754386 
1 0 1 1 0 0  0.755556 0.521739 0.607143 
1 0 1 1 1 0  1 1 0.513889 
1 1 0 0 1 0  0.941176 0.925926 0.820513 
 
3.2. Truth table  – edited version 
 
fssize1 fsurban1 fscomp1 fsright1 fscatch1 number fsmembers1 raw consist. PRI consist. SYM consist 
0 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.838235 
1 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.814815 
1 1 0 0 0 2  0.963265 0.939597 0.710843 
1 1 0 1 1 1  0.961165 0.955556 0.883929 
1 0 0 0 1 1  0.940298 0.904762 0.715909 
0 1 1 1 1 1  0.938775 0.916667 0.779661 
1 1 0 1 0 1  0.921788 0.833333 0.634615 
1 0 0 0 0 1  0.857924 0.518519 0.548951 
1 1 1 1 1 1  0.757895 0.08 0.507042 
1 1 1 0 0 1  0.730233 0.382979 0.564748 
1 1 1 1 0 2  0.723618 0.56 0.66055 
0 1 1 0 0 2  0.625 0.414634 0.634921 
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1 0 0 1 0 2  0.564626 0.015385 0.50303 
0 1 1 1 0 1  0.532467 0.225806 0.573427 
0 0 0 0 0 2  0.407166 0.066667 0.527426 
0 0 0 1 1 1  0.105882 0.012987 0.529412 
 
4. Professionalisation with regard to the media 
4.1. Truth table – raw version 
 
fssize1 fsurban1 fscomp1 fsright1 fscatch1 number fsmedia1 raw consist. PRI consist. SYM consist 
0 0 0 0 0 2  0.449511 0.146465 0.558704 
0 1 1 0 0 2  0.609375 0.380165 0.62234 
1 0 0 1 0 2  0.62585 0.438776 0.652482 
1 1 0 0 0 2  0.804082 0.701863 0.701068 
1 1 1 1 0 2  0.974874 0.95283 0.675958 
0 0 0 1 1 1  0.152941 0 0.5 
0 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.838235 
0 1 1 1 0 1  0.681818 0.484211 0.640244 
0 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 0.867257 
1 0 0 0 0 1  0.808743 0.635417 0.629787 
1 0 0 0 1 1  1 1 0.632075 
1 1 0 1 0 1  0.642458 0.443478 0.642458 
1 1 0 1 1 1  1 1 0.85124 
1 1 1 0 0 1  0.660465 0.215054 0.537879 
1 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.670732 
1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 0.683453 
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0 0 0 0 1 0  0.875 0.333334 0.518519 
0 0 0 1 0 0  0.795082 0.509804 0.577381 
0 0 1 0 0 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
0 0 1 0 1 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
0 0 1 1 0 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
0 0 1 1 1 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
0 1 0 0 0 0  0.608696 0 0.5 
0 1 0 0 1 0  0.714286 0 0.5 
0 1 0 1 0 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
0 1 0 1 1 0  0.4 0 0.5 
1 0 0 1 1 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
1 0 1 0 0 0  0.816667 0.241379 0.518519 
1 0 1 0 1 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
1 0 1 1 0 0  1 1 0.56962 
1 0 1 1 1 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
1 1 0 0 1 0  1 1 0.60177 
 
4.2. Truth table – edited version 
 
fssize1 fsurban1 fscomp1 fsright1 fscatch1 number fsmedia1 raw consist. PRI consist. SYM consist 
1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 0.683453 
1 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.670732 
1 1 0 1 1 1  1 1 0.85124 
0 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 0.867257 
0 1 1 0 1 1  1 1 0.838235 
1 0 0 0 1 1  1 1 0.632075 
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1 1 1 1 0 2  0.974874 0.95283 0.675958 
1 0 0 0 0 1  0.808743 0.635417 0.629787 
1 1 0 0 0 2  0.804082 0.701863 0.701068 
0 1 1 1 0 1  0.681818 0.484211 0.640244 
1 1 1 0 0 1  0.660465 0.215054 0.537879 
1 1 0 1 0 1  0.642458 0.443478 0.642458 
1 0 0 1 0 2  0.62585 0.438776 0.652482 
0 1 1 0 0 2  0.609375 0.380165 0.62234 
0 0 0 0 0 2  0.449511 0.146465 0.558704 
0 0 0 1 1 1  0.152941 0 0.5 
 
5. Professionalisation with regard to other parties 
5.1. Truth table – raw version 
fssize1 fsurban1 fscomp1 fsright1 fscatch1 number fsotherp1 raw consist. PRI consist. SYM consist 
0 0 0 0 0 2  0.299674 0.027149 0.516854 
0 1 1 0 0 2  0.255208 0 0.5 
1 0 0 1 0 2  0.557823 0.336735 0.625954 
1 1 0 0 0 2  0.530612 0.285714 0.607477 
1 1 1 1 0 2  0.673367 0.414414 0.603604 
0 0 0 1 1 1  0.152941 0 0.5 
0 1 1 0 1 1  0.938596 0.923913 0.829457 
0 1 1 1 0 1  0.24026 0 0.5 
0 1 1 1 1 1  0.153061 0 0.5 
1 0 0 0 0 1  0.775956 0.57732 0.622807 
1 0 0 0 1 1  0.253731 0 0.5 
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1 1 0 1 0 1  0.614525 0.4 0.632184 
1 1 0 1 1 1  0.174757 0 0.5 
1 1 1 0 0 1  0.706977 0.519084 0.644068 
1 1 1 0 1 1  0.336364 0.064103 0.536232 
1 1 1 1 1 1  0.947368 0.901961 0.671642 
0 0 0 0 1 0  0.354167 0 0.5 
0 0 0 1 0 0  0.42623 0.041096 0.514852 
0 0 1 0 0 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
0 0 1 0 1 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
0 0 1 1 0 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
0 0 1 1 1 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
0 1 0 0 0 0  0.413043 0 0.5 
0 1 0 0 1 0  0.714286 0 0.5 
0 1 0 1 0 0  0.581395 0 0.5 
0 1 0 1 1 0  0.4 0 0.5 
1 0 0 1 1 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
1 0 1 0 0 0  0.666667 0.354839 0.57971 
1 0 1 0 1 0  0.488372 0 0.5 
1 0 1 1 0 0  0.755556 0 0.5 
1 0 1 1 1 0  1 -1.#IND00 0.5 
1 1 0 0 1 0  0.338235 0 0.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
255 
 
5.2. Truth table – edited version 
fssize1 fsurban1 fscomp1 fsright1 fscatch1 number fsotherp1 raw consist. PRI consist. SYM consist 
1 1 1 1 1 1  0.947368 0.901961 0.671642 
0 1 1 0 1 1  0.938596 0.923913 0.829457 
1 0 0 0 0 1  0.775956 0.57732 0.622807 
1 1 1 0 0 1  0.706977 0.519084 0.644068 
1 1 1 1 0 2  0.673367 0.414414 0.603604 
1 1 0 1 0 1  0.614525 0.4 0.632184 
1 0 0 1 0 2  0.557823 0.336735 0.625954 
1 1 0 0 0 2  0.530612 0.285714 0.607477 
1 1 1 0 1 1  0.336364 0.064103 0.536232 
0 0 0 0 0 2  0.299674 0.027149 0.516854 
0 1 1 0 0 2  0.255208 0 0.5 
1 0 0 0 1 1  0.253731 0 0.5 
0 1 1 1 0 1  0.24026 0 0.5 
1 1 0 1 1 1  0.174757 0 0.5 
0 1 1 1 1 1  0.153061 0 0.5 
0 0 0 1 1 1  0.152941 0 0.5 
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E) Solution formulas 
1. Professionalised campaigning as an aggregated concept 
Complex solution34:  
large canton*~competitive canton*~catch-all party + 
large canton*urban canton*~catch-all party + 
large canton*~urban canton*~competitive canton*~right-wing party + 
large canton*urban canton*~competitive canton*right-wing party +  
~large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*catch-all party + 
large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*~right-wing party + 
urban canton*competitive canton*~right-wing party* + 
(solution coverage: 0.848792, solution consistency: 0.858833) 
 
Parsimonious solution: 
large canton*~catch-all party + 
large canton*~right-wing party + 
large canton*~competitive canton + 
urban canton*~competitive canton + 
~right-wing party*catch-all party + 
~large canton*urban canton*catch-all party +  
~large canton*competitive canton*catch-all party + 
(solution coverage: 0.915822, solution consistency: 0.791246) 
 
Intermediate solution: 
~competitive canton*large canton + 
~right-wing party*large canton + 
~catch-all party*large canton + 
catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton 
                                                 
34 For reasons of clarity, the conditions are presented in a shortened wording: the condition “being organised 
in a large canton” is shortened to “large canton”. The tilde sign (~) translates to “not”: “~catch-all party” 
means “not being organised by a catch-all party”. To recall, “*” is the Boolean expression for “and”, “+” is 
the Boolean expression for “or”. “*” links single conditions together to a combination of conditions, “+” 
separates the solution terms that all equally produce the outcome.  
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(solution coverage: 0.905690, solution consistency: 0.825871) 
 
2. Professionalisation with regard to the voters 
Complex solution:  
urbancanton1*competitive canton*~right-wing party + 
large canton*urban canton*~right-wing party*~catch-all party + 
large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*~catch-all party + 
~large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*catch-all party+ 
large canton*urban canton*~competitive canton*right-wing party*catch-all party  
(solution coverage: 0.761249, solution consistency: 0.832329) 
 
Parsimonious solution: 
urban canton*~right-wing party + 
large canton*competitive canton*~catch-all party + 
urban canton*~competitive canton*catch-all party + 
~large canton*urban canton*catch-all party + 
~large canton*competitive canton*catch-all + 
large canton*~competitive canton*right-wing party*catch-all 
(solution coverage: 0.808999, solution consistency: 0.740336) 
 
Intermediate solution: 
~right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton + 
~right-wing party*urban canton*large canton + 
catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton + 
catch-all party*~competitive canton*urban canton*large canton + 
~catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton*large canton + 
(solution coverage: 0.796143, solution consistency: 0.829665) 
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3. Professionalisation with regard to the members 
Complex solution: 
urban canton*competitive canton*catch-all party + 
large canton*~urban canton*~competitive canton*~right-wing party + 
large canton*urban canton*~competitive canton*~catch-all party + 
large canton*urban canton*~competitive canton*right-wing party + 
(solution coverage: 0.685691, solution consistency: 0.870408)  
  
Parsimonious solution: 
urban canton*~competitive canton + 
urban canton*catch-all party + 
competitive canton*catch-all party + 
large canton*~competitive canton*~right-wing party + 
large canton*~urban canton*~right-wing party 
(solution coverage: 0.776527, solution consistency: 0.813817) 
  
Intermediate solution: 
~right-wing party*~urban canton*large canton + 
~competitive canton*urban canton*large canton + 
catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton 
(solution coverage: 0.762862, solution consistency: 0.864299) 
 
4. Professionalisation with regard to the media 
Complex solution: 
urban canton*competitive canton*catch-all party + 
large canton*~competitive canton*~right-wing party*~catch-all party + 
large canton*~urban canton*~competitive canton*~right-wing party + 
large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*right-wing party + 
large canton*urban canton*right-wing party*catch-all party 
(solution coverage: 0.687738, solution consistency: 0.910282) 
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Parsimonious solution: 
urban canton*catch-all party + 
large canton*~competitive canton*~right-wing party + 
large canton*competitive canton*right-wing party 
(solution coverage: 0.716679, solution consistency: 0.860146) 
 
Intermediate solution: 
~right-wing party*~not competitive canton*large canton + 
catch-all party*competitive canton*urban canton + 
catch-all party*urban canton*large canton + 
right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton*large canton 
(solution coverage: 0.705255, solution consistency: 0.892100) 
 
5. Professionalisation with regard to other parties 
Complex solution: 
~large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*~right-wing party*catch-all 
party+ 
large canton*urban canton*competitive canton*right-wing party*catch-all party 
(solution coverage: 0.258890, solution consistency: 0.962963) 
 
Parsimonious solution: 
~large canton*~right-wing party*catch-all party+ 
large canton*competitive canton*right-wing party* catch-all party 
(solution coverage: 0.271693, solution consistency: 0.789256) 
 
Intermediate solution: 
catch-all party*~right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton*~large canton 
+ 
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catch-all party*right-wing party*competitive canton*urban canton*large canton 
(solution coverage: 0. 258890, solution consistency: 0.962963) 
